Nichols v. Harford County Bd. of Educ.

Decision Date18 March 2002
Docket NumberNo. CIV. AMD00-3074.,CIV. AMD00-3074.
Citation189 F.Supp.2d 325
PartiesNovella NICHOLS, Plaintiff v. HARFORD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

John M. Singleton, Gabriel Antonio Terrasa, Albertini Singleton Gendler and Darby LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.

Leslie R. Stellman, Hodes Ulman Pessin and Katz PA, Towson, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

DAVIS, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Novella Nichols ("Nichols"), formerly a tenured middle school teacher, has brought this action against her former employer, Harford County Board of Education ("defendant"), the superintendent of schools for Harford County, Jacqueline Haas, former assistant superintendent for human resources, Kathleen Eng, former school principal, Marilyn Owen, and former deputy superintendent, Bob Williams. Broadly construed, Nichols's pro se complaint (on a form made available to pro se litigants by this court) alleges the following claims: (1) employment discrimination based on race and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) employment discrimination based on age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended 19 U.S.C. § 621; (3) employment discrimination on the basis of a disability under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

On June 4, 2001, after a hearing, I entered an order dismissing several of Nichols's discrimination claims and all of the claims purportedly asserted against the individual defendants in an individual capacity. Therefore, the only remaining claims are those brought under Title VII and under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against the Harford County Board of Education.

Now pending is defendant's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The issues have been fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary. For the reasons set forth below, I shall grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Defendant's motion to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim on the ground of sovereign immunity need not be considered as summary judgment is appropriate on that claim in any event.1).

I.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material for purposes of summary judgment, if when applied to the substantive law, it affects the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment is also appropriate when a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in [Rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56] must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir.1991). Of course, the facts, as well as justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court, however, has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987).

II.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Nichols, the material facts are as follows.

Background

Nichols, a 55 year old African-American, became employed by defendant as a secondary education teacher in the area of language arts in August 1973. So far as the summary judgment record shows, for more than 20 years Nichols enjoyed an enviable career as a successful public school teacher. Apparently, the troubles which ultimately gave rise in 2000 to Nichols's retirement (on disability) and her institution of this lawsuit began around the time Nichols began working at Fallston Middle School in 1996.

Nichols suffers from anxiety disorder (characterized by, inter alia, panic attacks, high stress, and physiological changes), which was first diagnosed in 1996. Dep. of Novella N. Nichols at 25 (hereinafter Nichols Dep.). Evidently, Nichols suffered one or more major life traumas in the mid-1990s that have permanently altered her emotional and psychological balance, but as discussed below, she repeatedly declined (understandably, perhaps) to disclose any of the details of those events to her superiors or to permit her superiors to discuss her ailments with her physicians.

In part as a consequence of her psychiatric symptoms, Nichols began to accumulate a documented history of repeated use of sick leave. In June 1996, Nichols was requested to submit documentation from her doctors to verify her use of such leave. Def.'s Ex. 3 (Letter to Kathy Owens Wyatt, MSTA UniServ Director, from F. Thomas Pomilla, Principal of Fallston Middle School, dated July 2, 1996). Nichols was often requested to submit doctor's notes to verify her absences. Nichols Dep. at 16; Dep. of Marilyn Owen at 24 (hereinafter Owen Dep.). One of the recurring themes running through the record is Nichols's displeasure with defendant's insistence that she document the need for her medical absences.

Field Trips and Memorial Day Absences

In the fall of 1996, Nichols submitted a doctor's note in which her doctor requested that she be excused from "extracurricular activities, i.e., field trips" because the stress and anxiety produced by such events would be detrimental to her health. Def's Ex. 5 (Letter from Joshua R. Mitchell, III, M.D., dated September 13, 1996). Upon receipt of Dr. Mitchell's letter, Fallston Middle School Principal Marilyn Owen sent Nichols a letter informing her that she had received Dr. Mitchell's note but could not accede to her request to be excused from field trips for the following reasons: (1) such duty is a part of Nichols's responsibility as a teacher; and (2) the letter not did not state a sufficient basis to relieve Nichols of that duty. Def.'s Ex. 6 (Letter from Marilyn Owen, Principal, dated September 26, 1996). A few weeks later, Owen received another note from Dr. Mitchell elaborating on the need "to accommodate" Nichols with regard to field trips. Def.'s Ex. 7; Pl.'s Ex. 5 (Letter from Dr. Mitchell, dated October 7, 1996). According to this letter, Nichols suffers from hypertension, varicose veins, and other related conditions, and attending field trips and extracurricular activities exacerbates these conditions, as a result of the heightened stress of such situations. Id.

Subsequently, a meeting was held among Nichols, her union representative, Kathy Wyatt, and Dr. Kathleen Eng, assistant superintendent for human resources, at which Dr. Eng agreed to Nichols's request to be excused from field trips. It was decided that another teacher would substitute for Nichols on the field trip, and that Nichols would cover that teacher's classes. Owen Dep. at 21-22; Dep. of Kathleen Eng at 31 (hereinafter Eng Dep.); Def.'s Ex. 8 (Letter from Dr. Eng, dated January 23, 1997).

At the time the decision to permit Nichols to be absent from field trips was made, it was also decided that her request to be excused from field trips would be reviewed at the end of the school year, when Nichols was to submit further documentation. Eng Dep. at 19-20; Def.'s Ex. 8. At the end of the 1996-1997 school year, Nichols submitted documentation from her mental health counselor, social worker Ray Armillei, addressing the need for her to continue to be excused from field trips to accommodate her emotional distress and anxiety. Pl's Ex. 7. Dr. Eng reviewed the documentation from Armillei and determined that the documentation was not sufficient as it was from a licensed social worker, not a medical doctor. Nichols was asked to submit further documentation to corroborate Armillei's report. Eng Dep. at 36-37. Although Nichols did not submit further documentation, the school administration continued to "accommodate" Nichols with regard to field trips (by permitting her not to go on field trips) for the 1997-1998 school year. Owen Dep. at 86-87.

There was one instance in 1997 where no prior arrangements had been made to have a replacement teacher take Nichols's class on a scheduled field trip. Nichols Dep. at 40. Ultimately, however, another teacher did take Nichols's class on the field trip. Nichols testified that during the time it took to find a replacement teacher, Nichols felt stressed and embarrassed, particularly as her students sat in her classroom waiting to leave for the trip. Id. at 40-41.

Apparently, Nichols's anxiety and depression are particularly acute during the Memorial Day holiday. Pl's Ex. 7 (Letter from Ray Armillei, dated July 22, 1997). On May 28, 1997, Principal Owen wrote a letter to Nichols stating that Nichols had to provide a more specific reason for an absence during the week of May 19, 1997, as the doctor's note only stated that Nichols was "under his...

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