Newsom v. State

• Decision Date: 20 June 1895
• Citation: 107 Ala. 133,18 So. 206
• Parties: NEWSOM v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

18 So. 206

107 Ala. 133

NEWSOM v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 20, 1895

Appeal from circuit court, Cherokee county; J. A. Bilbro, Judge.

James T. Newsom was convicted of larceny, and appeals. Reversed.

The appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted under an indictment which charged that "James T. Newsom feloniously took and carried away a sack of corn, a part of an outstanding crop of corn, the property of Pierce Richards." Upon the trial of the cause, as is shown by the bill of exceptions, the testimony for the state tended to show that the owner of the property and two other persons saw the defendant pulling corn from the field of said Richards and putting it in a sack, and that he carried the same away but that the sack was not full. Upon one of the witnesses testifying to the facts as stated above, the state asked the witness the following question: "Did you watch the field the night before the larceny?" The defendant objected to this question, because it was irrelevant and immaterial, and duly excepted to the court's overruling his objection. The defendant introduced two witnesses who testified that they knew the defendant's general character in the community in which he lived, and that his character was good. Among the other instructions given by the court in its oral charge was the following: That if the defendant "feloniously took and carried away corn, part of the outstanding crop of Pierce Richards, then he is guilty as charged in the indictment, whether he took a sack full or not. The taking of one ear would be sufficient." To this portion of the court's general charge the defendant duly excepted. The defendant also separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of the following written charges requested by him: (1) "If the jury have a reasonable doubt, from the evidence, whether the sack was entirely full of corn or not, they must acquit the defendant." (2) "That, under this indictment defendant could not be convicted of grand larceny." (3) "That, under the evidence in this case, defendant could not be convicted of a higher offense than petit larceny." (4) "The court charges the jury that good character itself may, in connection with all the evidence generate a reasonable doubt, and entitle defendant to an acquittal, even though, without such proof of good character, you would convict." (5) "That, in arriving at defendant's guilt or innocence, the jury can look to the fact, if it be a fact, that they were neighbors; that the corn was taken in daytime,-openly carried to defendant's home by him." (6) "That, if the jury have a reasonable doubt whether the sack was full of corn or not, they must acquit the defendant." (7) "That, before the jury can convict the defendant, the state must prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the sack was entirely full of corn." (8) "That the presumption is the defendant is innocent, even after indictment found and read to him; and this presumption goes with him through the trial, until, by proof that the state has produced from the stand, evidence that convinces you, the jury, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the defendant feloniously took a part of the crop of corn belonging to and owned by Pierce Richards, and carried it away, with the intent to appropriate it to his own use. And if you believe from the evidence that he did take a portion of corn at the time alleged in the indictment, you must believe beyond all reasonable doubt that it was the property of Pierce Richards."

Denson & Burnett, for appellant.

Wm. C. Fitts, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BRICKELL C.J.

The fact that, on the night preceding the commission of the offense imputed to the defendant, the field in which the corn was standing was watched, was irrelevant. It was without tendency to prove or disprove any fact involved in the issue on which the jury was to pass. It was an independent, collateral fact, of which evidence could not be received without widening the scope of the inquiry, prolonging the trial, and obscuring the real issue. If the evidence was received, it would be the right of the defendant to controvert the fact by evidence, and a side issue would be formed, which, when determined, would not have aided in the solution of the material inquiry of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The admission of this evidence compels a reversal of the judgment.

The offense charged in the indictment is strictly statutory. The acts of which it consists, at common law, constituted a mere trespass, redressed only by civil remedies. Sullins v State, 53 Ala. 474; Holly v. State, 54 Ala. 238. As created by the statute, it is single, indivisible. It is grand larceny only. There is involved in it no lower grade of offense. Because of the insignificance in value of the part of the crop taken...