Newton/Boldt v. Newton
| Decision Date | 03 March 2004 |
| Citation | 86 P.3d 49,192 Or. App. 386 |
| Parties | Erna E. NEWTON/BOLDT, nka Erna E.N. Boldt, aka Erna E. Newton, Respondent, v. Leroy K. NEWTON, Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Brooks F. Cooper argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. J. Michael Alexander, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Swanson, Lathen, Alexander & McCann, P.C.
Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, and WOLLHEIM and SCHUMAN, Judges.
Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of plaintiff, his mother. The judgment occurred after the trial court allowed plaintiff to repudiate a settlement she and defendant had reached and put on the record at an earlier hearing. On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of his "Motion for Order Implementing Settlement Agreement" and the subsequent judgment in favor of plaintiff. We reverse.
In transactions between plaintiff and defendant occurring in 1995 and 1998, plaintiff conveyed to defendant partial ownership interests in stock and in a parcel of real property. In 1999, however, after plaintiff formed a relationship with a man of whom defendant apparently disapproved, she attempted to refinance the real property, and defendant, fearing that his mother was being imprudent, refused to cooperate. Plaintiff then filed this action seeking to quiet title to the real property in herself and to have the conveyance of stock to defendant declared null and void. She alleged that she made the transfers in order to avoid probate and had lacked donative intent. Defendant counterclaimed for an accounting and for conversion damages stemming from alleged misuse of stock dividends.
After both parties finished presenting evidence but before the court ruled, the parties announced that they had reached a settlement. The following colloquy occurred among the court, counsel and the parties:
Defendant drew up settlement documents, but plaintiff repeatedly refused to sign them. Instead, in January 2001, she informed the court that she had not understood the terms of the trust created by the settlement, and she renewed her request that the court quiet title to the real property in her and declare defendant's interest in the stock void.
The court held a second hearing in late January. Plaintiff appeared pro se. She argued—in her capacity as her own attorney and not as a sworn witness—that her former attorney had failed adequately to inform her of the nature and terms of the trust created by the settlement. Specifically, she claimed that when the court explained "neither party will have the right to liquidate their * * * shares" during her lifetime, she did not understand that to mean that she would have no access to the stock, which constituted the principal of the trust. She also claimed not to understand that the costs of administering the trust would be paid by the trust itself. The court, despite its earlier admonitions to plaintiff concerning her express agreement to settle, stated, "I'm satisfied that [plaintiff] didn't understand the terms of the so-called settlement at the time it was put on the record, and I'm going to hold the proceedings entered into on that date to be a nullity, and put it back on the trial docket." The court announced that it would reread the trial transcript and then rule on the merits.
In early May, defendant submitted a motion for an order implementing the settlement agreement. The court did not allow it. Instead, in a letter opinion dated May 8, 2001, the court found that the real property and stock transfers "were ill advised efforts to avoid probate and no present transfer of ownership was contemplated or intended." Judgment was entered in February 2002, quieting title to the real property in plaintiff, declaring the stock transfer and assignment documents null and void, and dismissing defendant's counterclaims.
A settlement agreed to in open court is a contract. City of Canby v. Rinkes, 136 Or.App. 602, 609, 902 P.2d 605 (1995),rev. den., 322 Or. 489, 909 P.2d 161 (1996). As framed by the parties—correctly, in our opinion—the issue in this case is whether the proceedings at the first hearing demonstrate the formation of a valid contract. Plaintiff argues that they did not. She bases her argument primarily on the trial court's finding that she did not understand the terms of the settlement. The extent of a party's understanding is a question of fact, which binds us if there is evidence to support it. Here, plaintiff contends that her statements at the second hearing provide sufficient...
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...subjective understanding; rather, it depends on whether the parties manifest assent to the same express terms.” Newton/Boldt v. Newton, 192 Or.App. 386, 392, 86 P.3d 49 (2004) (internal citation omitted); see alsoKitzke, 209 Or. at 572–73, 307 P.2d 522 (“ ‘[a]greement consists of mutual exp......
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...subjective understanding; rather, it depends on whether the parties manifest assent to the same express terms." Newton/Boldt v. Newton, 192 Or.App. 386, 392, 86 P.3d 49 (2004) (citation omitted). Questions regarding the intent of the parties are for the factfinder. Bennett v. Farmers Ins. C......
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