Nichols v. Persson
Citation | 468 P.3d 952,304 Or.App. 548 |
Decision Date | 10 June 2020 |
Docket Number | A163249 |
Parties | Kierin NICHOLS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Rob PERSSON, Superintendent, Coffee Creek Correctional Facility, Defendant-Respondent. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Oregon |
Lindsey Burrows argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was O'Connor Weber LLC.
Adam Holbrook, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Chief Judge, and Powers, Judge.*
Petitioner appeals from a judgment denying her petition for post-conviction relief. In the underlying criminal case, petitioner was convicted of intentional murder, ORS 163.115(1)(a) (2017), amended by Or. Laws 2019, ch. 635, § 4,1 first-degree theft, ORS 164.055, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance, former ORS 475.840(3)(b) (2009), renumbered as ORS 475.752(3)(b). Petitioner denied killing the victim and opposed any defense strategy that implicated her in that crime. In accordance with her wishes, her trial counsel pursued a defense theory that, based on the evidence, the victim either died of natural causes or was killed by someone else. Petitioner asserts in her post-conviction case that counsel's selection of defense theories was not based on a constitutionally adequate investigation of her mental illness, intellectual capacity, or drug dependence and the effect of those conditions on her ability to form the requisite intent for intentional murder. Without that investigation, she argues that trial counsel could not adequately advise her or rely on her refusal to pursue a particular defense.
We conclude that, because petitioner presented no evidence that she would have cooperated with a defense based on her diminished capacity had she been presented with adequate information and advice and because she did not show that there was more than a "mere possibility" that competent counsel could have presented such a defense without her consent, petitioner failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies in the representation afforded to her. Accordingly, we do not address whether trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate for failing to investigate, and we affirm.
We take the following facts about the underlying criminal trial from our opinion in the direct appeal, State v. Nichols , 252 Or. App. 114, 284 P.3d 1246 (2012), rev. den. , 353 Or. 428, 299 P.3d 889 (2013), as supplemented by undisputed evidence in the post-conviction record. Petitioner was convicted of intentional murder, first-degree theft, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance based on killing her elderly neighbor while stealing her neighbor's prescription medication and other items. Id . at 116, 284 P.3d 1246. Petitioner had admitted to stealing prescription medication and a ring from her neighbor when those items were found on her during the police investigation, but she argued at trial, based on the evidence and the incomplete and compromised investigation by the police, that the victim had died of natural causes or was killed by someone else.
At trial, defense counsel did not attempt to present either a complete or a partial defense to murder based on petitioner's mental illness, intellectual disability, or drug dependence. Trial counsel did argue, however, that petitioner's "bizarre" behaviors during police interviews and statements made while incarcerated were due to her mental illness or intellectual disability and were not an indication of her guilt. To support that argument, trial counsel had sought to introduce testimony from Dr. James Harper, who evaluated petitioner shortly before trial, and Gary Eby, who was petitioner's mental-health counselor before her incarceration. The trial court did not allow Dr. Harper's testimony when it was offered, because it was offered before the state admitted statements made by petitioner that trial counsel sought to explain through Dr. Harper's testimony and, thus, the court concluded that the testimony would be confusing to the jury. Petitioner's trial counsel did not make any further attempts to offer Dr. Harper's testimony at trial. The trial court also excluded Eby's testimony as not relevant to the issues for which trial counsel sought to use it, because counsel did not connect Eby's diagnoses of petitioner to her behaviors. Nichols , 252 Or. App. at 118, 284 P.3d 1246. On appeal, we affirmed petitioner's convictions. We concluded that Eby's testimony was inadmissible under OEC 702, because it did not include an explanation that linked petitioner's behavior during the investigation and her mental health conditions. Id. at 121, 284 P.3d 1246.
Petitioner then petitioned for post-conviction relief, alleging that her trial counsel was constitutionally inadequate under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. As relevant on appeal, she alleged that trial counsel was inadequate in the following ways:
, borderline personality disorder, a history of substance abuse dependency and kleptomania. Trial counsel did not offer any explanation how those diagnoses might generally affect someone's behavior, or in the alternative, how the diagnoses affect Petitioner's behavior. There is no proffered explanation how the diagnoses affect Petitioner's behavior. Dr. Harper's explanations would assist the jury in assessing petitioner's behavior, but trial counsel did not elicit explanations from the witness. If the jury had this information, the jury would have acquitted Petitioner or found her guilty of a lesser included offense.
In support of those allegations, petitioner presented two declarations from Dr. Harper, a psychological...
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