Nicholson v. Georgia Dept. of Human Resources (DHR), 89-8435

• Decision Date: 27 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-8435,89-8435
• Citation: 918 F.2d 145
• Parties: 54 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 737, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,401 Juanita NICHOLSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, (DHR), James G. Ledbetter, individually and in official capacity as Commissioner, Georgia Dept. of Human Resources, Defendant, Thomas R. Gaines, individually and in his official capacity as Director, DHR Division of Rehabilitative Services, Gene A. Wallace, individually and in his official capacity as Director of Planning Research and Special Projects, DHR Division of Rehabilitative Services, Paula McIntoch, individually and in her official capacity as Director of Management Support Services, DHR Division of Rehabilitative Services, Defendants-Appellants, Jane Shepard, individually and in her official capacity as Director of Quality Assurance and Human Resources Development, DHR Division of Rehabilitation Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 145

918 F.2d 145

54 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 737,

55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,401

Juanita NICHOLSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, (DHR), James G Ledbetter, individually and in official capacity as Commissioner, Georgia Dept. of Human Resources, Defendant Thomas R. Gaines, individually and in his official capacity as Director, DHR Division of Rehabilitative Services, Gene A. Wallace, individually and in his official capacity as Director of Planning Research and Special Projects, DHR Division of Rehabilitative Services, Paula McIntoch individually and in her official capacity as Director of Management Support Services, DHR Division of Rehabilitative Services, Defendants-Appellants Jane Shepard, individually and in her official capacity as Director of Quality Assurance and Human Resources Development, DHR Division of Rehabilitation Services, Defendant.

No. 89-8435.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Nov. 27, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 8, 1991.

George P. Shingler, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellants.

Alice D. Bonner, Oakley & Bonner, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before ANDERSON and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge.

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellee Juanita Nicholson, an employee of the Georgia Department of Human Resources ("DHR"), initiated this action against, inter alia, defendants Thomas Gaines, Gene Wallace and Paula McIntosh, several of her superiors at DHR. These defendants raised a defense of qualified immunity. The district court's denial of that defense is the subject of this appeal.

Until July, 1986, Nicholson, along with two male individuals, worked in the planning unit of the Division of Rehabilitation Services of the DHR. As of July 1, 1986, this unit was abolished and all three members of the unit were reassigned by defendants to other work positions. Although Nicholson made other claims below, this appeal involves only Nicholson's claim that her transfer and treatment constitutes sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

The district court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the government official being sued in his or her individual capacity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In evaluating a defendant's claim to qualified immunity, the following standard is applied: "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate the clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known." Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738.

As presently formulated, this standard serves as a shield to all government officials except the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ. 908 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir.1990). Application of this standard requires the court to conduct its review through the eyes of an objective, reasonable government official: could a reasonable official have believed his or her actions to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the official at the time the conduct occurred? See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641-42, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Malley, 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct. at 1098. Unless it can be said that the state of the law was of such clarity that a reasonable official should have been on notice that his or her challenged conduct was unlawful, that official is entitled to qualified immunity. Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876, 880 (11th Cir.1988). In satisfying this burden, the plaintiff cannot point to sweeping propositions of law and simply posit that those propositions are applicable. See Muhammad v. Wainwright, 839 F.2d 1422, 1424 (11th Cir.1987). Instead, the plaintiff must draw the court's attention toward a more particularized and fact-specific inquiry. Stewart at 1504. Under this inquiry, the plaintiff need not point to one or more cases that resolved the precise factual issues at issue in his or her case. See, e.g., Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1034-36 (11th Cir.1989); Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1476-77 (11th Cir.1989). "[A]lthough the standard is fact-specific, it is not one of factual rigidity." Stewart at 1504. Rather, the plaintiff need only show that there existed sufficient case law establishing the contours of his or her constitutional rights such that the unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct would have been apparent to a reasonable official in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the defendant. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638-40, 107 S.Ct. at 3038-39. If no such case law exists, then the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.

This standard presents two distinct questions of law. First, we must determine whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendants were clearly established at the time the defendants acted. Second, if the legal norms that defendants allegedly violated were clearly established, then we must determine whether the plaintiff has adduced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendants engaged in conduct violative of the clearly established right. Stewart at 1503.

Defendants argue in brief that the only evidence which Nicholson has adduced at the summary judgment stage is that the two male colleagues who were transferred at the same time plaintiff was transferred were offered choices relating to their new positions, while plaintiff was not. Defendants argue that plaintiff has adduced no other evidence from which intentional sex discrimination could be inferred. Thus, defendants argue that Nicholson has failed to adduce proof of a constitutional violation, and that a reasonable government official could have believed that such conduct was lawful.

The flaw in defendants' argument is that there was other evidence from which intentional sex discrimination could have been inferred. In addition to the disparate treatment noted in defendants' argument, i.e., that the two male employees were offered options as to their new position while Nicholson was not, there was other evidence. There was evidence from which the factfinder could find that the new job to which Nicholson was transferred was in effect a demotion. She was assigned an office in a small, windowless storage room that had no ventilation, had an average temperature in excess of 84 degrees, and was without a telephone for over a month. Nicholson's new office was generally referred to by employees as the "junk room" or "hot box." It had not served as an office previous to that time, nor was it again used as an office after Nicholson finally obtained a different office. In spite of her complaints concerning the office, Nicholson was unable to secure bona fide office space for over a year. At least two different male employees with less seniority were provided better office space during this period.

Nicholson's job responsibilities were substantially diminished after her transfer. Although she was a member...