Nichols v. Baer
Citation | 78 A.3d 344,435 Md. 324 |
Decision Date | 22 October 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 33,Sept. Term, 2011.,33 |
Parties | Sam NICHOLS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jesse W. Suiters v. Suzanne BAER and Nancy Burton, Personal Representatives of the Estate of Virginia Lee Suiters. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Maryland |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Demetrios G. Kaouris (Miles & Stockbridge, P.C., Easton, MD), on brief, for petitioner.
Bruce F. Bright (Ayres, Jenkins, Gordy & Almand, P.A., Ocean City, MD; Cynthia B. MacDonald of MacDonald Law Office, LLC, Salisbury, MD), on brief, for respondents.
Argued before BARBERA, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, BELL *, JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned), LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Md.Code (1974, 2011 Repl.Vol.) § 4–105 of the Estates & Trusts Article (“E & T”),1 as relevant to this case, provides:
“A will, or any part of it, may not be revoked in a manner other than as provided in this section.
* * *
“(4) By an absolute divorce of a testator and his spouse or the annulment of the marriage, either of which occurs subsequent to the execution of the testator's will; and all provisions in the will relating to the spouse, and only those provisions,shall be revoked unless otherwise provided in the will or decree.”
Accurately characterized as a revocation by divorce statute, by it terms, “unless otherwise provided in the will or decree,” a divorce revokes a pre-existing will's provisions “relating to” the spouse.
There is no disagreement as to the ultimate intent of the General Assembly in enacting this statute, to effect, in the absence of a contrary intention expressed by the testator, the revocation of all provisions of a testator's will, made prior to the divorce of the testator and his or her spouse or the annulment of the marriage, relating to the testator's spouse. Friedman v. Hannan, 412 Md. 328, 345, 987 A.2d 60, 70 (2010). The issue this case presents is focused on the implementation of that intent.2 We must decide what the General Assembly intended when it provided for an exception to revocation to be “provided in the will or decree,” whether the pre-existing will or the subsequent decree must acknowledge, and then disavow, the effect of the subsequent divorce, or whether an inference, drawn from the will and the decree, suffices.3
The facts necessary to resolve this case are straight-forward and largely undisputed. Jesse W. Suiters, the decedent, and Annie Lee Suiters, the respondent, were married in 1965. They separated in 1996, executing, on July 29, 1996, a Voluntary Separation Agreement and Property Settlement Agreement (“separation agreement”). In addition to addressing the property settlement between the parties, the separation agreement addressed the parties' inheritance rights and provided for the agreement's future effect on any subsequent divorce proceedings. As to the former, Paragraph 11 provided:
Paragraph 17 dealt with the enforceability of the separation agreement. It provided:
The parties were divorced by Decree of Absolute Divorce, entered May 25, 2006, in proceedings initiated by the respondent and in which the decedent did not appear. The decree incorporated, but did not merge, the separation agreement.
Almost three (3) years earlier, on June 18, 2003, the decedent executed his Last Will and Testament. As pertinent to this case, it provided:
The respondent had been designated personal representative and also as the decedent's attorney in fact by a Power of Attorney, executed by the decedent.
The decedent died shortly after the divorce and his will was admitted to probate. The central issue of those proceedings was the applicability of E & T § 4–105(4). The Circuit Court for Wicomico County, after a hearing, held that the revocation by divorce provision did apply and that the exceptions did not apply,4 resulting in the revocation of the provisions relating to the respondent. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court, holding that the revocation of § 4–105(4) was not triggered because the exceptions it recognizes applied. It reasoned:
“Pursuant to the plain meaning of the words, “unless otherwise provided in the ... decree,” we believe that, as long as the decree provides language that shows the intent of the parties to provide for a legacy to a spouse regardless of their marital status, the exception to the revocation of a will by divorce or annulment under Section 4–105(4) has been invoked.”
The petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted. Nichols v. Suiters, 420 Md. 81, 21 A.3d 1063 (2011). For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.
The petitioner construes § 4–105(4) as providing a straight-forward, bright-line standard: after the divorce of the testator and his or her spouse, all provisions in the testator's pre-existing will automatically are revoked, in the absence of a provision in that will or in the decree of divorce, stating a contrary intent. Thus, as he sees it, “[t]he intent of the Decedent is not relevant to the application of Section 4–105(4)....” He argues:
The petitioner relies on the pre–1990 version of § 2–508,5 the Uniform Probate Code provision relating to the revocation of will provisions by divorce and cases interpreting the Uniform Probate Code provision or provisions patterned after, or similar, to it. See, e.g., Friedman, 412 Md. 328, 987 A.2d 60 (2010); 6McGuire v. McGuire, 275 Ark. 432, 631 S.W.2d 12 (1982); Papen v. Papen, 216 Va. 879, 224 S.E.2d 153 (1976); Matter of Will of Reilly, 201 N.J.Super. 306, 493 A.2d 32 (1985); Estate of Reeves, 233 Cal.App.3d 651, 284 Cal.Rptr. 650 (1991); Matter of Estate of Rayman, 495 N.W.2d 241 (Minn.App.1993); Matter of Estate of Knospe, 165 Misc.2d 45, 626 N.Y.S.2d 701 (N.Y.Sur.1995).
In any event, the petitioner maintains, citing Gibboney v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 174 N.C.App. 834, 622 S.E.2d 162, 164–65 (2005) and Buchholz v. Storsve, 740 N.W.2d 107, 112 (S.D.2007), the exceptions set out in § 4–105(4) simply do not apply under the facts of this case. This is so, in the case of the will, he submits, because the will, in effect, does no more than merely name the respondent as a beneficiary. It does not “make reference to the fact that a subsequent divorce will not alter the spouse's status as a beneficiary under the will.” With regard to the divorce decree, the petitioner argues that, because the separation agreement never became a part of the divorce decree, that exception also does not apply.7
The respondent sees the case and the issue entirely differently. Noting that the language of the Maryland statute—“unless otherwise provided in the will or decree”—differs from that of the Uniform Probate Code—“unless the will expressly provides otherwise” 8—and the cases on which the petitioner relies—e.g. “unless...
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