Nichols v. Nichols

• Decision Date: 11 April 1907
• Citation: 66 A. 161,79 Conn. 644
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NICHOLS v. NICHOLS.

66 A. 161

79 Conn. 644

NICHOLS

v. NICHOLS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 11, 1907.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; George W. Wheeler, Judge.

Action by John J. Nichols against Susan W. Nichols.From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.Affirmed.

Action for an accounting for rents and proceeds of the sale received by the defendant of certain property in the state of New York, in which the plaintiff owned an interest; for the rents and profits and use received by the defendant of certain property in this state, in which the plaintiff owned an interest; for a judgment for the amount found due upon such accounting; for the setting aside of a deed of the plaintiff to the defendant of said property in this state; and for damages.Brought to the superior court in Fairfield county, where the court(Elmer, J.) overruled the defendant's demurrer to the complaint, and the case was afterward tried upon the issues raised by the pleadings before George W. Wheeler, J., and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appeals.No error.

Goodwin Stoddard and Alfred S. Brown, for appellant.Stiles Judson, for appellee.

HALL, J.(after stating the facts).The plaintiff, John J. Nichols, who brings this action through his conservator, Wallace M. Bulkley, appointed in 1903, is one of nine children of the Rev. Samuel Nichols and Susan N. Nichols.His brothers and sisters were George, Effingham, William, Charles, Samuel, Alexander, Maria, and Susan W. Nichols, the defendant.Their mother, Susan N. Nichols, died in 1872, and by her will, after giving to her husband the use and income during his life of all her real and personal estate, devised to eight of her said children, not including Charles, two pieces of real estate in New York City, one known as the "Cedar Street Property" and the other as the "Maiden Lane Property," and to the plaintiff and his sisters Maria and the defendant the homestead on Greenfield Hill, in this state, consisting of a dwelling house and about two acres of land, together with the personal property thereon, and in her will charged George, Effingham, William, Samuel, Alexander, and the plaintiff each with the payment of the sum of $2,500, amounting in all to $15,000, to five of her said children named as executors of her will, to be held by four of them in trust for the support of her son Charles, and upon his death, without issue, to be paid to his surviving brothers and sisters.William conveyed his interest in said property to Alexander in 1875. Rev. Samuel Nichols died July 17, 1880, and Charles died November 22, 1892, without issue.

The complaint contains two counts.The first alleges, in substance, that on March 1, 1877, the plaintiff, when from "infirmity of mind and mental impairment"he did not understand the purport or legal effect of the instrument he was signing, was induced by the request of his brother Effingham and the defendant, and by the undue influence exerted by them for the purpose of excluding the plaintiff from his said interest in said estate, and for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining his said interest for their own advantage, to join with his brothers and sisters, excepting Charles, in executing, without having received any consideration therefor, a deed releasing and conveying, subject to said life estate of the Rev. Samuel Nichols and to said charge of $15,000, his and their respective interests in said New York property as tenants in common, to George, Effingham, Alexander, Maria, and the defendant, as joint tenants; that the plaintiff's interest so released was of the value of about $40,000; that on May 10, 1882, said five joint tenants through an intermediate grantee conveyed said New York properties to Effingham, Alexander, and the defendant as joint tenants; that on February 21, 1888, said last-named grantees conveyed said Cedar Street property to the Mutual Life insurance Company of New York; that said Effingham died November 4, 1899, and Alexander died June 14, 1900; that the title to said Maiden Lane property thereupon vested in the defendant by operation of the law of joint tenancy; that from July 17, 1880, to February 21, 1888, Effingham and the defendant collected and appropriated to their own use the rents of the Cedar Street property, and from July 17, 1880, to November 4, 1899, the rents of the Maiden Lane property; and that the defendant from November 4, 1889, to September 30, 1902, collected and appropriated to her own use the rents of the Maiden Lane property, and also appropriated to her own use the sum of $140,000, which she received for the sale of the Maiden Lane property on September 30, 1902.

The second count alleges, in substance, that on the 21st of September, 1885, when the plaintiff was in the same weak and impaired mental condition described in the first count, and when he did not understand the purport or legal effect of the instrument he was signing, he was induced, by the request of his brother Effingham and the defendant, and by their undue influence exerted for the purpose of depriving him of his one-third interest in said Greenfield Hill property, of the value of about $3,500, and of obtaining said interest for their own advantage, to release to his sisterSusan W. Nichols, the defendant, all his interest in said Greenfield Hill real and personal property without having received any consideration therefor; and that the defendant has ever since used and possessed said property.

The complaint asks: (1) For a judgment for an accounting for the proceeds of the sale of the Maiden Lane property and for the rents and profits of that property and of the Cedar Street property; (2) judgment for the amount found due on such accounting; (3) that the deed of the Greenfield Hill property be set aside, and the plaintiff be restored to his interest therein, and in said personal property; (4) for an accounting for the rents and profits of the Greenfield Hill property and the value of the use of the personal property; and (5) for $50,000 damages.The defendant's demurrers to the complaint and to the first and second prayers for relief, presenting questions which were also made and decided under the subsequent pleadings, were overruled by the trial court.

The answer admits the execution by the plaintiff and others of the deeds described in the complaint and the plaintiff's transfer to the defendant of his one-third interest in the Greenfield Hill property, and that the defendant and her brother Alexander have received and appropriated the rents and profits of the New York City property, and that the defendant has received and appropriated the avails of the sale of the Maiden Lane property and has used the Greenfield Hill property as alleged; but denies that said conveyances were without consideration, that they were procured in the manner and for the purpose alleged in the complaint; that the plaintiff's mind was at that time infirm and impaired, as alleged, and that the values of the plaintiff's interests in said properties were as great as alleged, and alleges affirmatively that the causes of action set forth in the first count did not accrue to the plaintiff within 6 nor within 20 years, and that those described in the second count did not accrue to the plaintiff within C nor within 15 years next preceding the commencement of this action, that since the dates of the execution of said deeds the position of the parties thereto has been changed, and "that the plaintiff is barred by his own negligence and acquiescence, by lapse of time and want of equity from maintaining this action."

The plaintiff's reply denies said affirmative allegations of the answer, and alleges that the Maiden Lane property was conveyed to an innocent purchaser in another state, and that it cannot be annulled; that, at and ever since the time of the execution of said deeds by him, the plaintiff had been of unsound mind and incapable of understanding their meaning and effect, or of taking any intelligent action to revoke them or to require an accounting; and that said conveyances were procured by the defendant and her brother Effingham with full knowledge of the plaintiff's said mental condition.These averments of the reply were denied by the defendant.

Upon the questions thus raised by the pleadings as to the mental condition of the plaintiff at the time and since the conveyances were made, the consideration which he received for them, and the manner in which, and the purpose for which they were procured, the trial court has found, in substance, these facts:

The plaintiff is now 69 years of age and unmarried.From an early period of his life, he has been weak and deficient in intellect, and on March 1, 1877, and for a long time prior thereto, although not entirely bereft of mental capacity, judgment, and discretion, he was, and ever since has been, incapable of understanding or managing business or property affairs of any consequence, intricacy, or importance, or which required the exercise of discretion or judgment.He has been during said period, and still is, so deficient in mind as to be unable to understand any of the papers relating to the inheritance from his mother, and has had an appreciation only of the most simple affairs of life.He is not now, and has not been prior to March 1, 1877, of sound mind.By reason of mental infirmity he had no appreciation or understanding of the meaning and effect of the conveyance, in which he joined, of the New York City property on March 1, 1877, or of the conveyance of his interest in the Greenfield Hill property of December 21, 1885, but has always since supposed that said properties were still owned by the surviving members of the family in equal shares.He has never by himself had sufficient understanding to enable him to consider the effect upon his property rights or his future needs of said transactions, nor to rescind said conveyances, nor to take any appropriate...