Newsome v. Young Supply Co.

• Decision Date: 15 December 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 11–10149.
• Citation: 835 F.Supp.2d 406
• Parties: James NEWSOME, Plaintiff, v. YOUNG SUPPLY CO., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

835 F.Supp.2d 406

James NEWSOME, Plaintiff,

v.YOUNG SUPPLY CO., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 11–10149.

United States District Court,

E.D. Michigan,

Northern Division.

Dec. 15, 2011.

Joey S. Niskar, The Niskar Law Firm, P.L.L.C., West Bloomfield, MI, for Plaintiff.

Allan Neef, Grosse Pointe Woods, MI, Jeffrey T. Stewart, Seikaly & Stewart, Farmington Hills, MI, for Defendants.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, District Judge.

Plaintiff James Newsome brought this action under the Family & Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., alleging that Young Supply Company, Staffing Source Personnel, Inc. d/b/a Driver Source, Inc., and Driver Source, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) violated his job restoration rights under the FMLA when they refused to restore his original job position as a truck driver, or an equivalent position required by the FMLA. ECF No. 1. In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or alternatively for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. ECF No. 6. The Court entered an order construing Defendants' motion as one for summary judgment, and permitting the parties to engage in limited discovery regarding whether Defendants have 50 or more employees within a 75 mile radius of Plaintiff's worksite. ECF No. 10.

Defendants admit that they each employed 50 or more employees, ECF No. 6 at 4–5, that they were both “joint employers” of Plaintiff within the meaning of the FMLA, id. at 6, n. 5, that Staffing Source, whose primary place of business is located in Dearborn, Michigan, was the primary employer within this joint employment enterprise, id., and that if Staffing Source's facility is deemed to be Plaintiff's “work site” under the joint employment enterprise, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff under the FMLA, id. at 3, 5.

Defendants, however, challenge the authority of 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3) (1995), which is the Department of Labor regulation establishing Staffing Source's facility as Plaintiff's work site for purposes of determining whether the 50 employee/75 mile coverage exclusion applies, as an invalid exercise of the Department's rule-making authority under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Defendants also claim that a regulation not applicable to joint employment enterprises, 29 CFR § 825.111(a)(2), is controlling and dictates that Plaintiff's work site is Young Supply Company's Saginaw facility. Finally, Defendants allege that if 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3) (1995) is deemed valid, the amended version of that regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3) (2009), which did not take effect until after Plaintiff had already invoked his rights under the FMLA and commenced his leave, should be retroactively applied to this case to bar coverage under the FMLA. Plaintiff responds that Defendants' arguments are meritless, and are contrary to the rules of statutory construction applicable to the FMLA in general, and the FMLA “work site” rules, as mandated by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

A hearing was held on October 6, 2011, to address Defendants' motion. For the reasons provided herein, Defendants' motion will be denied.

I. Facts

Staffing Source Personnel, Inc. (“Staffing Source”) ¹, is an employee leasing company which provides employees to its customers. Young Supply Company is a customer of Staffing Source. The contract between Staffing Source and Young Supply Company states that employees such as plaintiff “are at all times acting and performing the services to [Young Supply Company] as employees of Driver Source.” ECF No. 13 Ex. A ¶ I. The contract further provides that Staffing Source “will direct and control employees in all matters including hiring, termination, and discipline and shall establish wages, salaries, benefits, bonuses and advancements.” Id. In addition, Staffing Source “shall maintain full and direct control over Driver Source personnel in regard to employee law matters, compensation, workers compensation and all indirect employment matters of the Driver Source employees leased to [Young Supply Company].” Id. ¶ II. Staffing Source likewise paid plaintiff his wages. ECF No. 13 Ex. B.

Plaintiff was hired by Staffing Source in October of 2002 to work as a truck driver. Nine months later, Staffing Source assigned Plaintiff to work for defendant, Young Supply Company, as a truck driver. In September of 2008 Plaintiff provided notice to Defendant of his need for a medical leave of absence in order to undergo surgery in January of 2009. Defendants concede that plaintiff's medical condition constituted a “serious health condition” under the FMLA. ECF No. 6. at 5. Plaintiff commenced his leave of absence on January 12, 2009. At the completion of his medical leave of absence, Defendants refused to reinstate Plaintiff into his original job position, or an equivalent job position.

II. Standard of Review

Where, as here, a determination of a motion to dismiss involves consideration of evidence beyond the face of the complaint, the motion cannot be treated as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), but rather must be treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the movant shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact cannot be proven or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and identifying where to look in the record for relevant facts “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(2); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the opposing party fails to raise genuine issues of fact and the record indicates the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

The court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The party opposing the motion may not “rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact” but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. Discussion

A. The FMLA

The FMLA allows an employee to take up to 12 weeks of leave in a 12 month period for, among other things, the employee's own “serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Upon completion of the leave, the employee is entitled to be reinstated into his or her original job position, or an equivalent job position. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). Employers are prohibited from interfering with an employee's rights under the FMLA, and are prohibited from retaliating against employees who invoke their rights under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) and (2); Edgar v. JAC Products, Inc., 443 F.3d 501 (6th Cir.2006).

For the protections of the FMLA to apply, the employee must be an “eligible employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). An eligible employee is one who is employed by the employer for at least 12 months, and who has worked at least 1,250 hours for the employer within the 12 month period preceding the leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i)-(ii). Defendants concede that Plaintiff is an eligible employee. However, the text of the FMLA provides for an “exclusion” to coverage under the Act: If the employer employs less than 50 employees at the employee's “worksite,” or within 75 miles of the employee's “worksite.” 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii).

FMLA is a remedial statute, and as such, its coverages and protections must be construed and interpreted broadly in favor of the plaintiff. Cobb v. Contract Transport, Inc., 452 F.3d 543, 559 (6th Cir.2006). Furthermore, the 50/75 “worksite” provision is, by the very text of the FMLA, an “exclusion” to coverage and, as such, the 50/75 provision must be construed “narrowly.” 29 USC § 2611(2)(B)(ii); Cobb, 452 F.3d at 559. Defendants contend that this statutory exclusion from coverage applies in the instant case because neither of them employed 50 or more employees within 75 miles of plaintiff's “worksite,” which the defendants place at Young Supply Company's Saginaw, Michigan, facility. Plaintiff disputes this, and asserts that his “worksite” was Staffing Source's Dearborn, Michigan, facility, and Defendants concede that they employed 50 or more employees within 75 miles of Staffing Source's Dearborn, Michigan, facility. The question then is what constitutes Plaintiff's “worksite.”

The term “worksite” is not defined in the FMLA. See29 U.S.C. § 2601–2654; O'Dea–Evans v. A Place for Mom, Inc., 2009 WL 2143739, at *5 (N.D.Ill....