Newton v. GF GOODMAN

• Decision Date: 10 August 1981
• Docket Number: No. S 80-2.,S 80-2.
• Citation: 519 F. Supp. 1301
• Parties: Martin L. NEWTON and Deborah A. Newton, Plaintiffs, v. G. F. GOODMAN AND SON, INC., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

519 F. Supp. 1301

Martin L. NEWTON and Deborah A. Newton, Plaintiffs, v. G. F. GOODMAN AND SON, INC., Defendants.

No. S 80-2.

United States District Court, N. D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

August 10, 1981.

David T. Stutsman, Elkhart, Ind., for plaintiffs.

Gerald A. Kamm, South Bend, Ind., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHARP, District Judge.

This cause went to trial before a jury solely on the theories of strict liability and breach of warranty.

In the Second Amended Complaint and the Pre-Trial Orders Plaintiffs contended that Defendant designed, manufactured and sold the automatic rubber cutting machine to Goshen Rubber Company, Inc., that such machine was involved in the injuries to Plaintiff Martin L. Newton, that Defendant was engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling such machines in interstate commerce and that the machine was expected to and did reach the employer of Martin L. Newton without substantial change in its condition. Plaintiffs also contended that the machine was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to Plaintiff, which proximately caused the injuries to Martin L. Newton.

It was specifically contended that the machine was designed to use a photo-electric eye for automatic activation of its cutting function, that the design and manufacture of the electrical controls was defective, that Defendant failed to provide adequate operating instructions for the controls of the machine and that no warnings were provided for the machine.

The Court instructed the jury as follows on the law of strict liability for sale of a product:

COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 20

"It is the law in Indiana that there is strict liability on the Seller of a Product where physical harm occurs to a user or a consumer where:

(1) One who sells any Product in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer.

(a) the Seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although

(a) the Seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the Seller."

The Court further gave the following instruction regarding the Plaintiffs case:

COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 19

"Plaintiffs, in order to prove their case, must show by a fair preponderance of all the evidence that:

1. Defendant designed or manufactured and sold a rubber cutting machine which when sold was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to ultimate users or consumers.

2. the rubber cutting machine was expected to and did reach the ultimate user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold; and

3. the defective condition proximately caused the injuries to Plaintiff Martin L. Newton.

Although the Plaintiff has charged that the rubber cutting machine was defective in several ways, the Plaintiffs need prove only one such defective condition was the proximate cause of his injuries in order to recover.

Defendants have the burden of proving all of the elements of their defenses."

In reviewing the evidence and ruling upon a Motion On The Evidence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, it is the law in the Seventh Circuit that the Court looks to the State law to determine the standard governing decisions on such motions. Kuziw v. Lake Engineering Co., 586 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1978); Kudelka v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 541 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1976); Lorance v. Marion Power Shovel Co., Inc. 520 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., (N.D.Ind.1974), 65 F.R.D. 661, aff'd, 528 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir. 1976).

The law in Indiana is that motions on the evidence may be granted only where there is a complete failure of proof, considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom favorable to the non-moving party.

"The rule in Indiana with respect to motions pursuant to T.R. 50, for judgment on the evidence, is that such a motion may properly be granted only if there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference derived therefrom supporting an essential element of the claim: a complete failure of proof. When considering a motion for judgment on the evidence, the Trial Court must consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the non-moving party." Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, Ind.App., 388 N.E.2d 541 at 544 (1979).

"The motion must be denied `where there is any evidence or legitimate inference therefrom tending to support at least one of the allegations. Where the evidence is such that the minds of reasonable men might differ, a directed verdict is improper, and the resolution of conflictive evidence is for the jury.'" (Original emphasis). Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173, 179 (1976); Ortho, supra, at p. 544 (1976). In this case, therefore, the question is, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence most favorably to Plaintiffs, whether there is a complete lack of evidence to support any one of Plaintiffs' contentions that the machine was defectively designed, or that Defendant failed to provide adequate instructions or warnings.

One primary claim was that the machine was defectively designed because Defendant designed it to use a photo-electric eye for automatic activation of the cutting function of the machine. The evidence established that the Defendant designed, manufactured and sold the rubber cutting machine in question, which was the third rubber cutting machine of its type designed, manufactured and sold to Goshen Rubber Co. by Defendant. Goshen Rubber Co. contacted the Defendant several years earlier and indicated that they wanted a rubber cutting machine to use in an automatic function on a continuous flow of rubber. The first machine was designed and manufactured for use with a cyclo-monitor activating device. The second machine was changed by Defendant to use a photo-electric cell system. This change was reflected on the design drawings by Defendant, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16, a photograph of the second machine, established that this machine was designed for use with the photo-electric eye activating device. The third machine, which resulted in the injury, was ordered according to copies of the prints with the same design and a cover letter from Defendant acknowledging they were to provide the photo-cell package for the activating device for the machine.

The evidence in the record is undisputed that Defendant designed, manufactured and sold the rubber cutting machine in question and intended it to be used as a rubber cutting machine in an automatic cutting fashion with the photo-electric eye device. The evidence establishes that Defendant was engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, and selling rubber cutting machines of various types, including automatic cutting machines. The testimony of Plaintiffs' experts, Raymond Brach and John Uhran, establishes that the machine was defective in its design and should not have been designed to use a photo-electric eye for an automatic activating device in the dusty environment. The testimony was that Defendant knew or had reason to foresee or anticipate that this automatic rubber cutting machine would be used in a dusty environment, due to the common practice of using soapstone or talc or other powdery substances to lubricate the uncured rubber. In the opinion of Brach and Uhran a machine to be used in such a dusty environment should not use a photo-electric eye beam for an automatic activating device. The facts establish that the Plaintiff, Martin L. Newton, was in the process of cleaning the machine, also a reasonably foreseeable necessity in any manufacturing process. Using an airhose he blew the dust out of the machine. The dust interrupted the eyebeam causing the machine to activate and to sever his thumb and first two fingers from his left hand.

Basically, the documents provided by the Defendant with its machine were an electrical schematic from Fawick, the component provider of the brake and clutch and electrical controls, and an electrical schematic drawn by Defendant referring to the photo-electric eye hook-up, plus a one page letter of Installation and Operation instructions by Defendant (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6) and the Fawick installation manual.

Plaintiffs contended to the jury that these did not constitute either adequate operating instructions or adequate warnings. Both experts Brach and Uhran stated that there were inadequate instructions or warnings with this machine. The Fawick installation manual in fact contained no operating instructions for the machine operator. The jury could reasonably have found that no operator instructions whatsoever were provided for this machine. In addition, the jury had evidence to justify it in finding that the "Installations and Operations Instructions" from Defendant, even including the two electrical schematics and the Fawick manual were inadequate, because detailed operating instructions were not included. Plaintiff Martin L. Newton, Carroll Hobson and Jack Thompson all testified that there were no operating instructions for the machine. Carroll Hobson indicated that he had never seen any written operating instructions for the machine. Martin L. Newton testified that he was never given any written operating instructions. There were no operating instructions on the machine and no warnings on the machine. It would clearly be a permissible finding under this evidence for the jury to conclude that inadequate operating instructions and inadequate warnings were provided by Defendant for this machine. Further,...