Newton v. City of Wilmington, Civ. No. 16-267-SLR

• Decision Date: 20 July 2016
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 16-267-SLR
• Citation: 206 F.Supp.3d 947
• Parties: Sye Christopher-Rashaud NEWTON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WILMINGTON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Delaware

206 F.Supp.3d 947

Sye Christopher-Rashaud NEWTON, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF WILMINGTON, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 16-267-SLR

United States District Court, D. Delaware.

Signed July 20, 2016

Sye Christopher-Rashaud Newton, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, pro se plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBINSON, District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Sye Christopher-Rashaud Newton ("plaintiff"), an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, proceeds pro se and has been granted in forma pauperis status. He filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming violations of his constitutional rights.¹ (D.I. 2)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court may properly dismiss an action sua sponte under the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) if "the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Ball v. Famiglio , 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir.2013) ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a pro se plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir.2008) ; Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. at 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (citations omitted).

An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams , 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory" or a "clearly baseless" or "fantastic or delusional" factual scenario. Neitzke , 490 at 327–28, 109 S.Ct. 1827 ; Wilson v. Rackmill , 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir.1989) ; see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States , 67 F.3d 1080, 1091–92 (3d Cir.1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to give it back).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Tourscher v. McCullough , 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B) ). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the court must grant plaintiff leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir.2002).

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that a claim has substantive plausibility. See Johnson v. City of Shelby , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347, 190 L.Ed.2d 309 (2014). A complaint may not dismissed, however, for imperfect statements of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted. See id. at 346.

Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal , a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps: (1) take note of the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and (3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp. , 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir.2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Elements are sufficiently alleged when the facts in the complaint "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ). Deciding whether a claim is plausible will be a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.

III. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

The complaint names a number of private attorneys, public defenders, judges, Attorney General of the State of Delaware Matt Denn ("Denn"), deputy attorneys general, unnamed Clerk's Office personnel, and the City of Wilmington ("City of Wilmington") and contains allegations related to two criminal cases wherein plaintiff entered into plea agreements. Plaintiff alleges that he was coerced into entering both plea agreements through the use of threats, fraudulent information, and misadvice, all accomplished through conspiratorial actions among defendants. Plaintiff pled guilty to assault in the second degree in October 2006, and pled guilty to robbery on February 27, 2007, following which he was immediately sentenced in both the assault and robbery cases. See Newton v. State , 2015 WL 4389878, at *1 (Del.2015). Plaintiff complains about the representation he received from his defense counsel, actions taken by deputy attorneys general in prosecuting his cases, orders entered by judges, and orders filed under wrong case numbers and sent by Clerk's Office personnel to wrong parties. Plaintiff alleges these acts violated his civil rights because he is black and indigent.

In January 2014, plaintiff filed a Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief. While not clear, it appears that defendant Delaware Superior Court Judge Jane M. Brady ("Judge Brady") denied the motion or was somehow involved with the motion given that plaintiff alleges that Judge Brady and defendant Delaware Superior Court Judge Diane Clarke Streett ("Judge Streett") entered, or were a direct cause of the entry of, a non-compliance order on June 3, 2014. Plaintiff explains that the Rule 61 motion was referred to Judge Brady on August 11, 2014 and that she held onto it until September 5, 2014, when it was referred to Judge Streett. Plaintiff also complains that Judge Brady ordered counsel to represent plaintiff, that defendant Office of Conflicts Counsel ("OCC") arranged an attorney, but the attorney "hindered more than helped." Plaintiff alleges that he did not need counsel and Judge Brady knew this.

Plaintiff also complains that, due to clerical errors in November 2014, docketing clerks sent orders to the wrong parties. He alleges that after he complained, a docket entry on November 8, 2014 suddenly appeared. Plaintiff's Rule 61 motion was dismissed on January 26, 2015. Plaintiff sought relief under Rule 60, and he also filed a notice of appeal. The Rule 60 motion was dismissed. On July 15, 2015, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Superior Court's judgment that denied plaintiff's motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61. See Newton v. State , 2015 WL 4389878 (Del.2015). Plaintiff alleges that the Delaware Courts lacked jurisdiction to enforce an invalid contract (i.e., plea agreement), and failed to prevent further violations. He also alleges that the Delaware Supreme Court deprived him of his right to equal protection. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages and declaratory and injunctive relief including an investigation of the Delaware criminal justice system.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

All claims prior to November 9, 2013 are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.² For purposes of the statute of limitations, § 1983 claims are characterized as personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 275, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In Delaware, § 1983 claims are subject to a two-year limitations period. See 10 Del. C. § 8119 ; Johnson v. Cullen , 925 F.Supp. 244, 248 (D.Del.1996). Section 1983 claims accrue "when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based." Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia , 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir.1998). Claims not filed within the two-year statute of limitations period are time-barred and must be dismissed. See Smith v. State , 2001 WL 845654, at *2 (D.Del. July 24, 2001).

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that generally must be raised by the defendant, and it is waived if not properly raised. See Benak ex rel. Alliance Premier Growth Fund v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P. , 435 F.3d 396, 400 n. 14 (3d Cir.2006) ; Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon , 807 F.2d 1150, 1167 (3d Cir.1986). "[W]here the statute of limitations defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the factual record is required to determine whether dismissal is appropriate, sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is permissible." Davis v. Gauby , 408 Fed.Appx. 524, 526 (3d Cir.2010) (unpublished) (quoting Fogle v. Pierson , 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.2006) ).

Plaintiff references acts taken by various defendants during the prosecution of two criminal cases from August 8, 2005 through July 15, 2015. The instant complaint was not filed until November 9, 2015. Hence, it is evident from the face of the complaint that claims accruing prior to November 9, 2013 are time-barred and they will be dismissed as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1).³

B. Habeas Corpus

To the extent that plaintiff attempts to challenge his conviction and/or sentence, his sole federal remedy for challenging the fact or duration of his...