Nichols v. Walter

Decision Date25 July 1887
Citation37 Minn. 264,33 N.W. 800
PartiesNICHOLS v WALTER AND OTHERS, CO. COM'RS, ETC.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Chapter 272, Laws 1885, providing a mode for removing county-seats, is unconstitutional and void, as in the nature of special legislation, and not uniform in its operation throughout the state, and so in violation of subdivision 5 of section 33 and of section 34 of article 4 of the constitution.

The provisions of the constitution referred to (adopted in 1881) abrogated the provisions of section 1 of article 11 of the constitution, so far as they relate to the removal of county-seats.

Appeal from district court, Lac qui Parle county.

Cole, Bramhall & Morris, for Nichols, appellant.

J. D. Springer, H. L. Hayden, and K. O. Jerde, for respondents.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

In 1881 an amendment to the constitution was adopted, adding to article 4 two sections, 33 and 34.

Sec. 33. The legislature is prohibited from enacting any special or private laws in the following cases: *** (5) For changing any county-seat.

Sec. 34. The legislature shall provide general laws for the transaction of any business that may be prohibited by section 1 of this amendment, (§ 33, art. 4,) and all such laws shall be uniform in their operation throughout the state.”

Section 1 of article 11 of the constitution provides: “All laws changing county lines in counties already organized, or for removing county-seats, shall, before taking effect, be submitted to the electors of the county or counties to be affected thereby at the next general election after the passage thereof, and be adopted by a majority of such electors.” Chapter 272, Laws 1885, provided a mode for changing county-seats by the county commissioners, submitting to the electors of the county the proposition to change the county-seat. Section 6 of that chapter provided: “If a majority of all the voters present and voting at such election shall vote in favor of such county-seat, it shall be the duty of the chairman of the board of county commissioners to certify to the same, with the attestation of the county auditor, to the governor of the state, who thereupon shall issue his proclamation to that effect, and cause the same to be published and printed in some newspaper printed and published at the capital of the state, and from the date of such proclamation the place so designated shall be the county-seat of such county; but, if there shall not be a majority of such votes in favor of such change, then it shall not be lawful for the county commissioners to again submit the question of the change or removal of the county-seat at any time within five years from the time such election is held: provided, that in all counties when the question of the change or location of the county-seat therein has heretofore been submitted to a vote of the electors of such county, and the county-seat therein has been fixed or located by such vote, no such county-seat so fixed or located shall be changed or removed under the provisions of this act, unless three-fifths (3-5) of all the voters present and voting at such election shall vote in favor of such change or removal.”

Several objections on constitutional grounds are made to this law. Section 1 of article 11 provided a mode for removing county-seats. This was to be done in each case by a special law providing for the removal, and which law, before taking effect, was to be submitted at the next general election to the electors of the county to be affected by it, and to be adopted by a majority of such electors. The law might be adopted or rejected by them. In the former event it took effect; in the latter, it became nugatory. The amendment of 1881 abrogated this mode of removal by prohibiting the passage of any special law, and of course did away with the necessity of submitting the matter to the electors. It is impracticable to so submit a general law. The proposition that a general law, to be operative, must be submitted to and adopted by the electors in each county in the state would be absurd, and equally absurd that a general law might be so submitted and be operative in the counties where adopted, and inoperative where rejected. By the amendment the whole matter of the mode of removal is left to the judgment of the legislature, with these restrictions: that the mode adopted shall be by general law, and that such law shall be uniform in its operation throughout the state. It is competent for the legislature to provide that, whenever a change in any county is asked for, the county commissioners shall submit the proposition to the electors of the county, and prescribe whether it must, to effect a removal, be adopted either by a bare majority, or by more than a majority,-for instance, by three-fifths or three-fourths, or any other proportion of the electors. But the provision must operate uniformly throughout the state.

It must be conceded that where a general law, uniform in its operation, is required, the law is none the less general and uniform because it divides the subjects of its operation into classes, and applies different rules to the different classes. For the purpose of efficient and beneficial legislation it is often necessary to do so. The question of the extent to which it may be done without running into special legislation is a difficult one. It is difficult, and perhaps not quite safe, to state any inflexible rule. With respect to political subdivisions of the state,-counties, cities, or towns,-the supreme court of Pennsylvania lays it down that the only proper classification is by population. We are satisfied that rule is together too narrow. For instance, laws for incorporating villages or granting corporate powers or privileges...

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