Newman v. Point Park Univ.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2022
• Docket Number: 2:20-cv-00204
• Parties: CHANNA NEWMAN, Plaintiff, v. POINT PARK UNIVERSITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

CHANNA NEWMAN, Plaintiff, v. POINT PARK UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

No. 2:20-cv-00204

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

March 31, 2022

OPINION

MARK R. HORNAK CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Mark R Hornak, Chief United States District Judge Plaintiff Channa Newman is a Jewish, Israeli, and Czech woman born in 1942 who is employed as a professor by Defendant, Point Park University, a post-secondary education institution located in downtown Pittsburgh. Plaintiff has worked at Point Park as a professor and at times as a Department Chair since 1964. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15, hereinafter cited as “AC”) consists of 19 counts encompassing 628 paragraphs over 75 pages and asserts an array of statutory discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims against Defendant, alleging that Defendant discriminated, retaliated, and harassed Plaintiff on the basis of her religion, race/national origin, sex, and age.

The overall dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant originated in what appears to have been at times a heated set of academic and philosophical contentions between Plaintiff and other faculty members at the University--and Plaintiff broadly alleges that this dispute has infiltrated Defendant's administration, the administration's decision making, and the student body. In addition to her statutory claims Plaintiff's Amended Complaint raises supplemental state common law claims against Defendant: breach of contract negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendant moves to dismiss almost all claims asserted in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on the grounds that each fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See ECF Nos. 18 and 19.) The Court groups the claims Defendant seeks to dismiss into five categories: (1) Plaintiff's statutory substantive discrimination claims; (2) Plaintiff's statutory retaliation claims; (3) Plaintiff's statutory hostile work environment claims (4) Plaintiff's state common law breach of contract claim; and (5) Plaintiff's state common law tort claims. With that framework in mind, Defendant seeks to dismiss in full each of the following counts for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted:

(1) Plaintiff's Statutory Substantive Discrimination Claims (Counts, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 11): Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims of discrimination on the basis of her race/national origin brought under (a) 42 U.S.C. § 1981, (b) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and (c) the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. §§ 951-963 (West 2022) (Count 2); Plaintiff's claims of discrimination on the basis of her religion and sex in violation of Title VII and the PHRA (Counts 4 and 6); Plaintiff's claim of discrimination on the basis of sex brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”) (Count 8); and Plaintiff's claim of age discrimination brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Count 11).

(2) Plaintiff's Statutory Retaliation Claims (Counts 1 and 10): Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim of retaliation in violation of § 1981, Title VII, and the PHRA (Count 1) as well as Plaintiff's claim of retaliation in violation of Title IX (Count 10).

(3) Plaintiff's Statutory Hostile Work Environment Claims (Counts 3, 5, 7, and 9): Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment on the basis of race/national origin in violation of § 1981, Title VII, and the PHRA (Count 3); Plaintiff's claims of hostile work environment on the basis of sex and religion in violation of Title VII and the PHRA (Counts 5 and 7); and Plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX (Count 9).

(4) Plaintiff's State Common Law Breach of Contract Claim (Count 17): As for Plaintiff's supplemental state common law claims, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract claim based on Defendant's alleged breach of a duty imposed by the parties' Agreement to Mediate (Count 17).

(5) Plaintiff's State Common Law Tort Claims (Counts 18 and 19): Finally, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim (Count 18) and Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count 19).^[1]

For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's statutory substantive discrimination claims (Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, and 11) and as to Plaintiff's statutory retaliation claims (Counts 1 and 10). The Court concludes that Plaintiff has facially stated a claim for relief as to the statutory substantive discrimination claims because the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that Defendant subjected Plaintiff to an adverse employment action and that the alleged circumstances give rise to a plausible inference of discriminatory intent. Plaintiff has also stated a claim for relief as to her statutory retaliation claims by plausibly alleging that she engaged in protected activity, that Defendant engaged in a materially adverse employment action, and that the adverse action was causally connected to Plaintiff's protected activity.

The Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims (Counts 3, 5, 7, and 9) because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that she was subject to objectively severe and pervasive discrimination in the workplace, an element necessary to facially show that relief might be warranted. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims at these counts are dismissed with prejudice. The Court also grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's breach of contract claim at Count 17 because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendant had a contractual duty to more extensively participate in mediation. Dismissal of Count 17 is likewise with prejudice. Finally, the Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim (Count 18) and Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count 19). The Court concludes that the PHRA preempts Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim because her allegations of negligent supervision are woven from the same fabric as her statutory discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims. Meanwhile, Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is preempted by Pennsylvania's workers' compensation statute. Dismissal of such state law tort claims is with prejudice. Finally, the Court denies Plaintiff's request at ECF No. 33 to convert Defendant's Motion to Dismiss into one for summary judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL BAKGROUND

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15) is the operative Complaint in this action. Defendant moved to dismiss all counts of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 18 and 19.)^[2]Plaintiff opposed the Motion (see ECF Nos. 24 and 25), and Defendant replied (see ECF No. 28). With leave of Court, Plaintiff filed a Surreply and further requested that this Court convert the Motion to Dismiss into one for summary judgment. (ECF No. 33.) Defendant opposed Plaintiff's request to convert the present Motion into a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 34.)

The Court held oral argument on the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 36.) Following argument, the Court deemed Count 12 as withdrawn by Plaintiff, and the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a More Definite Statement as to Counts 13, 14, 15, 16, and 19. (ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff filed her More Definite Statement as ordered, in which she represented that she had withdrawn Counts 15 and 16 and merged them with Counts 13 and 14. (ECF No. 38, at 10.) Defendant then represented that it no longer sought dismissal of Counts 13 or 14 (and by extension, no longer sought to dismiss Counts 15 and 16, as they had been merged with Counts 13 and 14). (ECF No. 39.) With that, these matters are now ripe for disposition.

II. FACUAL BACKGROUND^[3]

Plaintiff Channa Newman is a Jewish woman born in 1942 who holds United States, Israeli, and Czech citizenships and has been a professor at Point Park University since 1964-most recently as a Department Chair (“Chair”). (AC ¶¶ 10-16.) She alleges that she is the “sole Israeli faculty member” and “one of the oldest faculty members” at Point Park. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 17.)

The alleged events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims began in the course of an academic and philosophical dispute between Plaintiff and two other Point Park faculty members Professors Robert Ross (“Dr. Ross”) and J. Dwight Hines (“Dr. Hines”), both of whom Plaintiff allegedly helped hire and with whom Plaintiff initially had good relations. (Id. ¶¶ 18-24.) Eventually, Dr. Ross and Plaintiff began having disagreements regarding how class content about the longstanding Israel-Palestine conflict should be taught, and their professional relationship grew tense. (Id. ¶¶ 25-37.) Dr. Ross supports Palestine in that conflict, while Plaintiff views Dr. Ross's scholarship as “anti-Semitic and/or anti-Israel.” (Id. ¶¶ 40-44, 47.) According to Plaintiff, Dr. Hines has sided with Dr. Ross in this dispute. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that this internal conflict led Dr. Ross and Dr. Hines to successfully push for Plaintiff's removal as the Coordinator of the Global Cultural Studies (“GCS”) program and to oppose her election as Chair of the Humanities and Social Sciences (“HSS”) Department. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 53.) Plaintiff was nonetheless elected to the Chair position over Drs. Ross and Hines's opposition. (Id. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff alleges that the Point Park...