Newman v. State of Ind.

• Decision Date: 19 November 1997
• Docket Number: No. 97-1554,97-1554
• Citation: 129 F.3d 937
• Parties: Lawrence T. NEWMAN and Beverly R. Newman, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE OF INDIANA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 937

129 F.3d 937

Lawrence T. NEWMAN and Beverly R. Newman, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE OF INDIANA, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-1554.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 3, 1997.

Decided Nov. 19, 1997.

William E. Daily (argued), Danville, IN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Jon B. Laramore (argued), Jeffrey A. Modisett, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants-Appellees State of Indiana, Evan Bayh.

Michael A. Wilkins, Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee Children's Bureau of Indianapolis, Inc.

John T. Roy, Stephenson, Daly, Morow & Kurnik, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee Jack L. Cottey.

Niccolo N. Donzella, Shapiro & Olander, Baltimore, MD, Wendy J. Greenberg, Sandra Barnes (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Department of Human Resources, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant-Appellee State of Maryland.

Niccolo N. Donzella, Barron L. Stroud, Jr., Shapiro & Olander, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant-Appellee Worcester County, Maryland, Worcester County Sheriff's Department, Dan McAllister, Jim Stant.

N. Kent Smith, Hall, Render, Killian, Heath & Lyman, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee Kurt A. Moehle.

Peter A. Schroeder, Ellen W. Quigley, Norris, Choplin & Johnson, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee Michael Bishop.

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and MANION and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Chief Judge.

The subject of domestic relations, including adoptions, is the primary responsibility of the state courts, administering state law, rather than of the federal courts. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703-04, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 2214-15, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992); Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593, 10 S.Ct. 850, 852-53, 34 L.Ed. 500 (1890); T.W. v. Brophy, 124 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir.1997); Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir.1982); Congleton v. Holy Cross Child Placement Agency, Inc., 919 F.2d 1077 (5th Cir.1990). Modern federal constitutional law is so encompassing, however, that parties to domestic relations disputes are sometimes tempted to try to transform a routine domestic relations dispute into a federal case by clothing it in a federal constitutional garb, unmindful of the subtle doctrines that have evolved to prevent that kind of federal power grab. That is what has happened here. A married couple in Indiana, disappointed in their efforts to adopt a Maryland child, have brought a hopeless suit against 54 named, and many unnamed, agencies, officials, and private persons in Indiana and Maryland. The complaint, most of which the district court dismissed on the pleadings (certifying these rulings for immediate appeal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)), alleges in great detail a far-reaching and implausible conspiracy to prevent the Newmans, by reason of their being Jewish, from adopting Jewish (or, we suppose, any other) children.

Here is the story told in the complaint. Back in 1992 the Newmans had been declared eligible to adopt a child, but, because of their religion, the Indiana defendants discouraged them from trying actually to adopt any child. The Newmans managed to locate a trio of Jewish siblings in Maryland who were in foster care--two seven-year-old twin boys and their three-year-old sister, Laura. The social service department of Worcester County, Maryland approved the Newmans as adoptive parents and they were permitted to and did take the three kids back with them to Indiana, although there was as yet no formal adoption. Soon, however, the Newmans observed sexually aggressive and violent behavior on the part of the two boys, as well as bruises on Laura which suggested that she had been subjected to physical abuse. So the Newmans returned to the Worcester County agency first one of the boys and then, when the other's behavior didn't improve in his twin's absence, the other, retaining Laura. The agency says that it didn't want the trio separated, see In re Adoption of L.C., 650 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ind.App.1995); the Newmans, whose version we accept for purposes of this appeal, claim that the agency was motivated by anti-Semitism--that the Maryland defendants joined with the Indiana defendants "in a course of intentional and malicious conduct, the purpose of which was to abort the adoption of Laura by the Newmans and return Laura to Maryland."

The Newmans defied the defendants and in March of 1994 Worcester County officials sought and obtained in a Maryland court an ex parte order directing the Newmans to return Laura to Maryland. The officials took the order to the probate court in Indianapolis, seeking enforcement. The case was assigned to Judge Deiter, one of the defendants. The litigation was timed to begin just hours before the beginning of Passover, which prevented the Newmans from preparing for the hearing before Judge Deiter until the day before the hearing was held. The judge issued an order confirming the Maryland order. The Newmans appealed, and the Indiana intermediate appellate court affirmed. In re L.C., 659 N.E.2d 593 (Ind.App.1995). Simultaneously with these proceedings, the Newmans submitted a petition to the same judge to adopt Laura. The petition was denied in June, and, again, the intermediate appellate court affirmed. In re Adoption of L.C., supra. The Newmans unsuccessfully sought review in both cases by the Indiana Supreme Court and by the U.S. Supreme Court.

In May of 1994, after Judge Deiter had confirmed the Maryland order to return Laura to that state, Indiana officials (defendants all) arrived at the Newmans' home to take custody of the child. The Newmans wanted an opportunity for a further hearing before the judge to present (among other things) evidence that it would be contrary to Laura's best interests to remove her from their home. The judge agreed to conduct an "emergency best interests hearing" in his chambers that night. At the end of the hearing, the judge told the Newmans that he was ordering the sheriff to remove Laura from their home and that they could not leave his chambers until this had been accomplished. They were permitted to leave an hour and a half after the judge told them to stay.

In October, the Newmans visited the foster home in Maryland in which Laura had been placed after her removal from their home and observed evidence of abuse and neglect of the child. They went to the Worcester County social services agency to file a report of what they had seen. The agency refused to accept the report. Instead, the director called the sheriff, who when he arrived told the Newmans that they would have to leave because they were interfering with the work of the office. So ends the Newmans' adoption saga as narrated in the 49-page complaint.

The district judge, understandably confused and perhaps exasperated by the plethora of claims and defendants, issued a confusing order dismissing some of the claims and defendants and refusing to dismiss others. Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the district court to enter a final, and therefore immediately appealable, judgment disposing of fewer than all parties or fewer than all claims. Insofar as the judge dismissed all the claims against some of the parties, there is no problem. Insofar as he dismissed some of the claims against some of the parties, so that other claims against those parties remain pending in the district court, the entry of judgments under Rule 54(b) may have been improper. For he failed to indicate--and it is unclear from the record--whether the retained claims are separate from the dismissed ones, in the practical sense that there is minimal factual overlap. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (7th Cir.1997); NAACP v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 291-93 (7th Cir.1992); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 580 (1st Cir.1994).

Rather than remand for clarification and thus prolong an obviously meritless case, we shall indicate our view of the merits, affirm the judgment insofar as it dismisses all claims against a particular defendant (so that there is no question of the appealability of the dismissal), and vacate the remainder of the judge's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. We warn the Newmans and their counsel that continued persistence in this quixotic litigation will invite the imposition of sanctions. We note in this connection that Mr. Newman is himself a lawyer.

It is important to be clear about the scope of the suit. It is not brought on behalf of Laura. The Newmans do not purport to sue as her next friend or in any other representative capacity. The complaint is replete with allegations of abuse and neglect of Laura, but these allegations are irrelevant, since she is not a party and the Newmans do not claim that the abuse and neglect worked an injury to them for which they can obtain damages. Furthermore, the Newmans are not seeking to adopt or otherwise obtain custody of Laura. If that were the relief sought by the suit, the suit would be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, T.W. v. Brophy, supra, 124 F.3d at 898; Campbell v Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir.1996); Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (3d Cir.1993), as well as by res judicata. The Newmans lost both the suit brought by some of the defendants in the present case to have Laura returned to Maryland and the Newmans' own suit to adopt her. If the Newmans didn't like the results of those suits their only remedy, which they pursued to defeat, was to ask for review by the Indiana Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court. We have no jurisdiction to review decisions by the Indiana courts.

The only relief sought is an award of damages, primarily for religious discrimination and violations of due process, that are claimed to have frustrated the Newmans' desire to adopt Laura, and secondarily for the temporary deprivation of their liberty when Judge Deiter told them...