Newell v. New Hampshire Div. of Welfare, 88-024
| Decision Date | 04 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-024,88-024 |
| Citation | 550 A.2d 109,131 N.H. 88 |
| Parties | Valerie NEWELL v. NEW HAMPSHIRE DIVISION OF WELFARE and Roland Couture. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
This is an action for personal injuries allegedly resulting from the plaintiff's fall on stairs in a building owned by the defendant Couture and leased in part to the defendant division of welfare. The division moved for dismissal on the related grounds of sovereign immunity and the exclusive jurisdiction of the board of claims under RSA chapter 541-B (Supp.1983), the version of the statute in effect at the time this case arose. In its orders denying the division's motion and subsequent request for reconsideration, the Superior Court (McHugh, J.) ruled, inter alia, that it had jurisdiction to hear the case on a contract theory of recovery, that the defense of sovereign immunity was not available to the division, and that RSA chapter 541-B (Supp.1983) was unconstitutional. The division then brought this interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 8. We reverse.
The first question raised in the transfer asks whether RSA chapter 541-B (Supp.1983), empowering the board of claims to hear personal injury claims against the State, is unconstitutional, either in failing to provide for jury trial of claims over $500, see N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 20, or in failing to provide for the appointment of the board's members by the governor and council, see N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 46. We answer no to each part of the question.
Article 20 excepts from its guarantee of jury trial "cases in which it has been heretofore otherwise used and practiced," language that refers to common law practice prior to 1784. Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 338, 339, 53 A.2d 431, 432 (1947). That use and practice reflected the State's immunity both to tort liability, Sousa v. State, 115 N.H. 340, 342, 341 A.2d 282, 284 (1975), and to suit in its own courts without its consent. Id. There being consequently no right under article 20 to a trial by jury in an action against the State, that article does not prevent the State from retaining its immunity to suit in the courts at the same time it waives its immunity to liability in tort by submitting to the jurisdiction of the board of claims under RSA chapter 541-B (Supp.1983).
Like reasoning supports a finding of the constitutionality of adjudication by an administrative board, none of whose members is appointed by the governor and council, as against the objection that article 46 requires governor and council appointment of all judicial officers. Because the judicial power did not extend to actions against the State at common law, Sousa v. State supra, the reference to judicial officers in article 46 does not govern the appointment of those whose jurisdiction derives from a limited legislative waiver of the State's immunity to liability, see Chasse v. Banas, 119 N.H. 93, 96, 399 A.2d 608, 610 (1979), as effected by the enactment of RSA 541-B:9 (Supp.1983). See Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 562, 493 A.2d 1182, 1188 (1985); accord Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 17, 19, 509 A.2d 746, 747-48 (1986). The same analysis answers the plaintiff's belated suggestion that part I, article 37 of the State Constitution, mandating the separation of powers, is authority for a different answer from the one we give.
The second question presented is whether RSA 491:8, submitting the State to the superior court's jurisdiction in actions "founded upon any ... contract with the state," applies in this case, on the theory that the plaintiff claims "rights as a third-party beneficiary of [the] lease between the State and [Couture]." Again, we answer no. The plaintiff's only argument for applying the State's waiver of immunity to actions on contract claims rests on the lease's provision that if Couture as the The plaintiff maintains that the State's failure to notify Couture of negligently maintained stairs was a breach of the lease contract, entitling the plaintiff to recover as a third-party benefi...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ridlon v. N.H. Bureau of Sec. Regulation
...that there is "no right under article 20 to a trial by jury in an action [brought] against the State." Newell v. N.H. Div. of Welfare, 131 N.H. 88, 90, 550 A.2d 109 (1988) (emphasis added). But the differential treatment described in Newell stems from the "established principle of jurisprud......
-
In re Raduazo
...essentially a claim for monetary damages against the State and is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Newell v. New Hampshire Division of Welfare, 131 N.H. 88 (1988). Furthermore, there were several causes of action cited in the tobacco suit some of which are unrelated to the medi......
-
LaRoche v. Doe
...with the board of claims. See, e.g., Slovenski v. State, 132 N.H. 18, 20-21, 561 A.2d 1072, 1074 (1989); Newell v. N.H. Div. of Welfare, 131 N.H. 88, 91, 550 A.2d 109, 111 (1988). The plaintiff contends, however, that, under the facts of this case, the State waived its immunity and, hence, ......
-
Slovenski v. State, Dept. of Public Works and Highways
...in a reasonable time by amending RSA chapter 541-B in 1985, in conformity with constitutional mandates, see Newell v. N.H. Div. of Welfare, 131 N.H. 88, 91, 550 A.2d 109, 111 (1988); Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 493 A.2d 1182, we will not embark upon a constitutional analysis of R......