Newsom v. Newsom, A-9892

• Decision Date: 15 April 1964
• Docket Number: No. A-9892,A-9892
• Citation: Newsom v. Newsom, 378 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1964)
• Parties: Minnie L. NEWSOM, Petitioner, v. C. W. NEWSOM, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 842

378 S.W.2d 842

Minnie L. NEWSOM, Petitioner, v. C. W. NEWSOM, Respondent.

No. A-9892.

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 15, 1964

Rehearing Denied May 20, 1964.

Holloway & Slagle, Brownwood, for petitioner.

Darrell Shelton, E. P. Woodruff, Jr., Brownwood, for respondent.

STEAKLEY, Justice.

The Petitioner is Minnie L. Newsom, Plaintiff below, who sued her stepson, C. W. Newsom, Respondent here, for possession of certain land, later described, for rent and, in the alternative, for partition. The trial court rendered judgment for Petitioner for possession but denied her suit for rent. The Court of Civil Appeals held that Petitioner was not entitled to exclusive possession of the land and modified the judgment of the trial court to this extent. C. W. Newsom v. Mrs. Minnie Newsom, Tex.Civ.App., 371 S.W.2d 894.

The principal problem of the case involves the construction of a deed dated April 23, 1958, to Respondent from his father and stepmother. The father died shortly after execution of the deed. The deed reads as follows, omitting the metes and bounds description of the tracts of land not here involved:

'That we, S. Y. Newsom and wife, Minnie L. Newsom, of the County of Brown, State of Texas, for and in consideration of the love and affection we have for our son, CHARLES WILLIS NEWSOM, and for the purpose of partitioning our real estate among our three children, subject to certain restrictions hereinafter set out, have GRANTED, SOLD AND CONVEYED, and by these presents do GRANT, SELL AND CONVEY unto the said Charles Willis Newsom, of the County of Brown, State of Texas, subject to the restrictions below made, all those certain tracts and parcels of land lying and being situated in Brown County, Texas, and described as follows:

'FIRST TRACT:

'Being 60.58 acres of the M. R. Williams Survey No. 71, 12.63 acres of the William Patton Survey No. 25, 109.88 acres of the W. C. Anderson Survey No. 6, and 22 acres out of the William Guyman Survey.

'SECOND TRACT:

'All of the J. J. Cox Survey No. 38, Abstract No 216, patented to W. C. Dunn, assignee of J. J. Cox, by patent No. 105, Vol. 7, now owned by grantors.

'THIS conveyance is subject to an easement and right-of-way in favor of CHARLES EDWIN SPILLMAN across the M. R. Williams Survey No. 71 and a part of the William Patton Survey No. 25 more fully described in deed this day executed by grantors to Charles Edwin Spillman.

'TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the above described premises, together with all and singular, the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging unto the said Charles Willis Newsom, his heirs and assigns, forever, subject, however, to the reservations below made.

'And we do hereby bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators, to warrant and forever defend all and singular the said premises unto the said Charles Willis Newsom, his heirs and assigns, subject to said reservations, against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming, or to claim the same, or any part thereof, SAVE AND EXCEPT, however, that the grantors herein expressly reserve, and it is expressly agreed and understood, that they shall have for themselves and their assigns, the full possession, use, and benefit of the above described land and premises, as well as the rents, revenues, and profits thereof for and during the natural lives of grantors, and grantors further reserve unto themselves, and their assigns, for and during the natural lives of grantors, the exclusive right to lease said land above described for oil, gas, and other minerals, and to receive and have for themselves all bonus money, rentals and royalties alties paid under the terms of any such lease or leases.'

The J. J. Cox Survey was originally acquired as community property of Respondent's mother and father. His mother died intestate in 1918. Respondent was the only child of this marriage and as such inherited an undivided one-half interest in the tract of land. S. Y. Newsom subsequently married the Petitioner. They lived on the Cox Survey. Petitioner had two children by a former marriage. No children were born to S. Y. Newsom and Petitioner. As shown by its provisions, the deed was executed pursuant to a plan of partitioning the real estate interests of S. Y. Newsom and Petitioner between the three children.

The life estate reservations in the lands conveyed is clear. The question is whether this reservation as to the J. J. Cox Survey is limited to the one-half undivided interest owned by the grantors, or was intended to include all the Survey. If the latter, the life estate is enforceable against Respondent by virtur of his act of accepting the deed with its benefits to him. Greene v. White, 137 Tex. 361, 153 S.W.2d 575, 136 A.L.R. 626. The deed represents a bilateral agreement to which Respondent as grantee is bound contractually; he is estopped by his acceptance of the deed to deny the provisions or reservations therein which may be adverse to him.

The problem of the proper construction of the deed is one of determining the intent of the parties. Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, 125 Tex. 549, 84 S.W.2d 442; Smith v. Allison, 157 Tex. 220, 301 S.W.2d 608. The reservation by the grantors of a life estate in the lands described in the conveyance clauses can be reduced to a one-half interest in the J. J. Cox Survey only by giving controlling effect to the words 'now owned by grantors' by which the description in the deed of this particular tract is concluded. In our opinion, the more reasonable construction is that this phrase was no more than a descriptive limitation. The deed thereby purported to convey to Respondent only that which was owned by the grantors. But the life estate reservation contemplated a natural protection to the father and stepmother of Respondent, i. e., that they would have a life estate in all the properties conveyed, including the Cox Survey which they were occupying as their homestead. Otherwise, the grantors could lose their existing rights in the full tract upon the establishment of a homestead elsewhere, or, upon the death of Respondent's father, his surviving wife would have...