Newton v. Office of the Architect of Capitol

• Decision Date: 14 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 10–cv–01542 (RCL).,10–cv–01542 (RCL).
• Citation: 839 F.Supp.2d 112
• Parties: Margaret D. NEWTON, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF THE ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

839 F.Supp.2d 112

Margaret D. NEWTON, Plaintiff,

v.OFFICE OF THE ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, Defendant.

No. 10–cv–01542 (RCL).

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

March 14, 2012.

Jeffrey Howard Leib, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Benton Gregory Peterson, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.

This case is related to Newton v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 840 F.Supp.2d 384, No. 10–CV–01542 (RCL), 2012 WL 768204 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2012) (Lamberth, C.J.) (“ Newton I ”). Both cases involve plaintiff Margaret Newton's allegations of unlawful racial discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation against the Office of the Architect of the Capitol (“OAC”). Before the Court is OAC's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Def.'s Mot. [8], May 20, 2011. Having carefully considered the motion, the opposition, the reply, the entire record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court will grant defendant's Motion. A review of the background of the case, the governing law, the parties' arguments, and the Court's reasoning in resolving those arguments follows.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court presented a more detailed background of this case in its Newton I Memorandum Opinion granting summary judgment in favor of the OAC. Accordingly, the Court here will only repeat the facts relevant to this subsequent action.

On October 2, 2005, the OAC hired plaintiff Margaret Newton, an African American, as a GS–12, Step 4, Human Resources Specialist in the Employee Benefits & Services Branch of its Human Resources and Management Division (“HRMD”). Am. Compl. ¶ 16. Newton's first-line supervisor during this time was Maria Wennersten, Chief of the Employee Benefits & Services Branch. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17.

In October 2006, the HRMD was reorganized and Chief Wennersten became head of a different branch. Id. ¶ 19. Because of the reorganization, from October 2006 until March 4, 2007, Newton reported directly to HRMD Director Rebecca Tiscione, who served concurrently as Acting Chief of the Employee Benefits & Services Branch. Id. ¶ 19. On March 4, 2007, Rebecca Vento was hired as the new Chief of the Employee Benefits & Services Branch and became Newton's first-line supervisor. Id. ¶ 21.

In December 2007–January 2008, Newton requested and was denied “a noncompetitive promotion” to the GS–13 level. Id. ¶¶ 11, 31. In subsequent months, Newton was placed on a “work plan” and denied an “Alternative Work Schedule.” Id. ¶ 12. On August 27, 2009, the OAC notified Newton that her position would be subject to a “classification audit” which, depending on the results, could result in a promotion or a demotion. Id. ¶¶ 37–39. Newton does not allege what resulted from this first classification audit or whether it was even completed. On March 22, 2010, the OAC notified Newton that her position would be subject to a second “classification audit.” Id. ¶ 43. The second audit concluded that Newton was performing work at the GS–12 level. Id. ¶ 49.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant OAC has moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). Def. Mot. [8]. A motion to dismiss is appropriate when a complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To overcome this hurdle, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Atherton v. District of Columbia, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C.Cir.2009), and grant a plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994).

However, the Court may not “accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Id. While a complaint does not need to contain detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint that offers “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citations omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). In other words, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950;see also Atherton, 567 F.3d at 681.

III. ANALYSIS

The OAC moves to dismiss all of Newton's claims. Def.'s Mot. [8]. As to her discrimination and retaliation claims, the OAC argues that Newton has failed to plead a prima facie case of discrimination and retaliation—specifically, that Newton has failed to plausibly allege that she was subject to an adverse employment action. Id. at 17–19, 20–22. As to her hostile work environment claims, the OAC argues that Newton's allegations demonstrate mere “isolated incidents,” not the severe and pervasive conduct required to show a hostile work environment. Id. at 12–16. Newton counters that dismissal is inappropriate because she has plausibly alleged the adverse actions necessary to survive a motion to dismiss. Pl.'s Opp'n [12] 20–29. The Court will discuss these and other arguments in the analysis that follows.

A. Discrimination & Retaliation

Newton brings various discrimination and retaliation claims against the OAC under the Congressional Accountability Act, 2 U.S.C. 1311(a)(1), 1317(a) (“CAA”) (Counts I–II, IV–VI, VII). Pursuant to the CAA, OAC employees are to be free from any discrimination based on race. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301(3)(F), 1311(a)(1). Racial discrimination under the CAA is the same as discrimination “within the meaning of section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” § 1311(a)(1). Similarly, employers cannot retaliate against employees who engage in protected activity, and CAA retaliation claims have been analyzed under the same standards as Title VII retaliation claims. See Fields v. Office of Johnson, 520 F.Supp.2d 101, 106 (D.D.C.2007).

To state a prima facie case of discrimination, Newton must plausibly allege that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting reference omitted). To state a prima facie case of retaliation, Newton must plausibly allege that “(1) [she] engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) [she] suffered a materially adverse action by her employer; and (3) that a causal link connects to two.” Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C.Cir.2009). This case centers on whether Newton has plausibly alleged that she suffered an adverse employment action.

In the discrimination context, an adverse employment action is an action with “materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Nurriddin v. Bolden, 674 F.Supp.2d 64, 89 (D.D.C.2009). In the retaliation context, a materially adverse action is one that could conceivably dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 70, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006); see also Velikonja v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 122, 124 (D.C.Cir.2006); Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C.Cir.2006). Newton has not plausibly alleged facts sufficient to meet either test.

First, Newton has not plausibly alleged an adverse action sufficient to support her discrimination claims—that is, an action “affecting the terms, conditions or privileges of employment or future employment such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Nurriddin, 674 F.Supp.2d at 89. Newton alleges that on August 27, 2009, the OAC notified her that her position would be subject to a “classification audit” which, depending on the results, could result in a promotion or a demotion. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37–39 (emphasis added). This “classification audit” is not an adverse action. Newton fails to allege that anything occurred as a result of this audit or whether the AOC even completed the audit at all. It is difficult to understand how an audit that was either never completed, or completed without any impact on Newton's job duties, could affect her employment “terms, conditions or privileges.” Nurriddin, 674 F.Supp.2d at 89. Further, courts have held that actions with some negligible impact on an employee's job, like the denial of travel to conferences, do not qualify as adverse actions. Id. Newton's case is even clearer because she does not allege that the audit even negligibly impacted the terms of her employment.

Newton also alleges that on March 22, 2010, the OAC notified her that her position would be subject to a second “classification audit.” Am. Compl. ¶ 43. This second audit concluded that Newton was performing work at the GS–12 level. ¶ 49. Again, the Court finds that this audit caused Newton no objectively tangible harm because Newton fails to allege that anything occurred as a result. Prior to, during, and after the audit, Newton was a GS–12 employee. For as much as Newton argues that the harm caused by this audit was in her failure to be promoted, she cannot bootstrap her insufficient denial of promotion claim from Newton I to this subsequent case. See Newton I, 840 F.Supp.2d at 391–98, at *5–10. Simply put, “not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse...