Newton Loan & Banking Co. v. Reeves

• Decision Date: 30 June 1911
• Citation: 56 So. 255,2 Ala.App. 411
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals
• Parties: NEWTON LOAN & BANKING CO. v. REEVES.

56 So. 255

2 Ala.App. 411

NEWTON LOAN & BANKING CO. v. REEVES.

Court of Appeals of Alabama

June 30, 1911

Appeal from Circuit Court, Houston County; H. A. Pearce, Judge.

Action by the Newton Loan & Banking Company against J. H. Reeves.From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.Affirmed.

H. L. Martin, for appellant.

Benjamin F. Reid, for appellee.

WALKER P.J.

To the complaint counting on a lost note alleged to have been executed by the defendant, he interposed a plea of non est factum.In the trial it was not controverted by the defendant that a note bearing date, for the amount, and payable as alleged in the complaint, was executed.His contention was that the note was not his individual obligation, but was signed by the name of the Houston Brick Company, a corporation, by him as president and manager.It was also an undisputed fact that the note was given in payment for wood sold and delivered by the payee.The plaintiff introduced several witnesses, whose testimony tended to show that the note was signed by the defendant in his individual capacity.The defendant's testimony supported his contention.

Over objections interposed by the plaintiff, the defendant was permitted to introduce evidence as to the location of the place of business of the Houston Brick Company, that the defendant was the president and manager of that company, and in charge of its business and that he bought the wood for that company.On such an issue as that presented in the trial, it does not seem to the court that the admission of that evidence was error.It had a tendency to show the existence of a motive on the part of the Houston Brick Company to make the note in question in consideration of a debt owing by it, and the absence of a motive on the part of the defendant to give his individual note for a debt for which he was not personally liable.It cannot be said that the evidence admitted was without a tendency in a reasonable degree to establish the probability of the defendant's version of the matter being the correct one.If it had such tendency, it was legally relevant.Hill v. State,146 Ala. 51, 55, 41 So 621;1 Elliott on Evidence, § 156;Jones on Evidence, § 138.When the question is as to whether the note sued on was made by the defendant or by another person or corporation shown by some of the evidence in the case to have been its maker evidence that the debt thereby secured was the debt of the...