Nichols v. Nichols
| Citation | 18 A. 153,61 Vt. 426 |
| Parties | MARY E. NICHOLS v. HENRY E. NICHOLS ET AL |
| Decision Date | 01 August 1889 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Vermont |
JANUARY TERM, 1889.
The decree of the Court of Chancery is affirmed and the cause remanded.
Wolcott & Wilbur and Roberts & Roberts, for the oratrix.
Present ROSS, POWERS, TAFT, ROWELL, JJ.
Objection is made that the bill is not adequate to the relief asked for upon the facts reported.
It is true as argued that the orator in equity must prevail upon the allegations made in his bill. But the orator may state his case in different aspects and if either is good he may succeed, notwithstanding it may be inconsistent with some other stated ground of recovery. McConnell v. McConnell, 11 Vt. 290.
The bill in this case is somewhat inartificial but the allegation that the deed in question was executed in fraud of the marital rights of the oratrix states a ground for relief.
The master's report states in substance that the deed of James Nichols to his children dated Nov. 10th, 1884, was executed with full knowledge on the part of grantor and grantees of the marital rights of the oratrix in the granted premises and with the intention that it should have the effect to supplant such rights.
The deed cannot be said to be voluntary as there was a consideration, but the fact that a consideration passed is of no importance if the deed in fact was made with the fraudulent intent to avoid a vested right of the wife.
By the marriage Mrs. Nichols by law had a vested right to a certain extent in such property as her husband then had or might thereafterwards acquire during her coverture. This right fluctuated as from time to time in the ordinary course of events the husband conveyed away his property or made new accumulations. But at all times during coverture the wife because she is wife, has a tangible and valuable interest in her husband's estate, springing from the marriage itself which the law recognizes and protects. Accordingly, from the earliest times, it has been held that any such conveyance by the intended husband or wife before marriage of their estate made to defraud the just expectations of the other is a fraud against which equity will give relief. Kerr Fraud and Mistake, 217.
If such conveyance before marriage, which defeats merely expected advantages, is a fraud upon marital rights in the eye of the law, much more should it be so regarded if the conveyance be made...
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