Nichols v. Seaboard Coastline Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 December 1976
• Citation: 341 So.2d 671
• Parties: Lacey H. NICHOLS, III, who sues as Administrator of the Estate of Lacey H. Nichols, Jr., Deceased, v. SEABOARD COASTLINE RAILWAY Co., a corp., et al. SC 1590.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 671

341 So.2d 671

Lacey H. NICHOLS, III, who sues as Administrator of the Estate of Lacey H. Nichols, Jr., Deceased, v. SEABOARD COASTLINE RAILWAY Co., a corp., et al.

SC 1590.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 30, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 4, 1977.

Selman & Beard, Jasper, and Hogan, Smith & Alspaugh by W. Clay Alspaugh, Birmingham, for appellant.

Morris W. Savage of Bankhead, Savage & Stepens, Jasper, for appellees.

JONES, Justice.

Plaintiff, Lacey H. Nichols, as personal representative of his deceased father, appeals from an adverse judgment and order overruling his motion for a new trial. The suit is based on a crossing accident claiming damages for wrongful death against Seaboard Coastline Railway Co. and its employee, Jim C. Laird.

The sole dispositive issue may be stated: Where extraneous material was introduced into the jury's deliberations, must actual prejudice be shown to work a reversal of the verdict? We hold that the character and nature of the extraneous material in this case constitutes prejudice as a matter of law and no showing that the jury was in fact influenced thereby in arriving at their verdict is necessary. The trial Court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial; therefore, we reverse and remand.

Because each 'extraneous matter' case must be decided in light of its particular facts and attending circumstances, it is essential that we set forth the factual context in which this issue is presented. Following the close of the evidence (May 28), the Court gave a rather lengthy jury instruction--both oral and written requested charges--including, for example, the legal definitions of negligence, contributory negligence, subsequent negligence, subsequent contributory negligence, and wantonness.

After deliberating for some period of time, the jury came in and asked the Court the following question:

'Judge, we ask for more clarification on negligence. We are confused. We can't remember all that we heard and could we have that? That is what has us confused. There was more than one kind and we are confused.'

The Court responded:

'Let me ask this before answering your question, would you gentlemen like to go home and get a good night's rest and come back tomorrow and take up? It would be improper for the Court to recharge on the law. You have been charged on the law, and it would be improper for the Court to undertake to charge all of it. For that reason, I wonder if you . . . you are like the rest, you are tired and I wonder if you would like to go home and come back tomorrow. We will get out and let you decide.'

The following morning (May 29), upon the jury's arrival in the courtroom, the Court said:

'Mr. Foreman, in regard to your statement made by you as foreman of the jury to the Court yesterday afternoon before you adjourned for the night, the Court wants to state this in regard to additional instruction. The Court feels it would be improper to rehash what has already been given. Court might not use the same language and there might be different interpretations put on it and the Court feels it might be improper. If there is additional instructions as to the law that the Court didn't charge on that is applicable in the case, I think that would be proper, but the Court doesn't know of any law that it did not charge on that he feels is applicable. If you would like to just briefly apprise the Court of what the jury had in mind for additional instructions, all right, or if you feel, all of you feel, that you are now ready to go back and deliberate and have discussions and it might clarify things then we will withdraw and let you go right in to your work this morning.'

The jury foreman responded:

'Your Honor, I think . . . what we wanted was clarification and not instructions. That was the way I asked for it. But, I believe we can go ahead this morning.'

One of the grounds of Nichols' motion for a new trial raised the 'extraneous matters' issue and attached affidavits of five jurors, which, though varying as to certain minor details, stated in substance the following: Shortly after the jury began its deliberations on the morning of May 29, one of the jurors took a piece of paper from his pocket, explained that he had looked up some definitions the night before, and listed on the blackboard the terms negligence, contributory negligence, subsequent negligence, and subsequent contributory negligence. He then stated the definitions of these terms which he said he had gotten from the World Book Encyclopedia. He further advised the other members of the jury that, by the law as he understood it, if both parties contributed to the fault of the accident, the jury could not find against the defendants.

Three of the affidavits contained statements to the general effect that several members of the jury, who had felt after the first day's deliberations that the plaintiff should recover, accepted the juror's explanation of the legal terms from the World Book and changed their minds in favor of the defendants.

At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, eleven of the twelve jurors (one was physically disabled) testified in person and disclosed without material variation essentially the same account of the jury room events on the morning of May 29. Four other jurors (in addition to the one named in the affidavits) stated that they too had consulted either the World Book or the American College Encyclopedic Dictionary to clear up confusion concerning several legal words and phrases. One of these publications cites a railroad crossing accident to illustrate 'negligence' and 'contributory negligence.' Several of the jurors testified that, in spite of the definitions of the legal terms from the reference books discussed by the jury, they based their verdict on the evidence from the 'witness chair' and on the law as charged by the Court.

The trial Judge asked a juror--one of the four who testified they had consulted the World Book for definitions--the following question:

'Did you base your verdict on what was in the book solely or did you base it on the evidence and the law that was given to you in the Court room?'

The juror answered:

'I did not base it on the book. I looked it up on what you gave us, the law and I understood that if he contributed to the accident that he could not receive . . . I looked it up to be sure I understood what you gave.'

Our resolution of the issue here presented presupposes two propositions:

1. We are not faced with the general rule which forbids jurors from impeaching their own verdict. This well entrenched rule relates to Intrinsic influence and is based on the sound public policy of judicial administration which zealously guards the sanctity of the jury room. Dumas v. Dumas Brothers Manufacturing Company, Inc., 295 Ala. 370, 330 So.2d 426 (1976); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Powaski, 232 Ala. 66, 166 So. 782 (1936); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Holmes, 223 Ala. 188, 134 So. 875 (1931).

2. Definitions of legal terms and concepts (negligence, contributory negligence, subsequent negligence, subsequent contributory negligence) from general reference books (World Book and American College Encyclopedic Dictionary) are Extraneous matters and fall within the exception to the general rule which, likewise, is well recognized in our case law. Weekley v. Horn, 263 Ala. 364, 82 So.2d 341 (1955). The fact that the books themselves were not before the jury does not vitiate the operative effect of this exception to the general rule, for, indeed, there is no contention that this extraneous matter was not before the jury during its deliberations and before it reached a unanimous verdict.

Within the context of these facts and legal premises, then, the issue is narrowly focused: whether the movant bears the burden, as a matter of law, to prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the trial judge that such extraneous matter was, in fact, prejudicial. Seaboard claims that the law places this burden on the movant, and that the trial Judge has resolved the factual issue of prejudice against the plaintiff and in favor of the railroad and it employee.

We disagree. We hasten to add, however, as previously noted, our holding is restricted to the particular facts and attending circumstances of the instant case. The difficulty of stating with precision a legal principle to govern the 'extraneous facts' exception to the general rule was recognized in Weekley v. Horn, supra, in which Mr. Justice Mayfield, speaking for the Court, said:

'No cases are brought to our attention wherein this court has sought to define the meaning of Extraneous facts within the stated exception. The cases which the appellant brings to our attention involve the consideration by juries of papers, documents, a dictionary, etc., which were not introduced into the evidence. We shall not here attempt to define and limit the term Extraneous facts as embraced in the exception to the general rule.'

While the concern of the Weekley Court was whether the alleged influences were extraneous (invoking the exception) or intrinsic (within the general rule prohibiting impeachment), the 'extraneous influence' cases have turned chiefly on this same inquiry rather than on a definitive rule requiring proof of actual prejudice. For example, Dulaney v. Burns, 218 Ala. 493, 119 So. 21 (1928), interpreting Leith v. State, 206 Ala. 439, 90 So. 687 (1921), says, 'It must appear that injury was done by the extraneous matter being before the jury.' At first glance the emphasis here seems to be on the introductory phrase, 'It must appear that injury was done . . .'--implying that movant has the burden of proving injury. The holdings of Leith and Dulaney, however, do not bear this out.

Leith rejected jury impeachment testimony because the trial judge found the extraneous matter was not before the jury until after the verdict had been reached. Dulaney holds that dictionary definitions of common words, commonly understood, did not...