Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 94-1341

Citation44 F.3d 234
Decision Date20 January 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-1341,94-1341
Parties129 Lab.Cas. P 57,826, 31 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1238, 10 IER Cases 329 Hung P. NGUYEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CNA CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

ARGUED: John William Toothman, John W. Toothman, P.C., Alexandria, VA, for appellant. Deborah Brand Baum, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, DC, for appellee. ON BRIEF: Teresa L. Diaz, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, Washington, DC, for appellee.

Before LUTTIG and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and CHASANOW, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILLIAMS wrote the opinion, in which Judge LUTTIG and Judge CHASANOW joined.

OPINION

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Hung P. Nguyen filed this diversity action against his former employer, the CNA Corporation (CNA), after CNA refused Nguyen's request to return to employment with the company following a leave of absence. In his two-count amended complaint, Nguyen alleged the following: (1) that CNA's employee manual, alone or in combination with other statements, created an implied employment contract under which CNA could only refuse Nguyen's return from a leave of absence for "just cause," which CNA did not have under the facts presented; and, (2) in the alternative, that promissory estoppel barred CNA from refusing Nguyen's request to return from leave. CNA moved for, and the district court granted, summary judgment on both the contract and promissory estoppel claims. Nguyen now appeals, challenging not only the district court's reasoning on the merits but also a number of alleged procedural mistakes the district court made in reaching its decision. We conclude that the district court made no errors in granting summary judgment in CNA's favor and affirm the decision below.

I.

CNA, formerly known as the Center for Naval Analysis, is a private military research organization that specializes in the research of defense-related issues for the United States Navy. In March of 1989, Nguyen began working for CNA as a Research Analyst, where his primary initial responsibility was researching the Soviet Union's naval capabilities. In this capacity, Nguyen participated in a CNA research project in which he studied Soviet military press publications to determine whether the Soviet Union possessed the technological capabilities to detect nuclear submarines from orbiting space satellites. In August of 1991, Nguyen circulated to his superiors the product of his studies: an essay in which he posited that the Soviets were more proficient at detecting nuclear submarines in deep ocean waters from space than the Navy had thought possible up to that point.

The parties view the events following Nguyen's circulation of the report very differently. Nguyen maintains that certain superiors were upset about the paper because of its potential negative impact on continued funding for the United States submarine fleet. Nguyen argues that this fear on the part of certain CNA superiors created the subsequent employment problems that beset Nguyen at CNA. CNA contends, however, that whatever the implications of the paper, the overall project on which Nguyen was working--studies of the Soviet military press to determine Soviet military advances--had come to a conclusion around the time the paper was circulated, and CNA further asserts that Nguyen was having trouble performing on other research projects and in other roles with CNA.

Both parties agree that in January of 1992, Nguyen requested and was granted a four-month leave of absence beginning in March of that year to finish a doctoral thesis at Johns Hopkins University. The parties disagree, however, on the circumstances and implications of Nguyen's decision to take the leave. In any event, in June of 1992, after his four-month leave was almost over, Nguyen sought reinstatement at CNA as a Research Analyst. CNA denied his application for reinstatement.

Nguyen responded to this decision by filing suit against CNA on October 19, 1993. Nguyen alleges in Count I of his amended complaint that the company's employee manual, alone or in combination with other statements, created an implied employment contract pursuant to which CNA could only discharge him or refuse his return from a leave of absence for "just cause." Nguyen alternatively alleges in Count II that under a promissory estoppel theory of liability, CNA could not refuse Nguyen's request to return from leave.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CNA on both counts of the amended complaint. As to the implied contract theory in Count I, the district court ruled that CNA was entitled to summary judgment on two grounds. First, the district court held that the employee manual and other statements did not form the basis of an enforceable contract because the manual contained a valid disclaimer. Thus, as a matter of law, Nguyen was precluded from claiming that he had anything but an at-will employment relationship with CNA. Second, the district court ruled that even if the employee manual, alone or in combination with other written statements, otherwise transformed the employment relationship from one of at-will employment to one allowing termination for cause only, those writings did not meet the requirements of the Virginia statute of frauds. Because the district court ruled for CNA as a matter of law on Count I, it necessarily denied Nguyen's cross-motion for summary judgment as to liability on that same count. As to the promissory estoppel theory alleged in Count II, the district court additionally held that Nguyen's theory must fail as a matter of law because, even assuming Virginia had adopted the theory of promissory estoppel, there was no enforceable, definite and explicit promise. Finally, the district court held that the following motions were rendered moot by his earlier rulings: (1) Nguyen's cross-motion for summary judgment based solely upon Nguyen's contention that his requests for admissions were admitted by default when CNA was one day late in filing its responses; and, (2) Nguyen's apparent request, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), for more time in which to complete discovery before ruling on the motion for summary judgment. We review Nguyen's appeal from each of these rulings in turn.

II.

We review the district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Lockhart v. United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Trust, 5 F.3d 74, 77 (4th Cir.1993); Miller v. FDIC, 906 F.2d 972, 974 (4th Cir.1990). In conducting this review, we apply the same legal standards as the district court. Ramos v. Southern Maryland Elect. Co-op., Inc., 996 F.2d 52, 53 (4th Cir.1993). The district court should only grant a motion for summary judgment where there is no genuine dispute as to an issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). As this Court recently summarized:

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to show absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The opposing party must demonstrate that a triable issue of fact exists; he may not rest upon mere allegations or denials. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the case is insufficient. Id.

Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 67, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994). All reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). And yet, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. Finally, the district court's grant of summary judgment may be affirmed on different grounds than that on which the district court relied. Keller v. Prince George's County, 923 F.2d 30, 32 (4th Cir.1991) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1156 n. 6, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970)); Farwell v. Un, 902 F.2d 282, 283 (4th Cir.1990).

A.

We turn first to the district court's grant of summary judgment for CNA on the implied contract theory contained in Count I. CNA maintains that an at-will employment relationship existed between itself and Nguyen, and, accordingly, the company was justified, as a matter of law, in denying Nguyen's request for return from leave. Nguyen maintains, however, that an employee manual distributed to him by CNA, as well as statements made to him by various CNA managers, transformed his at-will employment relationship into one in which CNA could only terminate or refuse a request for return from a leave of absence for cause and only after following certain procedures as specified in the manual. Nguyen further maintains that the facts surrounding this transformation into a for-cause termination relationship create material issues of fact precluding summary judgment and mandating reversal of the district court in this case. Applying choice of law rules of the state in which it sat, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021-22, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941), the district court correctly determined that Virginia law governs the contract issues in this matter because the parties entered into the employment relationship (and, more specifically, the alleged implied contract) in Virginia. Rossman v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 282, 287 (4th Cir.1987) (applying Virginia law to determine that the substantive law of...

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