Newton v. State, 86, Sept. Term, 2016.
Citation | 168 A.3d 1,455 Md. 341 |
Decision Date | 23 August 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 86, Sept. Term, 2016.,86, Sept. Term, 2016. |
Parties | Donta NEWTON v. STATE of Maryland |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by Lisa J. Sansone (Law Office of Lisa J. Sansone, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.
Argued by Michelle M. Martin, Assistant Attorney General (Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.
Argued before Barbera, C.J., Greene, Adkins, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, JJ.
In postconviction cases, we must often navigate the fine line between a defendant's right to a fair trial on the one hand and the legal system's interest in finality on the other. Today we are faced with the question of whether a postconviction petitioner's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in consenting to the presence of an alternate juror during deliberations. We also address whether his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the alternate juror's presence was plain error.
On the evening of September 20, 2004, Jerrell Patillo went to "hang out" with old friends in Baltimore City, including Petitioner Donta Newton. While Newton and Patillo were talking, Newton, for no apparent reason, began shooting at Patillo. A bullet struck Patillo in the back, and he fell to the ground. Newton attempted to shoot him again, but his gun jammed, and Patillo fled down the street. After Newton cleared his gun, he ran after Patillo, shooting at him. A second bullet struck Patillo in his left buttock. He survived his injuries.
Newton was charged with attempted first-degree murder and various handgun-related offenses in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. His case was tried twice. On February 7, 2006, the first trial was declared a mistrial due to juror absences and scheduling conflicts. The court empaneled another jury and the second trial began that same day. During the second trial, the court excused one juror due to illness, and an alternate was seated in his place. Another juror requested to be excused because he had a doctor's appointment the next day. The court declined his request.
At the close of the trial, the court called State and defense counsel to the bench, and the following exchange ensued:
Before sending the jury to deliberate, the court instructed the jury and alternate:
Now, I'm going to ask that the alternate juror go to the jury room, stay with the jury until they reach a decision. However, you are the alternate juror, therefore, you are not to participate in any of the discussion. Sit and listen carefully and the reason for that is, heaven forbid something should happen that causes one of the [12] jurors not to be able to return or continue, you could become the [twelfth] juror. Please, the 12 jurors, understand that the alternate is not to be involved in the discussion, so don't let her. I think everybody will understand to participate in that, perhaps, she needs to be there to hear everything going on, so that in the unlikely event she is needed as a juror she can step right in without missing a beat, so to speak.
The jury deliberated for approximately two hours and twenty minutes. Before the jury returned, the following exchange occurred at the bench:
The jury found Newton guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder and two consecutive five-year sentences for the handgun-related charges. Newton appealed his convictions.
On appeal, Newton argued that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding reasonable doubt, attempted first-degree murder, and the handgun-related offenses. He also contended that he was not properly advised of his right to testify. Newton did not argue that the presence of the alternate juror during deliberations was plain error. The Court of Special Appeals rejected Newton's arguments and affirmed his convictions in an unreported opinion. Newton v. State , 178 Md.App. 754 (2008).
In March 2012, Newton filed a petition for postconviction relief in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act ("UPPA"), Maryland Code , §§ 7–101 through 7–109 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP"). He raised several grounds for relief, including violations of his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.1 Specifically, Newton alleged that: (1) his trial attorney was ineffective because he failed to object to an alternate juror being present in the jury room during deliberations in violation of Maryland Rule 4–312(g)(3) ;2 (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the alternate juror's presence during deliberations was plain error; and (3) the trial court erred in permitting the alternate to sit in on deliberations. In February 2013, the postconviction court found in favor of Newton, agreeing with him on all three issues.3 Accordingly, the court granted Newton a new trial. The State appealed.
The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The intermediate appellate court held that Newton's attorney made a valid strategic decision when he agreed to let the alternate sit in on deliberations, and therefore was not ineffective. State v. Newton , 230 Md.App. 241, 270–71, 146 A.3d 1204 (2016). The court further held that Newton's appellate counsel's performance was not deficient because it was unlikely that the presence of the alternate would be deemed plain error, especially given that trial counsel had agreed to the arrangement. Id. at 272–73, 146 A.3d 1204. The court did not address whether the trial court erred in instructing the alternate to sit in on deliberations. Id. at 245, 146 A.3d 1204 n.2.
We granted Newton's Petition for Certiorari to consider the following questions:4
Because we answer these questions in the negative, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
The review of a postconviction court's findings regarding ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. Harris v. State , 303 Md. 685, 698, 496 A.2d 1074 (1985). Because we are not finders of fact, we defer to the factual findings of the postconviction court unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 698, 496 A.2d 1074. But we review the court's legal conclusion regarding whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated without deference. Id. at 697, 496 A.2d 1074 (citations omitted). We "re-weigh" the facts in light of the law to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred. Id. at 698, 496 A.2d 1074 (citations omitted).
Newton urges us to affirm the judgment of the postconviction court granting him a new trial. He argues that his trial counsel was deficient because he failed to object to an alternate juror being present during jury deliberations. He also asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective because she did not raise the alternate juror issue on appeal.5 The State, on the other hand, maintains that neither Newton's trial counsel nor his appellate counsel were ineffective because they both made valid tactical decisions.
Newton argues that his trial counsel was deficient because he was ignorant of Stokes v. State , 379 Md. 618, 843 A.2d 64 (2004), in which this Court held that it was reversible error for the court to send an alternate juror into deliberations over defense counsel's objection. Id. at 629, 642, 843 A.2d 64. Without knowledge of this case, Newton claims, his trial counsel could not have made a valid tactical decision when he acquiesced to the alternate's presence. Newton further argues that the alternate's presence during deliberations was structural error, and, therefore, prejudice is presumed under the Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test. Alternatively, if prejudice is not presumed, Newton contends, he was prejudiced because had his trial counsel objected to the presence of the alternate, he would have been granted a new trial on appeal.
This case requires us to analyze how structural error interacts with a postconviction ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. We begin with a discussion of these two doctrines.
In general, when an...
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