Nichol v. Arin Intermediate Unit 28
| Decision Date | 25 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-CV-646.,03-CV-646. |
| Parties | Brenda NICHOL, Plaintiff, v. ARIN INTERMEDIATE UNIT 28; Robert H. Coad, Jr., Executive Director, Arin Intermediate Unit 28, in his personal and official capacities, John T. Smith, Jr., Director of Special Education, Arin Intermediate Unit 28, in his personal and official capacities, Robert T. Truscello, Supervisor, Arin Intermediate Unit 28, in his personal and official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Joseph L. Luciana, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Pittsburgh, PA, Kristina J. Wenberg, Vincent P. McCarthy, American Center for Law & Justice, New Milford, CT, for Plaintiff.
Richard B. Tucker, III, Gary J. Gushard, Tucker Arensberg, Anthony G. Sanchez, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.
The "Garb Statute," a provision of the Pennsylvania School Code, prohibits teachers and certain other Pennsylvania public school professional employees from wearing religious dress, marks, garb, emblems or insignia while performing their duties in public schools. 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 11-1112, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, art. XI, § 1112. The "Religious Affiliations" policy adopted by defendant ARIN Intermediate Unit 28 ("ARIN") prohibits all of its employees from wearing "religious emblems, dress, or insignia" in schools under ARIN's authority, specifically including religious jewelry such as "crosses and Stars of David" as examples of prohibited religious apparel or accessories.
On April 8, 2003, Brenda Nichol was suspended pursuant to the Garb Statute and ARIN's Religious Affiliations policy from her job as an instructional assistant at the Penns Manor Area Elementary School ("Penns Manor"), a school within Intermediate Unit 28, for refusing to comply with her supervisor's request that she remove or conceal a small cross she regularly wore on a necklace.
Because this Court finds that ARIN's Religious Affiliations policy violates the Free Exercise of Religion and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, that Ms. Nichol will suffer irreparable injury in the event the Court does not grant her request for injunctive relief, and that the balance of equities (i.e., the harm to plaintiff if the Court does not grant a preliminary injunction versus any harm to other parties and to the public if such relief is granted) weighs in her favor, the Court finds the ARIN's Religious Affiliations policy unconstitutional, and will direct defendants to reinstate Ms. Nichol to her former position pending disposition of plaintiffs request for a permanent injunction.
On May 6, 2003, plaintiff filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief, and a motion for a preliminary injunction, with Ms. Nichol's affidavit attached, requesting this Court, inter alia, to declare the Garb Statute and the Religious Affiliations policy unconstitutional under the Free Speech and Free Exercise of Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, enjoin the enforcement of the statute and policy, and reinstate her to her former position as instructional assistant.
On May 8, 2003, the parties filed a joint stipulation of facts (Document No. 9), and defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (Document No. 10) for failure to state a claim, along with a response and brief in opposition to prehminary injunction, with affidavits by individual defendants Robert H. Coad, Jr., ARIN's Executive Director, and Robert T. Truscello, Supervisor for ARIN.
The Court heard oral argument on May 9, 2003, and thereafter scheduled an evidentiary hearing and directed the parties to present evidence on the three factual matters in dispute: the size of plaintiffs cross; the frequency and length of time she had worn the cross and whether she wore it visibly; and Mr. Truscello's knowledge or awareness that plaintiff wore a cross to work at Penns Manor (i.e., what did he observe and when did he observe it). The evidentiary hearing was conducted on May 12, 2003. Pursuant to this Court's order, the parties have filed supplemental briefs and supplemental joint stipulations of facts not in dispute.
The facts and circumstances giving rise to plaintiffs First Amendment claims have mostly been stipulated by the parties, as set forth below.
3. Defendant, ARIN, is a political and governmental subdivision of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. ARIN is located at 2895 W. Pike, Indiana, Pennsylvania 15701-9769. ARIN receives federal, state, and local school district funding. ARIN is governed by a Board of Directors, composed of one school board member from each public school district in Armstrong and Indiana Counties.
4. ARIN is a part of the governance structure of public education in the Commonwealth. ARIN is charged with providing services to Armstrong and Indiana County school districts, and providing educational support for the students of those counties. ARIN provides the counties' schools with educational technology, professional/staff development, curriculum services, school-age programs, preschool education, adult education, cooperative projects, and statewide initiatives.
5. Defendant, Robert H. Coad, Jr., Ed. D., is the Executive Director of ARIN Intermediate Unit 28.
6. Defendant John T. Smith, Jr., Ph.D., is the Director of Special Education of ARIN Intermediate Unit 28.
7. Defendant Robert T. Truscello is a Supervisor of Special Education of ARIN Intermediate Unit 28.
8. Ms. Nichol's employment with ARIN began as a substitute for one year in 1995; she was later hired by ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, full-time, beginning in the Fall school year of 1996.
9. During 1995, Ms. Nichol was placed in Marion Center High School, but during the period beginning in the Fall 1996 school year and ending in the Spring of 2002, she began work in Marion Center Middle School.
10. From the Fall of 2002 until April 8, 2003, Ms. Nichol worked in Penns Manor Area Elementary School, located at 6003 Rt. 553 Hwy., Clymer, Pennsylvania 15728. Ms. Nichol's supervisor is Robert Truscello.
11. As an instructional assistant in an emotional support classroom, Ms. Nichol's duties include assisting students in mainstream classroom activities, monitoring and recording behavior of those students, and implementing the behavior and educational plan for those students. At the time relevant to this lawsuit, she spent most of her time with one particular fourth grade student who is considered emotionally disabled and who has difficulties especially with transitions. However, there are other fourth, fifth and sixth grade students in the classroom.
12. In 1997, Ms. Nichol received a notice with her paycheck, dated October 16, 1997 and addressed to Intermediate Unit Staff, that explained the "Pennsylvania Public School Code (24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 11-1112)" did not allow wearing religious jewelry, giving "Crosses or Stars of David" as examples. The notice included an explanation of consequences-a one-year suspension, and a permanent suspension in the event of a second infraction.
13. On March 11, 2003, Mr. Truscello approached the teacher in Ms. Nichol's classroom, as well as Ms. Nichol and other co-workers of Ms. Nichol, reminding them to comply with the Pennsylvania School Code that prohibits wearing any religious symbol, or not to display any religious symbol openly if they chose to wear one, while at work. He explained that this prohibition included a cross or any other religious symbol. They were asked either not to wear their crosses or to tuck them in.
14. The Policy that restricts plaintiff Nichol's ability to openly display her cross necklace was promulgated under the authority of, and is controlled by, ARIN, which cites to the Pennsylvania School Code, 24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 11-1112 as its authority. [Exhibit "A" to the Joint Stipulation of Facts is a copy of the ARIN Policy.]
15. On April 4, 2003, Mr. Truscello approached Ms. Nichol regarding the matter, and Ms. Nichol explained to him that she believed that his request was like asking her to remove or hide her wedding rings. Ms. Nichol also explained that the cross was a symbol of freedom for her, and that she could not deny Christ in such a way as she was being asked to do. Mr. Truscello responded to Ms. Nichol's explanation by saying that he was not buying the wedding ring rationale, and that Ms. Nichol's religion is in her heart, not in what she wears.
16. Later in the day on April 4, 2003, Mr. Truscello returned to Ms. Nichol's classroom, specifically to give Ms. Nichol a copy of the ARIN Intermediate Unit 28 handbook, and he cited to it, explaining that she could not wear her cross. Mr. Truscello again asked Ms. Nichol to tuck in her cross, and he gave her until April 8, 2003 to decide whether she would comply. He warned that if Ms. Nichol wore her cross on April 8, 2003, he would suspend her for one year, as the Pennsylvania School Code required.
17. On April 8, 2003, Ms. Nichol visibly wore her cross to work and was suspended.
18. Ms. Nichol later received an official letter of suspension, dated April 8, 2003, from John T. Smith, Jr. notifying her that she was suspended from employment as of April 7, 2003, with pay, until further notice. See Exhibit "B" to the Joint Stipulation of Facts.
19. The following week, Ms. Nichol received a second notice from Robert H. Coad, Jr., dated April 16, 2003, which supplemented the letter of April 8,...
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