Nibbs v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 08 February 1995
• Docket Number: D. Ct. App. Civ. No. 1991-029
• Citation: 31 V.I. 196
• Parties: CHARLES NIBBS, Individually, and as a Government Employee, Appellant v. DEBRA ROBERTS, Appellee
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

31 V.I. 196

CHARLES NIBBS, Individually,and as a Government Employee, Appellant v. DEBRA ROBERTS, Appellee

D. Ct. App. Civ. No. 1991-029

District Court of the Virgin Islands Div. of St. Croix

February 8, 1995

Appeal from a final judgment of the Territorial Court in an action brought pursuant to the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act, and the common law. District Court, Moore, J., affirmed on all counts except remanded the determination of official liability on the part of the government and the defendant, and reduced the amount of money awarded for nominal damages.

[Headnotes classified to Virgin Islands Digest]

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MICHAEL A. JOSEPH, ESQ., Christiansted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for Appellant

YVETTE D. ROSS, ESQ., (LAW OFFICES OF GEORGE W. CANNON, JR.), Frederiksted, St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for Appellee

MOORE, Chief Judge, District Court of the Virgin Islands; WATSON, Judge of the United States Court of International Trade, Southern District of New York, Sitting by Designation; and MEYERS, Judge of the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John, Sitting by Designation.

On Appeal from the

Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands

OPINION OF THE COURT

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Territorial Court in an action brought pursuant to the federal civil rights statute, 42U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 33, §§ 3401-16 (1994) ("VITCA"), and the common law.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This appeal arose out of events occurring on July 26, 1989, which led to the arrest of Debra Roberts ("appellee" or "Roberts") by Charles Nibbs, a Virgin Islands Police Officer ("appellant" or "Nibbs"). The facts leading to Roberts' arrest, though at points disputed, are not complex, and may be stated simply. Appellee, a 1989 graduate of Central High School, St. Croix, was employed by the Virgin Islands Department of Education as a summer school counselor at Central High School Annex. On July 26, 1989, between 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m., she was waiting inside the Annex's gate to be picked up by her mother. A fight erupted nearby, drawing a large crowd; Roberts was not involved in the fight. The police were called, and appellant, the officer responding to the call, attempted to disperse the crowd. According to Nibbs, he gave a command over the loud speaker of his squad car for "everyone" to wait across the street. Appellee admitted she heard the command, started to move away from the gate and toward the school, because that was where she normally waited for her mother and she didn't believe the command was directed to her since she was not part of the crowd or fight. Nibbs, on observing Roberts ignoring his instructions, ran to her and grabbed her arm. Appellee claimed that as her arm was grabbed roughly she instinctively jerked it away, knocking appellants' hat off in the process. Nibbs then pushed Roberts towards his squad car, "slamming" her head against the vehicle and striking her with his hands and club. Appellee stated that even though she became very cooperative after appellant's assault, she was nonetheless handcuffed, "shoved" into the back of Nibbs' squad car, taken to the stationhouse, and placed in a cell. Appellee testified that on the way to the police station, appellant told her "to shut up or he would shut her up." The record shows that she was taken before a judge to be advised of her rights within an hour and promptly released.

Upon her release, appellee went to the emergency room at St. Croix Hospital, where pain killers were prescribed and she wasreferred to the surgical clinic. She did not go to the clinic, but went to see her private physician three days later. Appellee sustained several injuries to her body, including bruised ribs, a swollen neck, a scar on her arm, and an injury to her back which was described as "a little out of place." The criminal charges filed against Roberts were dismissed.

A. The Claims or Pleadings

On January 25, 1990, appellee brought an action in the Territorial Court against appellant and the Government of the Virgin Islands ("Government") for damages. The complaint stated claims against Officer Nibbs personally, acting in his individual capacity, for the common law torts of assault and battery, false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("Common Law Claims"), and, by the use of excessive force, for deprivation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("1983 Claim"). Pursuant to the theory of respondeat superior, the Common Law Claims were also brought against the Government under the VITCA by naming Nibbs in his official capacity as a police officer acting within the scope of his employment ("VITCA Claims").

Appellant filed an answer generally denying the specific allegations of the complaint, but not raising the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Appendix ("App.") at 9b.

B. Proceedings before the Trial Court

The case was tried on March 18 and 19, 1991, with a jury determining the liability of Nibbs, in his individual capacity, for the 1983 Claim of excessive force and the Common Law Claims of assault and battery, false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The VITCA Claims against the Government of the Virgin Islands and Officer Nibbs in his official capacity were tried to the bench.¹ At the close of appellee's case below, both counsel for the Government and for appellant moved for directed verdicts under Fed. R. Civ. R 50. The court denied Nibbs' motion for adirected verdict on the individual liability claims, and thus allowed the case to go to the jury on the 1983 Claims and on the Common Law Claims against Nibbs, individually.

On March 20, 1991, the jury returned a verdict finding appellant liable on all counts and assessing damages of $20,000 compensatory, $10,000 punitive and $5,000 "nominal" damages.² On the same day, the trial judge dismissed the vicarious liability claims tried to the court against the Government on the grounds that Officer Nibbs could not have acted in his "individual capacity," as was found by the jury, and at the same time be found to have actedin his "official capacity" to make the Government liable. Thus, in the view of the trial judge, the sole question for the court as fact finder on the VITCA Claims was "whether the officer acted in his individual capacity or in his official capacity. If he acted in his official capacity, then the government is liable. If he acted in his individual capacity, then the government is not liable." App. at 12a. The trial judge then ruled that he was constrained to dismiss the claims brought pursuant to VITCA against Officer Nibbs and the Government of the Virgin Islands, even though he "would have found liability, and . . . would have awarded damages irrespective of the capacity question." Id. at 15a. On September 24, 1991, the court entered an order of judgment, adopting its oral renderings from the bench without any elaboration.

II. OVERVIEW OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

Officer Nibbs raises numerous challenges to the jury's verdict and the trial court's findings and conclusions of law. Primarily, Nibbs contends that he could not be liable in his individual capacity: first, because the Government asserted that appellant was acting in his official capacity and joined in his motion for a directed verdict, and second, because he did not act in so outrageous and excessively violent a manner as to make him liable in his individual capacity, rather than in his official capacity. Appellant's last argument along this line is that the trial court committed reversible error in its instructions to the jury on the standard for a civil rights violation under section 1983.

Secondarily, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the jury's verdict. He contends that the record does not support an award of punitive damages, nor does it support the jury's finding of intentional and/or reckless infliction of emotional distress. Finally, Nibbs argues that the trial court abused its discretion in two respects: one, by admitting into evidence an order dismissing the criminal charges against appellee; and two, by admitting evidence of a jury verdict against another police officer who was a key witness for appellant.

We disagree with Nibbs on all issues raised. In particular, we find that appellant misapprehends the law when he contends that he may not be held liable in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. We also find that the trial court erred harmlessly in appellant's favor in instructing the jury on the legal requirement for an excessive force claim under section 1983. We further find that both appellant and the trial judge were incorrect in their understanding of the distinction between an official-capacity suit and an individual-capacity suit under section 1983, and based on this misapprehension of the law, the trial court committed plain error when it dismissed the official-capacity claims brought against appellant and the Government pursuant to VITCA. We therefore remand with instructions.

III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 33. The trial court's decision concerning the application of a legal precept is subject to plenary review. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Etienne, 28 V.I. 121, 127, 810 F. Supp. 659, 662 (D.V.I. APR 1992); Ross v. Bricker, 26 V.I. 314, 318, 770 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (D.V.I. APP. 1991). The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 4 V.I.C. § 33; Christian v. Joseph, 23 V.I. 193, 198 (D.V.I. APR 1987); Ascencio v. Ramirez, 20 V.I. 508, 513 (D.V.I. APP. 1984). Appellate courts will not disturb factual findings unless "the determination [of the trial court] is either (1) completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of credibility,...