Nichols v. Dwyer
| Decision Date | 11 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 18-14041 |
| Parties | MATTHEW NICHOLS, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM DWYER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
OPINION & ORDER (1) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Dkt. 149), (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECUSAL (Dkt. 150), AND (3) DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECALL MANDATE (Dkt. 154)
Before the Court are Plaintiff Matthew Nichols's motions for reconsideration (Dkt. 149), for recusal of the undersigned (Dkt. 150), and for a recall of the mandate issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Dkt 154). For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Nichols's motions for reconsideration and recusal, and it denies as moot his motion for a recall of the Sixth Circuit's mandate.[1]
This Court has recounted the background of this case at length see, e.g., 9/29/23 Op. & Order at 2-6 (Dkt. 145), and it need not reiterate that full background here. Nichols brought several claims in this Court against the City of Warren and city officials following his termination from the position of Deputy Police Commissioner with the Warren Police Department. See id. at 4. After this Court dismissed his claims, Nichols appealed. See id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court's dismissal of certain claims, but it reversed as to this Court's dismissal of two of Nichols's procedural due process claims, finding that these causes of action survived against Defendants City of Warren and Warren Police Commissioner William Dwyer. See id. at 4-5 (citing Nichols v. Dwyer, 856 Fed.Appx. 589, 601 (6th Cir. 2021)). The Sixth Circuit made clear that Nichols had no procedural due process claim based on his claim to the Deputy Commissioner position; rather, he had plausibly alleged a property interest only in his prior position of lieutenant. Id. (citing Nichols, 856 Fed.Appx. at 596-599).
On remand, this Court conferred with the parties and confirmed their position that Nichols's claims were ready for review on summary judgment. See id. at 5-6 (citing 2/4/22 Order at 2-3 (Dkt. 120)). The parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the Court held a hearing on those motions on July 27, 2022. This Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Nichols's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 8-9. It concluded that Nichols-both in his briefing and in representations made through his attorney, Jamil Akhtar, during the hearing-sought only a return to the Deputy Commissioner position, a form of relief in which he had no property interest for due process purposes. See id. at 6-9. The Court entered judgment against Nichols (Dkt. 146).
Nichols now moves for (i) reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment in Defendants' favor, (ii) recusal of the undersigned from this matter based on alleged personal bias, and (iii) a recall of the Sixth Circuit's mandate.
The Court addresses each of Nichols's motions in turn and finds that none has merit.
Though Nichols styles his motion as one for reconsideration, he cites the standard for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) (allowing a court to grant relief in the event of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”) and 60(b)(6) (). See Mot. for Recons. at 4-5. Rule 60(b) is the proper basis for a request from relief from a final order and judgment like those challenged by Nichols's present motion. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(h)(1) ( ).
The Court proceeds by explaining the basis for the decision that Nichols considers a “mistake.” Mot. for Recons. at 2. As this Court has explained, in the event of his termination from the Deputy Commissioner position, Nichols was guaranteed certain protections under his employment agreement and the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) executed between the City of Warren and the union for Warren police officers. See 9/29/23 Op. & Order at 2. Nichols's employment agreement stated that he served as Deputy Commissioner “at the pleasure of the Mayor” and that he could be terminated from his Deputy Commissioner position “for any reason or no reason at all.” Emp. Ag. at PageID.1469 (Dkt. 50-1). If so terminated, Nichols had a right to return to his former position of lieutenant. Id. The CBA provided a process by which a covered employee in the bargaining unit-e.g., a lieutenant-could file a grievance to challenge a termination from that position. 9/29/23 Op. & Order at 2-3 (citing CBA (Dkt. 55-8)). This four-step process might result in arbitration, but only if the union or the City elected to invoke arbitration-the individual grievant had no right to demand arbitration. Id.
When Nichols was terminated from the Deputy Commissioner position, his employment with the City of Warren ended completely-i.e., he was not returned to his lieutenancy position. Id. at 3-4. Further, City of Warren representatives deprived Nichols of access to the CBA's grievance procedures (according to Nichols's well-pleaded allegations), which Nichols would have been entitled to invoke as a lieutenant in the bargaining unit facing termination. See Nichols, 856 Fed.Appx. at 599.
Nichols's procedural due process claim required a protected property interest. See id. at 596. The Sixth Circuit made clear that Nichols had “no property right” in the Deputy Commissioner position, from which he could have been terminated without cause. Id. Rather, Nichols had plausibly alleged only that he had “a constitutionally protectable property interest in his continuing employment as a Lieutenant in the bargaining unit of the Warren Police Department.” Id. at 597. Nichols had adequately alleged that he was denied due process as to this interest because he had not been “afforded the opportunity to return to the bargaining unit,” where he would have been “eligible to initiate the grievance procedure” to fight to maintain his lieutenancy position. Id. at 599.
However, on remand, Nichols did not assert a due process claim based on a property interest in the lieutenancy position. See 9/29/23 Op. & Order at 6-9. In fact, Nichols specifically represented to the Court through counsel that he was not requesting a return to that position. Id. at 6. Rather, Nichols insisted-both in his briefing and through counsel at the hearing-that the sole relief he sought was a return to the Deputy Commissioner position, arguing that he had not been properly terminated from that position because only the mayor of the City could remove him. Id. But Nichols had no property interest in the Deputy Commissioner position. See id. at 8 (citing Nichols, 856 Fed.Appx. at 596). Because Nichols could not “utilize a theory of procedural due process to win reinstatement to a position in which he ha[d] no property right,” the Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Nichols's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 8-9 ().
Nichols now asserts that this decision was a “mistake,” though in fact, he merely disagrees with the outcome. Nichols argues that “the Court made a mistake, in not ruling that the contractual right to return to the bargaining unit, could only be triggered by the Mayor,” and that Nichols's “removal from the Deputy Commissioner's position by the Mayor is a question of fact for a jury to decide, and the Court made a mistake in not ruling that this interpretation of the employment agreement needed to go to the jury.” Mot for Recons. at 2 (emphasis in original). Nichols further submits that “the decision of the Mayor is a condition precedent to the Plaintiff being allowed to invoke his right for arbitration under the” CBA, which he also asserts is a question of material fact to be decided by a jury. Id. at 5-6.
This Court did not make a “mistake” by “not ruling” the way Nichols hoped it would. Nichols did not have a breach-of-contract claim before this Court on remand nor a procedural due process claim based on his removal from the Deputy Commissioner position. See 9/29/22 Op. & Order at 8 (citing Nichols, 856 Fed.Appx. 589 at 596). His only surviving claim was a procedural due process claim based on his alleged property interest in a return to the lieutenancy position, and Nichols expressly chose not to assert any claim based on this interest. See id. at 6 9. Lacking a protected property interest in the Deputy Commissioner's position, Nichols cannot manufacture a meritorious due process claim by recycling his old argument that only the mayor could terminate him from the Deputy Commissioner's position. Nichols's assertion that there are questions of material fact relating to who could terminate him as Deputy Commissioner does not relieve him of the obligation to demonstrate that his requested relief is grounded in a protected property interest. See 9/29/22 Op. & Order at 8-9 (citing Kizer, 649 F.3d at 468). Nichols has asserted no such property interest, and so he has no viable procedural due process claim. The grant...
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