Newton v. South Carolina Dep't of Pub. Safety
| Decision Date | 23 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No.: 6:10-cv-01781-JMC |
| Parties | Bradley C. Newton, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety and Mark A. Keel, Individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
This matter is before the court on Defendants' South Carolina Department of Public Safety ("SCDPS") and Mark A. Keel's ("Defendant Keel"), individually, Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 12]. Based on the record before this court, Defendants' motion is granted as to Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and this matter is remanded to state court for resolution of any state law claims.
This action was commenced on June 1, 2010, by the filing of the Complaint [Doc. 1] in the Court of Common Pleas for Laurens County, South Carolina. On July 8, 2010, Defendants timely removed this action from state court to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a) and (b), based on the presence of federal claims asserted against Defendant Keel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff began his employment with SCDPS, on or about September 12, 2005, as a trainee for the position of Highway Patrol Trooper. During his employment with SCDPS, Plaintiff received satisfactory performance evaluations. Plaintiff was promoted to other positions including Trooper First Class and Senior Trooper. Plaintiff was reassigned from Troop Three in Greenville County to Troop Two in Laurens and Newberry Counties in October 2009.
On or about December 9, 2009, SCDPS terminated Plaintiff's employment for allegedly falsifying official records and exhibiting negligence in the performance of his duties relative to the mishandling of collision reports. Plaintiff filed a grievance related to his termination. At the grievance hearing, held on or about December 17, 2009, Plaintiff requested to resign his employment instead of being terminated. SCDPS accepted Plaintiff's resignation, and the parties formalized Plaintiff's separation from his employment in a Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release (the "Agreement"), dated December 22, 2009. In the Agreement, SCDPS allowed Plaintiff to resign effective December 9, 2009, in exchange for dismissing his grievance and all claims related to it. Plaintiff claims that the purpose of the Agreement was to allow him to pursue career options in law enforcement with other agencies. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated this confidential Agreement by providing alleged false information to the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy (the "Academy") that Plaintiff had resigned in lieu of termination for his violation of SCDPS's policy on misconduct and that Plaintiff was dishonest with his employer. When Plaintiff learned that Defendants had reported to the Academy that he had resigned in lieu of termination rather than only reporting that he had resigned, Plaintiff requested that Defendants restore his grievance rights. Defendants refused Plaintiff's request to have his grievance rights restored.
Plaintiff filed this action alleging causes of action against SCDPS for negligence and civil conspiracy under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, §§ 15-78-10 et. seq., and breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendant Keel, and further alleges, under section 1983, that Defendant Keel, in his capacity as Director of SCDPS, deprived Plaintiff of his right to pursue his grievance against SCDPS, thus violating his right to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Defendants seek summary judgment as to each of Plaintiff's causes of action and further assert that Defendant Keel is entitled to qualified immunity on the federal constitutional claims asserted against him in his individual capacity.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. See id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence insupport of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. See Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant Keel under section 1983. Section 1983 is the federal provision permitting a civil action for the deprivation of federally guaranteed rights. Section 1983 allows a citizen, or other person within the jurisdiction of the United States, to bring suit against any person acting under the color of law, whether state or federal, for depriving him of rights secured by the United States Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not confer a substantive right, rather it provides a "method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). The first step in analyzing a section 1983 claim is to identify the federal right that has allegedly been infringed. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Keel violated his due process and equal protection rights.
Defendants argue that, to the extent that Plaintiff's due process claim is based on the alleged breach of the Agreement, Defendant Keel is entitled to summary judgment because breach of acontract does not give rise to a claim for deprivation of due process. In cases involving due process claims for violations of the terms of a contract or settlement agreement, many courts have held that a "mere breach of contract by government does not give rise to a constitutional claim." Sudeikes v. Chicago Transit Authority, 774 F.2d 776, 770 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Manilla Investment Co. v. Trammell, 239 U.S. 31 (1915)); see also Kilcoyne v. Morgan, 664 F.2d 940, 942 (4th Cir. 1981) ; see also Heath v. City of Fairfax, 542 F.2d 1236, 1238 (4th Cir. 1976) (). To the extent that Plaintiff has alleged a violation of due process based on Defendants' alleged breach of the Agreement, the court finds that such a breach of contract alone does not give rise to a claim for deprivation of due process.
Further, Defendants argue that, to the extent that Plaintiff's due process claim is based on being denied the right to pursue his grievances, Defendant Keel is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff was an at-will employee, and thus did not have a property interest in his employment. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest because the charges against Plaintiff were true and were not made public by Defendants. A public employee cannot establish a due process claim unless the employee can show that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest protected by the clause. Bradley v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., C.A. No. 3:08-2510-JFA-JRM, 2010 WL 883729, at *16 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2010). At-will employment is not a property interest for purposes of the Due Process Clause. See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 492 (1998). However, an at-will employee may establish a due processclaim based on the deprivation of a liberty interest where an employer has deprived the employee of the "freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities." Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). To establish such a claim, an employee must allege that the employer made statements regarding the employee "that: (1) placed stigma on [the employee's] reputation; (2) were made public by the employer; (3) were made in conjunction with [the employee's] termination or demotion; and (4) were false." Sciolino v. City of Newport News, Va., 480 F.3d 642, 646 (4th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff concedes that he was an at-will employee. Thus, the court finds that Plaintiff's employment was not a property interest for purposes of the Due Process Clause.1 Therefore, the court turns to whether Plaintiff was deprived of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Plaintiff alleges that because Defendant Keel denied him the opportunity to contest the allegations against him through the grievance process, Defendant Keel impeded his ability to take advantage of other employment...
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