Nichols v. State
| Docket Number | 402-7-19 Wncv |
| Decision Date | 04 September 2020 |
| Citation | 2020 Vt Super 090401 |
| Parties | Benjiman Nichols, Plaintiff v. State of Vermont, Defendant |
| Court | Superior Court of Vermont |
Defendant has moved to dismiss this action under Vt. R. Civ. P 12(b)(1) &(6). Defendant asserts that it is cloaked with sovereign immunity regarding Plaintiffs claims and therefore, that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims. Vt. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). To the extent that is not true Defendant maintains Plaintiff Benjiman Nichols has failed to state a claim. Vt. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendant attached certain public records from a related judicial proceeding in support of certain parts of its motion. In an earlier ruling, the Court converted the motion into a one for summary judgment, per Vt. R. Civ. P. 56(d), so that it could consider the materials appended to the Defendant's motion. It granted Plaintiff an opportunity to respond to the transformed motion, which he did. .
The Court makes the following determinations.
The Vermont Supreme Court disfavors Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. "Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only when it is beyond doubt that there exist no facts or circumstances consistent with the complaint that would entitle Plaintiff to relief." Bock v. Gold, 2008 VT 81, ¶ 4, 184 Vt. 575, 576 (mem.) (quoting Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Joerg, 2003 VT 27, ¶ 4, 175 Vt. 196, 198)). In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court "assume [s] that all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint are true, accept[s] as true all reasonable inferences that may be derived from plaintiff's pleadings, and assume[s] that all contravening assertions in defendant's pleadings are false." Mahoney v. Tara, LLC, 2011 VT 3, ¶ 7, 189 Vt. 557, 559 (mem.) (internal quotation, brackets, and ellipses omitted).
Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) are slightly different. The Court is allowed to accept certain types of evidence that relate to the bases for the court's jurisdiction without transforming the motion into a summary judgment motion. See Conley v. Crisafulli, 2010 VT 38, ¶ 3, 188 Vt. 11, 14. Federal law is clear that the question of sovereign immunity is jurisdictional. See, e.g., DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. U.S., 926 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir.) (), cert, denied, 140 S.Ct. 439 (2019). While our Supreme Court has not so held with regard to state sovereign immunity, it has referred to the doctrine as being "jurisdictional." City of S. Burlington v. Dep't of Corr., 171 Vt. 587, 590 (2000) (); Denis Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 159 Vt. 481, 485 (1993) (). The Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over claims against the State of Vermont unless there is valid waiver of its sovereign immunity.
Further, as the Court has converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, the standards of Rule 56 are also relevant. Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded as "an integral part of the .. . Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Morrisseau v. Fayette, 164 Vt. 358, 363 (1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence in the record, typically referred to in the statements required by Vt. R. Civ. . P. 56(c), shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Vt. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 163 Vt. 83, 86 (1994).
A party opposing summary judgment may not simply rely on allegations in the pleadings to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Instead, it must come forward with deposition excerpts or affidavits to establish such a dispute. Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621, 628, (1991). If the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may be entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party is unable to come forward with evidence supporting its case. Poplaski v. Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 254-55 (1989).
In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all facts and indulges all inference in favor of the non-moving party. Price u. Leland, 149 Vt. 518, 521 (1988).
The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was improperly served with a Domestic Violence Final Order of Protection (the "Order"), in New Hampshire. He was later arrested, in Vermont, for violating the contact terms of the Order. The contact was observed by a court officer, and the Plaintiff was arrested at the courthouse. After arraignment and hearing, he was held without bail. He want to trial and was convicted. His conviction was reversed on appeal in State v. O'Keefe, 2019 VT 14, 209 Vt. 497, which is referenced in the Amended Complaint.[1] The Supreme Court concluded that, even if Plaintiff had oral notice of the terms of the Order from the New Hampshire judge and that his attorney was provided with a copy of the written Order, the State had produced no evidence that it was also mailed to Plaintiff as was required under New Hampshire law. Since the evidence submitted did not show that the Order had been validly served on Plaintiff, his convictions for violating that Order could not stand. In sum, Plaintiff spent over four years in jail in connection with that criminal proceeding.
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges claims of: Violation of the due process clause of the Vermont Constitution, Chapter I, Article 10; false imprisonment; and violation of Vermont's Innocence Protection Act (VIPA).
Defendant's motion to dismiss challenges each of those causes of action. It argues that the Article 10 claim fails because no private monetary remedy is appropriate under Article 10 due to the existence of the VIPA and because the claims fails to state a due process violation. It contends that the false imprisonment claim fails because the State has retained its immunity where an alternate remedy, such as the VIPA, exists; and because the existence of "probable cause" for the prosecution precludes the false imprisonment claim. Finally, it asserts that the VIPA claim fails because Plaintiff has not alleged, and could not allege, that he was "actually innocent" of the charges. Plaintiff disputes all of those points.
The State makes a multifaceted assault on Plaintiffs claim of a due process violation under the Vermont Constitution. Vt. Const. Art. 10. It argues that the provision is not self-executing and that, even if it is, a damages remedy should not be implied. Lastly, the State asserts that the Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a due process violation on the merits.
Plaintiffs seeking to bring a claim directly under the Vermont Constitution must satisfy two initial hurdles. First, the provision has to be "self-executing." In other words, under a four-part test, it must provide clear standards that were intended to be enforced without some type of enacting legislation. Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt 219, 222 (1995). Second, the Court must consider whether a monetary damages remedy is appropriate or whether there is some other protective scheme or remedy that may suffice to protect the interests secured by the Constitution. Id.; In re Town Highway No. 20, 2012 VT 17, ¶ 36, 191 Vt. 231, 253 ( ).
As to the first two points, there is no controlling Vermont precedent regarding Article 10. The federal court for the District of Vermont has found that Article 10 is self-executing. Billado u. Parry, 937 F.Supp. 337, 345 (D. Vt. 1996). Also, under somewhat similar circumstances as presented here, a trial court opinion has determined that a monetary damages remedy should not be implied in light of the existence of a possible tort remedy for false imprisonment. See Mason v State, 1 No. 246-4-13 Wrcv, 2016 WL 9453678, at *3 (Vt. Super. July 11, 2016).
In this instance, the Court concludes that it need not weigh in on those thorny threshold issues because Plaintiff has simply failed to state a claim for a due process violation. The Supreme Court's ruling in O'Keefe is specifically referenced in and is a part of the Amended Complaint. That decision shows that Plaintiff was charged with the criminal offense of violating a New Hampshire abuse prevention order. Plaintiff was present at the underlying New Hampshire hearing where the abuse prevention order was issued, along with his counsel. At the end of the hearing, the judge indicated a final order was being issued. The Court provided Plaintiff notice of the final order through service upon his attorney. Plaintiff later allegedly violated the order by having contact with the woman who obtained the order; Plaintiff asserted when he was arrested that he thought the order was enforceable only in New Hampshire.
The O'Keefe Supreme Court decision shows that Plaintiff had counsel and received a jury trial. He moved for acquittal at the end of the State's case based on the...
To continue reading
Request your trial