Neyman v. Buckley, 2203 EDA 2015
| Decision Date | 28 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2203 EDA 2015,2203 EDA 2015 |
| Citation | 153 A.3d 1010 |
| Parties | Freyda NEYMAN, Appellant v. Florence BUCKLEY |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Rosiland B. Marshall, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Appellant, Freyda Neyman, appeals from the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Family Court Division that dismissed her complaint in divorce seeking the dissolution of her Vermont civil union. Appellant claims the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and in support, she argues that under principles of comity, the Family Court Division had jurisdiction to dissolve her civil union under the Pennsylvania Divorce Code.1 We hold that a Vermont civil union creates the functional equivalent of marriage for the purposes of dissolution and conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
On July 12, 2002, Appellant and Appellee, Florence Buckley (collectively, "the parties"), two adult Pennsylvania residents, entered into a civil union in Vermont, the first state to offer civil unions. The parties began living separate and apart in December 2002. At that time, same-sex marriage was not recognized in the United States.
In 2014, the parties each signed respective affidavits of consent, which specified that their civil union was irretrievably broken and stated the intention to request a final decree of divorce/dissolution. On June 2, 2014, Appellant filed a complaint in the trial court averring that the parties were adults who had resided in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for at least six months prior to the complaint and seeking the entry of a divorce/dissolution decree under Section 3301(c) of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code. On February 4, 2015, Appellant filed a praecipe to transmit the record of the entry of a final decree/dissolution of the civil union.
On June 22, 2015, the trial court dismissed Appellant's complaint stating:
[T]he Family Court Division may only divorce parties from the ‘bonds of matrimony.’ Pa.R.C.P. 1920.1 (a). This court cannot issue a Decree or Order dissolving the Vermont Civil Union that is the subject of this action. Therefore, the Complaint in Divorce is hereby dismissed. The Civil Trial Division of Philadelphia County has jurisdiction over complaints seeking dissolution of civil unions as actions in equity and has entered order/judgments dissolving same.
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court did not address. Appellant took the instant timely appeal on July 22, 2015. On August 20, 2015, Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.
The trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) responsive opinion on February 23, 2016. The court observed the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968 vests jurisdiction in the family court division for matters implicating domestic relations, including "divorce and annulment and property matters relating thereto." Trial Ct. Op., 2/23/16, at 6–7 ). The court concluded the Divorce Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure refer to "divorce from the bonds of matrimony," and did not authorize the dissolution of civil unions. Id. at 4–5. Moreover, the court determined it was under no obligation to recognize a Vermont civil union as a marriage because Vermont maintains a distinction between a civil union and a same-sex civil marriage. Id. at 5. Lastly, the court noted that the appropriate forum for Appellant's action was in the civil trial division. Id. at 8.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:
As the instant case involves the question of whether a legal cause of action in dissolution exists, our standard of review is de novo and this Court must independently review the record to determine whether a legal divorce action is presented. Jayne v. Jayne , 443 Pa.Super. 664, 663 A.2d 169, 172 (1995).
As to the jurisdiction of the family court divisions of the courts of common pleas, Section 952 of the Judiciary Code provides:
The divisions of a court of common pleas are administrative units composed of those judges of the court responsible for the transaction of specified classes of the business of the court. In a court of common pleas having two or more divisions each division of the court is vested with the full jurisdiction of the whole court, but the business of the court may be allocated among the divisions of the court by or pursuant to general rules.
42 Pa.C.S. § 952.
The Schedule to Article 5 of the 1968 Pennsylvania Constitution pertains to Philadelphia and states:
Pa. Const. Sched. Art. 5, § 16 (q)(i)
The Divorce Code defines "divorce" as "divorce from the bonds of matrimony."4 23 Pa.C.S. § 3103 ; see also Pa.R.C.P. 1920.1. The courts of common pleas have "original jurisdiction in cases of divorce and for the annulment of void or voidable marriages[.]" 23 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a).
Courts with jurisdiction of domestic relations have broad jurisdiction to resolve matters uniquely pertaining to matrimonial causes, including disposition of property between the parties, issues related to children, and to resolve "[a]ny other matters ... which fairly and expeditiously may be determined and disposed of in such action." 23 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a)(5). The Divorce Code aims to "[m]ake the law for legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience." 23 Pa.C.S. § 3102(a)(1).
The family court division, therefore, may exercise broad equitable power:
In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the parties or to effectuate the purposes of this part and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require against either party or against any third person over whom the court has jurisdiction and who is involved in or concerned with the disposition of the cause.
23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f). In Magee v. Magee , 360 Pa.Super. 66, 519 A.2d 994 (1987), this Court discussed the specialized role of the family court division as follows:
The Family Court Division has all the powers that can be exercised by a court of common pleas. The need to have all matters relating to family problems directed to this specialized division is obvious, particularly when there are different claims relating to the same issue, as is the case here. Obviously, the Family Division judge is equally competent to decide the action in assumpsit, if properly brought, relating to support, medical expenses and education, founded on contract law under a separation agreement, as he is to determine the same matters under statutory and common law, pursuant to a complaint in support.
A brief review of the evolution of Pennsylvania, Vermont, and federal law regarding same-sex marriage and civil unions provides necessary context to understanding the legal properties of a Vermont civil union vis-a-vis Pennsylvania law. In September 1996, the United States Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), which codified a definition of "marriage" and "spouse" as follows: "the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." See 1 U.S.C. § 7. Additionally, DOMA provided:
No State ... shall be required to give effect to any public act ... of any other State ... respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State ... or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
See 28 U.S.C § 1738C.
One month later, in October 1996, Pennsylvania amended its Marriage Law to include a definition of marriage and mandate the non-recognition of marriage between persons of the same sex. Specifically, Section 1102 states:
23 Pa.C.S. § 1102. Section 1704 provides:
It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding public policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one woman. A marriage between persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.
23 Pa.C.S. § 1704.
In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held that the Vermont Constitution required same-sex couples be afforded the same statutory rights and protections as opposite-sex couples. Baker v. State , 170 Vt. 194, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (1999). However, the Baker Court did not mandate that same-sex couples be permitted to marry. Id. at 867. Rather, the Court required the Vermont legislature to take action to comply with its holding. Id. at 867. In 2000, the Vermont legislature responded to Baker by creating a civil union scheme.
The Vermont civil union statute specifically provided "all the...
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