Nichols v. State

Citation127 Ind. 406, 26 N.E. 839
Case DateFebruary 25, 1891
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

127 Ind. 406
26 N.E. 839

Nichols et al.
v.
State.
1

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 25, 1891.


Appeal from circuit court, Delaware county; O. J. Lotz, Judge.

[26 N.E. 840]


Davis & Martz and Gregory & Silverburg, for appellants.
The Attorney General, J. G. Leffler, J. W. Ryan, and W. H. Thompson, for the State.

COFFEY, J.

This was a prosecution instituted in the Delaware circuit court, by affidavit and information, against the appellants, Doan Nichols and Fannie Wiley and one Ret Shetterly, charging them with the crime of abduction. The affidavit in the cause charges “that Doan Nichols, Ret Shetterly, and Fannie Wiley, at the county of Delaware, in the state of Indiana, on the 14th day of May, 1890, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously entice and take away from the city of Muncie, in the county aforesaid, one Almeda Q. Waters, a female of chaste character, then and there being, to the city of Indianapolis, in the county of Marion, in said state, with the felonious intent then and there of rendering the said Almeda Q. Waters a prostitute.” The information in the cause follows the affidavit. A trial of the cause before a jury resulted in a verdict finding the appellants guilty as charged. The court, over a motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment, rendered judgment on the verdict, from which this appeal is prosecuted. No motion was made in the circuit court to quash the affidavit or information, nor is the evidence in the record.

Section 1993, Rev. St. 1881, upon which this prosecution is based, is as follows: “Whoever entices or takes away any female of previous chaste character from wherever she may be to a house of ill fame or elsewhere, for the purpose of prostitution, shall be imprisoned,” etc. It is insisted by the appellants that the circuit court erred in overruling their motion in arrest of judgment, because the affidavit and the information in the cause do not state a public offense. The principal objection urged is that neither the affidavit nor information contains a description of any particular house or place to which Almeda Q. Waters was taken for the purpose of rendering her a prostitute. The rule is that, where words of a particular description in a statute are followed by general words that are not so specific and limited, unless there be a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose, the general words are to be construed as applicable to persons or things, or cases of like kind as those designated by the particular words. Bish. St. Crimes, §§ 245, 246; State v. McCrum, 38 Minn. 154, 36 N. W. Rep. 102;Berg v. Baldwin, 31 Minn. 541, 18 N. W. Rep. 821;Miller v. State, 121 Ind. 294, 23 N. E. Rep. 94. Following this rule of construction, it was held in the case last cited that the words “or elsewhere,” as found in the statute under consideration, should be construed to mean a house of ill fame or some other place of like character, where prostitution of the character practiced at houses of ill fame or assignation was, or was intended to be, carried on. The purpose of the statute was to punish persons, whether male or female, who should engage in the business of inducing females of chaste character to become inmates or frequenters of houses of ill fame, assignation, or other places for purposes of prostitution. It has no application to persons who entice, allure, or solicit females of chaste character to accompany them to any convenient place for the sole purpose of having illicit intercourse. It applies to such persons only as allure chaste females to houses of ill fame, or other places of like character, to have common, indiscriminate, meretricious commerce with men, or where they may become prostitutes. Fahnestock v. State, 102 Ind. 156, 1 N. E. Rep. 372; Osborn v. State, 52 Ind. 526; Com. v. Cook, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 93; State v. Stoyell, 54 Me. 24;Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603;State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa, 447;People v. Plath, 100 N. Y. 590, 3 N. E. Rep. 790; Miller v. State, supra. Prostitution, in its limited sense, is the practice of a female offering her body to an indiscriminate intercourse with men,-the common lewdness of a female. Section 2003, Rev. St. 1881, declares that “any female who frequents or lives in houses of ill fame, or associates with women of bad character for chastity, either in public or at a private house which men of bad character (for chastity) frequent or visit, or who commits fornication for hire, shall be deemed a prostitute.” If, therefore, it sufficiently appear from the affidavit and information before us that the appellants enticed the person therein named, a female of previous chaste...

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57 practice notes
  • State v. Gardner, Nos. 30032
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • March 14, 1916
    ...her a prostitute is equivalent to an allegation that it was done for the purpose of prostitution.” Nichols v. State, 127 Iowa, 406, 26 N. E. 839. A “prostitute” is “a woman who practices illicit intercourse with men for hire” (Worcester's Dict; Zimmerman v. McMakin, 22 S. C. 372, 53 Am. Rep......
  • Simmons v. State, No. 29220
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • October 5, 1955
    ...Brown, 1923, 192 Ind. 648, 653, 138 N.E. 17; Wiggins v. State, 1909, 172 Ind. 78, 80, 87 N.E. 718; Nichols v. [234 Ind. 497] State, 1890, 127 Ind. 406, 408, 26 N.E. 839; City of Jeffersonville v. Nagle, 1921, 191 Ind. 70, 72, 132 N.E. 4; Marter v. City of Vincennes, 1948, 118 Ind.App. 586, ......
  • State v. Gardner, 30032
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • March 14, 1916
    ...of rendering her a prostitute is equivalent to an allegation that it was done for the purpose of prostitution." Nichols v. State, (Ind.) 127 Ind. 406, 26 N.E. 839. A prostitute is "a woman who practices illicit intercourse with men for hire." (Worcester's Dictionary; Zimmerman v. McMakin, (......
  • Zechiel v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., No. 4704.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • October 12, 1932
    ...150 Ind. 441, 50 N. E. 479; Boyer v. Robertson, 149 Ind. 74, 48 N. E. 7; Davis v. Taylor, 140 Ind. 439, 39 N. E. 551; Nichols v. State, 127 Ind. 406, 26 N. E. 839. This presumption in favor of the order of the court appointing said receivers, and it further appearing that they duly qualifie......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
57 cases
  • State v. Gardner, Nos. 30032
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • March 14, 1916
    ...her a prostitute is equivalent to an allegation that it was done for the purpose of prostitution.” Nichols v. State, 127 Iowa, 406, 26 N. E. 839. A “prostitute” is “a woman who practices illicit intercourse with men for hire” (Worcester's Dict; Zimmerman v. McMakin, 22 S. C. 372, 53 Am. Rep......
  • Simmons v. State, No. 29220
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • October 5, 1955
    ...Brown, 1923, 192 Ind. 648, 653, 138 N.E. 17; Wiggins v. State, 1909, 172 Ind. 78, 80, 87 N.E. 718; Nichols v. [234 Ind. 497] State, 1890, 127 Ind. 406, 408, 26 N.E. 839; City of Jeffersonville v. Nagle, 1921, 191 Ind. 70, 72, 132 N.E. 4; Marter v. City of Vincennes, 1948, 118 Ind.App. 586, ......
  • State v. Gardner, 30032
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
    • March 14, 1916
    ...of rendering her a prostitute is equivalent to an allegation that it was done for the purpose of prostitution." Nichols v. State, (Ind.) 127 Ind. 406, 26 N.E. 839. A prostitute is "a woman who practices illicit intercourse with men for hire." (Worcester's Dictionary; Zimmerman v. McMakin, (......
  • Zechiel v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., No. 4704.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • October 12, 1932
    ...150 Ind. 441, 50 N. E. 479; Boyer v. Robertson, 149 Ind. 74, 48 N. E. 7; Davis v. Taylor, 140 Ind. 439, 39 N. E. 551; Nichols v. State, 127 Ind. 406, 26 N. E. 839. This presumption in favor of the order of the court appointing said receivers, and it further appearing that they duly qualifie......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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