Neylon v. Cnty. of Inyo
| Decision Date | 25 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:16-CV-0712 AWI JLT |
| Parties | MELISSA M. NEYLON, Plaintiffs v. COUNTY OF INYO, INYO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, BILL LUTZE, DOUGLAS RICHARDS, and DOES 1 to 50, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE
This case stems from the erroneous arrest by Inyo County Sheriff's deputies of Plaintiff Melissa Neylon ("Neylon"), pursuant to an outstanding warrant from Indiana for a Melissa Chapman ("Chapman"). The operative complaint is the Fourth Amended Complaint ("FAC"). Neylon now moves under Rule 12(f) to dismiss all affirmative defenses alleged in the Answer. For the reasons that follow, Neylon's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.1
From the Complaint, Neylon was at the Inyo County Jail in connection with her employment on December 4, 2015. At the Jail, Neylon was arrested and imprisoned based on an outstanding felony warrant from Indiana for Chapman. Neylon's association with the Indiana warrant was solely based on an alleged hit on one of Neylon's former legal names, after the former legal name appeared on a database. Defendant Sgt. Douglas Richards ("Richards") of the Inyo County Sheriff's Office mistakenly identified Neylon as Chapman. After Neylon's arrest, Richards received information about Chapman's height, weight, hair, eye color, and date of birth.The subsequent information about Chapman was not conclusive and not sufficiently similar to Neylon. Neylon was imprisoned and charged with a felony crime based on the Indiana warrant for Chapman.
On December 18, 2015, an Identity Hearing ("ID Hearing") before Judge Lamb of the Inyo County Superior Court was held. Richards testified that there was a "Live Scan" fingerprint match between Neylon and Chapman. This testimony was allegedly false. There was no fingerprint match between Neylon and Chapman. Based in part on Richards's misrepresentation, Judge Lamb decided to continue to hold Neylon.
On December 21, 2015, Neylon was finally released from Jail, and employees of the Inyo County Sheriff's office understood that Neylon was not in fact Chapman.
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to strike from "any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion is to avoid the costs that arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial. See Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir 2010); Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.1983). Immaterial matter is defined as matter that "has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded." Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 974. Impertinent matter is defined as "statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question." Id. Scandalous matters are allegations "that unnecessarily reflects on the moral character of an individual or states anything in repulsive language that detracts from the dignity of the court," and "includes allegations that cast a cruelly derogatory light on a party or other person." Quatela v. Stryker Corp., 820 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Redundant allegations are allegations that "constitute a needless repetition of other averments or are foreign to the issue." Wilkerson v. Butler, 229 F.R.D. 166, 170 (E.D. Cal. 2005). Granting a motion to strike may be proper if it will make the trial less complicated or if allegations being challenged are so unrelated to plaintiff's claims as to be unworthy of any consideration as adefense and that their presence in the pleading will be prejudicial to the moving party. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1993).2
An affirmative defense may be insufficient either as a matter of law or as a matter of pleading. Gomez v. J. Jacobo Farm Labor Contr., Inc., 188 F.Supp.3d 986, 991 (E.D. Cal. 2016). An affirmative defense is legally insufficient if it "lacks merit under any set of facts the defendant might allege." Id. (quoting Dodson v. Strategic Restaurants Acquisition Co., 289 F.R.D. 595, 603 (E.D. Cal. 2013)). Affirmative defenses are insufficient as a matter of pleading if they fail to give the plaintiff "fair notice of the defense." Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010); Wyshak v. City Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979); Gomez, 188 F.Supp.3d at 991. "'[T]he fair notice' required by the pleading standards only requires describing [an affirmative] defense in 'general terms.'" Kohler v. Flava Enters., Inc., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015); Gomez, 188 F.Supp.3d at 991. "Fair notice . . . requires that the defendant state the nature and grounds for the affirmative defense." Gomez, 188 F.Supp.3d at 992; United States v. Gibson Wine Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55053, *13(E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016). "Although 'fair notice' is a low bar that does not require great detail, it does require a defendant to provide 'some factual basis' for its affirmative defense." Gomez, 188 F.Supp.3d at 992; Gibson Wine, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55053 at *13. Fact barren affirmative defenses or bare references to doctrines or statues are unacceptable because they "do not afford fair notice of the nature of the defense pleaded." Gomez, 188 F.Supp.3d at 992; Gibson Wine, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55053 at *14.
Neylon argues that the defense is legally insufficient to the extent that Defendants are attempting to apply qualified immunity to the state law claims. Neylon also argues that the defense is factually insufficient in that it is nothing more than a fact-barren reference to qualified immunity. Further, the defense is a redundant negative defense because it denies liability byalleging defects in her prima facie case. Finally, the defense is immaterial to the extent that it suggests that any defendant subjectively acted in good faith.
Defendants argue that the first affirmative defense should not be stricken. First, the defense is not being asserted against state law claims. Second, qualified immunity is well known, and the allegations give Neylon fair notice. Third, Neylon cites no authority that the defense is a redundant negative defense. Finally, the defense is not impertinent or immaterial because the good faith allegation is a way of alleging that the defendants did not knowingly violate the law.
The first affirmative defense reads:
At all times mentioned in the Complaint, the individual Defendants were acting in good faith and are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). County of Inyo personnel acted in good faith, and did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights in the arrest and detention of Melissa Neylon.
Plaintiffs are correct that qualified immunity has no application to the state law claims in this case. Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 724 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2013). However, Defendants confirm that they are not asserting qualified immunity against any state law claims. See Doc. No. 59 at 4:23. Given Defendants' confirmation and the well-established rule that qualified immunity does not apply to state law claims, the Court will read the first affirmative defense as applying only to the individual defendants3 and to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
With respect to factual sufficiency, the Court is satisfied that fair notice has been given. The allegations do not simply state that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity and stop there. The allegations expressly identify the affirmative defense, cite pertinent authority that describes the defense, and state that the officers did not violate clearly established law in connection with the arrest and detention of Neylon. Given the nature of qualified immunity, andthe fact that it is a well established, often litigated, and well understood defense, it is unclear what further factual allegations should be included in order to provide "fair notice." While it would certainly be possible for Defendants to cite other precedent that supports their assertion of qualified immunity, or to specifically identify what unique factual aspects of this case show that the law was not clearly established, such allegations would only be needed to meet a heightened pleading standard. Cf. Gomez, 188 F.Supp.3d at 991-92 (). All that is required is "fair notice," which is a fairly low bar. Id. at 992. Because Defendants have expressly identified the defense, their particular conduct that should be immune, and stated that their particular conduct did not violate clearly established law, Defendants have done enough to adequately plead qualified immunity. Cf. Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827 ().
With respect to redundancy, Neylon is correct that "negative" defenses, i.e. defenses that simply negate an element of the plaintiff's claim or defenses that state the plaintiff cannot meet her burden as to an element of proof, are not affirmative defenses. See Zivkovic v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002); Gomez, 188 F.Supp.3d at 991; Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan, ...
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