Newman v. Career Consultants, Inc.

Decision Date18 January 2007
Docket NumberNo. 1:05-cv-1032-MEF.,1:05-cv-1032-MEF.
Citation470 F.Supp.2d 1333
PartiesAltha NEWMAN, Plaintiff, v. CAREER CONSULTANTS, INC., d/b/a CAPPS College, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Malcolm Rance Newman, Malcolm R. Newman, PC, Dothan, AL, for Plaintiff.

Bradley Roberts Byrne, Adams & Reese LLP, Mobile, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FULLER, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Altha Newman ("Plaintiff') brings suit against Defendant Career Consultants Inc., d/b/a Capps College ("Defendant"), alleging that it discriminated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 US.C. § 1981 (" § 1981"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), and the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Ala.Code § 25-1-20 et seq. ("AADEA").1 Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, declaratory judgment, equitable relief, and attorney's fees and costs. This cause is presently before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 13). The Court has carefully considered the pleadings, briefs, and evidentiary submissions. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's motion is due to be GRANTED.

I. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (ADEA), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction). The parties contest neither personal jurisdiction nor venue, and the Court finds a sufficient factual basis for each.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor." Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) (quoting Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing: the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must believe the evidence of the nonmovant and must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir.2003) (the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

III. Facts and Procedural History

The Court has carefully considered all documents submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the submissions of the parties establish the following relevant facts:

Plaintiff is currently fifty-five years old. In 2003, she applied for a position at Capps College in Dothan, Alabama. She first interviewed with Lou McCallister, the Dothan Campus Director. McCallister offered her the position of admissions advisor. Plaintiff subsequently had a follow-up phone conversation with Paul Hoffman, Capps' Executive Vice President, who worked in Mobile, Alabama. Plaintiff started training on August 12, 2003. For the purposes of this motion, the Court will consider McCallister as Plaintiffs direct supervisor, although she states that she never quite understood the chain of command at Capps. Plaintiff did know that she worked under McCallister's supervision.

Around the end of April 2004, McCollister asked Plaintiff if she would be interested in the Registrar position. She was surprised because McCallister had earlier said that Plaintiff and another black female, Monteka Freeman, were "better in those positions," referring to the position of admissions advisor. Plaintiff told McCallister that she would think about it over the weekend. McCallister said that the decision to offer her the position came from Mobile. Plaintiff decided to accept the position. McCallister told Plaintiff that it was not necessary for her to have a job description. Plaintiff did not receive a pay raise when she became Registrar. Plaintiff asked on several occasions for a pay raise, but McCallister said that her move to the Registrar position was a later al promotion. Plaintiff did get a pay raise in October or November of 2004.

McCallister made comments about Plaintiffs age from time to time. He asked her how it felt to be over fifty and made comments about people Plaintiffs age forgetting things. At the time, McCallister was thirty-nine or forty years of age. McCallister also told Plaintiff that she should be friendlier to Hoffman, to smile more when he was around, and to show more enthusiasm. He also told her to lighten up and that she was too uptight and professional. McCallister "sometimes" or "on occasion" asked Plaintiff why it was common for black males to have drug convictions. Plaintiff understood that she was supposed to report discrimination to McCallister. She also knew that she could report discrimination to Hoffman as well.

In July 2004, after she had been Registrar for over a month, Plaintiff was getting calls about the transcripts and inputting grades on rosters, and other related inquiries. However, she had not been trained in those duties. Plaintiff asked McCollister to see a job description for the Registrar position. McCallister showed her a description, and said that certain duties would be performed by him, by the Program Director, or by Sarah Buffy, the receptionist. However, the main office in Mobile was holding Plaintiff responsible for all of the Registrar duties. Plaintiff attempted to resolve this situation with McCallister but was unsuccessful. McCallister did modify the Registrar job description in writing.

McCallister was providing training for Buffy, who was white and approximately thirty-five years old, in certain Registrar duties that Plaintiff was not allowed to do. For example, McCallister would not teach Plaintiff how to schedule classes and would not let her do so; he showed Buffy how to schedule classes and assigned her that task.

Later in July 2004, Plaintiff emailed Hoffman and said that she needed training. Hoffman called McCallister to see about sending someone from Mobile to train Plaintiff. Hoffman quickly provided a trainer, Roberta Ellis, for Plaintiff. However, the training could not go forward because of a problem with the records. McCallister was angry with Plaintiff over this incident. He said that he felt betrayed that Plaintiff had talked to Hoffman rather than talking to him. After this conversation, Plaintiff and McCallister had little to say to each other.

On September 27, 2004, Plaintiff told McCallister that she thought he was discriminating against her on the basis of race, age, or both, because she was not being trained but he was training Buffy for the Registrar position. McCallister denied discriminating against Plaintiff.

In December 2004, Plaintiff talked to Hoffman regarding acts she thought were fraudulent at Capps. However, she did not discuss specific incidents, because she did not want to be seen as a whistleblower. Plaintiff also brought up the fact that she was not being trained. After their conversation, Hoffman sent Plaintiff an email on December 14, 2004. Hoffman noted that Plaintiff was reluctant to discuss specifics regarding her claims of fraudulent activity. He officially asked her to report to him any and all concerns she had regarding compliance issues no later than December 17, 2004. Hoffman informed Plaintiff that if he did not receive a report from her, he would assume that all issues had been investigated and resolved by Plaintiff and McCallister. Plaintiff did not provide Hoffman with any additional information.

Hoffman would on occasion ask Plaintiff to let him know what McCallister was doing. However, Plaintiff usually did not do so, because McCallister asked her what she talked about with Hoffman.

Plaintiff...

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