Nguyen v. Knowles

• Decision Date: 21 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. CIV S-03-2381 MCE GGH P,CIV S-03-2381 MCE GGH P
• Parties: LEN NGUYEN, Petitioner, v. M. KNOWLES, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

LEN NGUYEN, Petitioner,

v.M. KNOWLES, Warden, Respondent.

No. CIV S-03-2381 MCE GGH P

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: March 21, 2011

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding with appointed counsel, has filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted in San Joaquin County Superior Court following a jury trial in 1997 of first degree murder, attempted murder and carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle for which he was sentenced to a term of 25 years to life. Amended Petition (AP) (docket # 23), p. 1. Petitioner raises the following grounds: 1) insufficient evidence to sustain the first degree murder conviction (also applicable to petitioner's conviction for attempted murder); 2) trial court's failure to identify and define the "target offenses" under the natural and probable consequences doctrine violated petitioner's due process rights; 3) prosecutorial misconduct violated petitioner's right to due process; 4) cumulative effect of errorsviolated petitioner's due process rights. AP, pp. 5-24.¹

II. AEDPA

The statutory limitations of federal courts' power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has recently held and reconfirmed "that § 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 'adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785 (U.S. 2011). Rather, "when a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absenceof any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Id. at 784-785, citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S.Ct. 1038 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when it is unclear whether a decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another basis). "The presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's decision is more likely." Id. at 785.

The Supreme Court has set forth the operative standard for federal habeas review of state court decisions under AEDPA as follows: "For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), 'an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.'" Harrington, supra, 131 S.Ct. at 785, citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786, citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (2004). Accordingly, "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or.. could have supported[ ] the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. "Evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.'" Id. Emphasizing the stringency of this standard, which "stops short of imposing a complete bar of federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings[,]" the Supreme Court has cautioned that "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id., citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2003).

The undersigned also finds that the same deference is paid to the factual determinations of state courts. Under § 2254(d)(2), factual findings of the state courts are presumed to be correct subject only to a review of the record which demonstrates that the factual finding(s) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts inlight of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." It makes no sense to interpret "unreasonable" in § 2254(d)(2) in a manner different from that same word as it appears in § 2254(d)(1)-i.e., the factual error must be so apparent that "fairminded jurists" examining the same record could not abide by the state court factual determination. A petitioner must show clearly and convincingly that the factual determination is unreasonable. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 969, 974 (2006).

The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002). Specifically, the petitioner "must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, supra, 131 S.Ct. at 786-787. "Clearly established" law is law that has been "squarely addressed" by the United States Supreme Court. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746 (2008). Thus, extrapolations of settled law to unique situations will not qualify as clearly established. See e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653-54 (2006) (established law not permitting state sponsored practices to inject bias into a criminal proceeding by compelling a defendant to wear prison clothing or by unnecessary showing of uniformed guards does not qualify as clearly established law when spectators' conduct is the alleged cause of bias injection). The established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 9, 123 S. Ct. 362, 366 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early, supra, 537 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. at 365. Where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in adjudication of thatissue. "Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable." Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. Background

Petitioner relies on the facts of the offenses as set forth in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision which consolidated all of the direct appeals of petitioner and his three co-defendants in an unpublished decision, People v. Kiet Tran, et al., 2003 WL 21061575 (Cal. App.3rd Dist. May 13, 2003). See Amended Petition (AP), p. 2 n. 1. Respondent asks the court, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 201, to take judicial notice of the Findings and Recommendations, ² in a co-defendant's, Nhat Nguyen's, federal habeas petition, Nguyen v. Kane, Case No. 2:04-CV-1829 GEB JFM (HC) (2009 WL 3823962) (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2009), a copy of which respondent attaches as Exhibit A to the Answer. Answer, p. 5 & Ex. A. Although petitioner disagrees with the ultimate conclusions drawn by Magistrate Judge Moulds, he concedes that judicial notice may be taken of the decisions of other courts pursuant to Rule 201(b)(2).³ The undersigned grants the request for judicial notice of November 13, 2009 Findings and Recommendations of Nguyen v. Kane, Case No. 2:04-CV-1829 GEB JFM (HC). See United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) ("a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases...."). Judge Moulds in his Findings and Recommendations takes the facts from the same Third District Court of Appeal opinion⁴ that petitioner cites.Sixteen-year-old Andy Tran suffered a fatal gunshot wound to his chest as he ducked behind the couch in a friend's living room. An adult houseguest in the home, Sen Dang, was also shot, but not fatally, during the same incident. A jury convicted defendants Kiet Ahn Tran (Kiet), Si Van Dang (Si), Nhat Minh Nguyen (Nhat), and Len Nguyen (Len) of the first degree murder of Andy Tran (Andy) (Pen.Code, § 187) FN1 and the attempted murder of Sen Dang (§§ 664/187).FN2

FN1. Unless otherwise designated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

FN2. Because several defendants, the deceased, and some witnesses have identical surnames, for clarity and out of no disrespect, we shall refer to the defendants and the deceased by their first names.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Because defendants contest the sufficiency of the evidence, " 'we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.' " (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 864 P.2d 103, citation omitted.) Based on that standard, the...