Nickel Mine Brook Associates v. Joseph E. Sakal, P.C.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 14105,14105
• Citation: 217 Conn. 361,585 A.2d 1210
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NICKEL MINE BROOK ASSOCIATES v. JOSEPH E. SAKAL, P.C.

Page 1210

585 A.2d 1210

217 Conn. 361

NICKEL MINE BROOK ASSOCIATES v.JOSEPH E. SAKAL, P.C.

No. 14105.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 4, 1990.

Decided Feb. 5, 1991.

Thomas J. Weihing, with whom were John T. Bochanis, Bridgeport and Joseph E. Sakal, Seymour, for appellant(defendant).

Richard F. Connors, New Haven, for appellee(plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO, HULL and BORDEN, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether an attorney who represents a client in obtaining a zoning change and in other matters relating to certain real property is entitled to file a mechanic's lien under General Statutes § 49-33.¹We conclude that attorneys performing such services are not included among those entitled to file mechanics' liens.

The facts are not in dispute.The defendant, Joseph E. Sakal, P.C., is a law firm that performed legal services related to a 100 acre parcel of land in Seymour owned by the plaintiff, Nickel Mine Brook Associates, a general partnership.These services, which were provided between February, 1986, and January, 1990, involved zoning, land planning and related matters.²The defendant's bill for the services rendered was $62,195.The defendant timely filed a mechanic's lien against the plaintiff's parcel of land to secure payment for the services that had been provided.The plaintiff filed an application to discharge or reduce the lien pursuant to General Statutes § 49-35a.³The trial court granted the application, concluding that § 49-33 was not intended to protect claims by attorneys.The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the matter to this court pursuant to Practice Book§ 4023.We now affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Section 49-33(a) provides that "[i]f any person has a claim for more than ten dollars for materials furnished or services rendered in the construction, raising, removal or repairs of any building or any of its appurtenances or in the improvement of any lot or in the site development or subdivision of any plot of land ... the building ... or the lot or ... the plot of land, is subject to the payment of the claim."(Emphasis added.)The dispositive issue in this case is whether the legislature intended to include attorneys performing services for clients in connection with the rezoning of land and related real estate matters among the persons entitled to file mechanics' liens when it expanded the scope of § 49-33 in 1974 by adding the phrase "or in the improvement of any lot or in the site development or subdivision of any plot of land."SeePublic Acts 1974, No. 74-310.

The defendant contends that the legal services it performed for the plaintiff constitute services rendered in the improvement, the site development, and the subdivision of the property, as these terms are used in § 49-33(a).It claims that because the statute does not exclude attorneys from the class of persons entitled to file mechanics' liens, the services it provided fall within the purview of the statute when it is interpreted liberally.The plaintiff asserts that the trial court properly ruled that the defendant could not file a mechanic's lien because the 1974amendment was not intended to expand the scope of § 49-33(a) to include persons whose services do not enhance the property in some physical manner or lay the groundwork for the physical enhancement of the property.We agree that the 1974amendment to § 49-33 does not extend the benefits of the mechanic's lien statute to the defendant, but our interpretation of the amended statute does not require us to address whether the services rendered must always be connected to some physical enhancement of the property in order to fall within the scope of § 49-33(a).

The starting point in any case involving a question of statutory construction must be the language used by the legislature.King v. Board of Education, 203 Conn. 324, 332, 524 A.2d 1131(1987);Verdon v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 187 Conn. 363, 366, 446 A.2d 3(1982)." 'Where the words of a statute fail to indicate clearly whether the provision applies in certain circumstances, it must be construed by this court....'Board of Trustees v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 544, 550, 436 A.2d 266(1980).Under our rules of statutory construction, this court is to be guided by the language, purpose and legislative history of the statute in question."Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital, 204 Conn. 399, 405, 528 A.2d 805(1987).

The guidelines for interpreting mechanic's lien legislation are well established.Although the mechanic's lien statute creates a statutory right in derogation of the common law;Camputaro v. Stuart Hardwood Corporation, 180 Conn. 545, 550, 429 A.2d 796(1980);Gruss v. Miskinis, 130 Conn. 367, 370, 34 A.2d 600(1943); its provisions should be liberally construed in order to implement its remedial purpose of furnishing security for one who provides services or materials.H & S Torrington Associates v. Lutz Engineering Co., 185 Conn. 549, 553, 441 A.2d 171(1981);Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J.W. Fisher Co., 183 Conn. 108, 115, 438[217 Conn. 365] A.2d 834 (1981).Our interpretation, however, may not depart from reasonable compliance with the specific terms of the statute under the guise of a liberal construction.Camputaro v. Stuart Hardwood Corporation, supra, 180 Conn. at 551, 429 A.2d 796;Stone v. Rosenfield, 141 Conn. 188, 191, 104 A.2d 545(1954).Finally, "the provisions of our statute differ sufficiently from the mechanic's lien legislation of other states so that precedents elsewhere are of limited utility in the interpretation of our act."⁴Camputaro v. Stuart Hardwood Corporation, supra;New Haven Orphan Asylum v. Haggerty Co., 108 Conn. 232, 236, 142 A. 847(1928).

This court has previously examined the effect of the 1974amendment to § 49-33(a).In Camputaro v. Stuart Hardwood Corporation, supra, we considered whether a contractor's work in road building and site preparation was lienable under § 49-33 prior to the 1974amendment.We concluded that the contractor was not entitled to file a mechanic's lien because "cases construing the language of [§ 49-33 prior to the 1974amendment] have required, as a condition of lienability, that the work done be incorporated in or utilized in the building (or the appurtenance) to be constructed, raised, removed or repaired."Id., 180 Conn. at 552, 429 A.2d 796.We concluded that one of the purposes of the 1974amendment was to eliminate this requirement that the work be incorporated or utilized in a building or appurtenance.Id., at 553-54, 429 A.2d 796.Finally, we noted that "[a]lthough the legislative history of the amended § 49-33 is, as is often true, somewhat murky, it is consistent with an intention to expand the coverage of the mechanic's lien."⁵Id., at 554, 429 A.2d 796.

As a threshold matter, we note that the language of the 1974amendment appears to have extended the coverage of § 49-33 to two distinct types of services: (1) services rendered in the improvement of any lot; and (2) services rendered in the site development or subdivision of any plot of land.Although the defendant claims that the services it provided fall within both of these categories, it relies upon this apparent distinction in arguing that we must interpret these categories separately in determining what types of services fall within the purview of § 49-33(a).Our review of the legislative history leads us to conclude otherwise.

The original version of Senate BillNo. 275, which became Public Acts 1974, No. 74-310, extended the scope of § 49-33(a) only to services rendered "in the site development or subdivision of any plot of land."The language referring to "the improvement of any lot" was adopted as House Amendment A. Conn.House Journal, May 1, 1974, pp. 1086-87;17 H.R.Proc., Pt 10, 1974 Sess., pp. 4970-73.The legislative history indicates that the purpose of this amendment to Senate BillNo. 275 was not to create a distinct category of services for which one could file a mechanic's lien, but rather to avoid potential problems for title searchers by restricting the ability of one who provides services for only a single lot to file a mechanic's lien against an entire subdivision.⁶17 H.R.Proc., Pt. 10, 1974Sess., pp. 4970-71.We conclude that the phrase "improvement of any lot" was intended to include the same types of services embraced by the phrase "site development or subdivision of any plot of land."The only distinction intended by the legislature was between services benefiting particular lots and those benefiting the subdivision as a whole.⁷

In determining what types of services the legislature intended to include when it used the terms "improvement,""site development" and "subdivision," " '[t]he title of legislation when it is acted upon by the legislature is significant and often a valuable aid to construction....'(Citations omitted.)Miller v. Board of Education, 166 Conn. 189, 194, 348 A.2d 584(1974)."Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital, supra.The title of Senate BillNo. 275 was "An Act Concerning Mechanic's Liens on Land Being Improved or Subdivided."(Emphasis added.)A "mechanic" is normally envisioned as a skilled worker who brings about a result by the use of tools, machines or equipment.See Random House Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged Ed.).Moreover, there is a distinct difference between legal services and the types of services that we previously have indicated fall within the scope of § 49-33(a).See, e.g., Camputaro v. Stuart Hardwood Corporation, supra, 180 Conn. at 553-54, 429 A.2d 796(suggesting in dicta that road construction and grading of a building site are within the scope of § 49-33 after the 1974amendment);Stone v. Rosenfield, supra, 141 Conn. at 192, 104 A.2d 545(installation of permanent fixtures);Marchetti v....