Nicholson v. State

• Court: Maryland Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Before BRUNE; PER CURIAM
• Citation: Nicholson v. State, 182 A.2d 31, 229 Md. 123 (Md. 1962)
• Decision Date: 15 June 1962
• Docket Number: No. 328,328
• Parties: Leroy NICHOLSON v. STATE of Maryland.

Page 123

229 Md. 123

182 A.2d 31

Leroy NICHOLSON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 328.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 15, 1962.

Samuel S. Field, III, Baltimore, for appellant.

Eli Baer, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. (Thomas B. Finan, Atty. Gen., Saul A. Harris, State's Atty., and Joseph G. Koutz, Deputy State's Atty., for Baltimore City, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and HAMMOND, PRESCOTT, HORNEY and SYBERT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is frivolous and devoid of merit. Appellant was arraigned under three indictments: one charged him with grand larceny and receiving; another with 'junking without a permit' (the stolen property); and the third with unlawfully trespassing upon the real property from whence the stolen property was taken. He pleaded not guilty to the larceny indictment, and guilty to the other two. He presses only the appeal relating to the larceny.

His first contention is the usual and stock one of an alleged insufficiency of the evidence. There was evidence that appellant and three other men, during a lunch hour, drove into the fenced-in yard of the Lord Baltimore Press and loaded on a truck something over a ton of second-hand machine parts, drove away, and sold the parts as junk for $21. Other testimony stated the fair market value of the property taken was $1,396. Appellant took the stand and admitted taking the property, but claimed he was given permission to do so by some employees, whom he was unable to identify. It is obvious there was evidence, if believed by the trier of facts, sufficient to support a conviction of grand larceny. The trial judge was not required to accept appellant's exculpatory statement, nor was the selling-price of the machine parts, as junk, controlling as to value.

Appellant also claims the sentence was improper; it was confinement in the House of Correction for 4 years. It was within the statutory maximum, Code (1957), Article 27, Section 340; hence he cannot be heard to complain. Ponder v. State, 227 Md. 570, 177 A.2d 839.

Appellant's last contention is that his trial counsel (not the same as counsel on appeal) represented him so poorly that he was denied due process of law. This is a serious accusation relative to the professional ability of trial counsel, and should only be made when there is a sound basis for doing so. However, the charge apparently stems from appellant's present counsel's lack of practical experience in criminal procedure.

The principal complaints are:...