Nickell v. Handly
| Decision Date | 08 September 1853 |
| Citation | 51 Va. 336 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | NICKELL & MILLER v. HANDLY & als. |
Testatrix devises and bequeaths a small farm, slaves and other property on the land to a trustee for the life of her daughter H, remainder to the children of H living at her death. And the trustee is directed so to use and conduct the farm, slaves and other property as to be most advantageous to the interest and support of said H and her children during her life time. There are five children, and the husband of H is dead. H becomes indebted; judgments are recovered against her; and she is discharged as an insolvent debtor: And then her creditors file a bill to subject her interest in the property to the debts: HELD:
1. H and her children are not entitled to have set apart for each of them an equal share of the trust property or its annual products; but it is to be held by the trustee, and the annual products are to be applied to their support according to the necessities of each.
2. The creditors would only be entitled to the ratable portion of H of any surplus of the annual products of the trust subject after providing for the support of herself and family; and as any such surplus is not alleged or shown to exist, the bill was properly dismissed.
3. If any surplus product now exists or shall hereafter exist plaintiffs may file a bill to subject it, notwithstanding the dismissal of this bill.
This was a suit in equity in the Circuit court of Monroe county instituted by James M. Nickell and Robert Miller against Henrietta F. Handly and Isaac Campbell, to subject certain property held in trust by Campbell, to satisfy debts due to the plaintiffs by Henrietta F. Handly. The case is fully stated by Judge Samuels in his opinion.
Price, for the appellants.
Caperton, for the appellees.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit court of Monroe county, in a suit wherein the appellants were complainants, and the appellees were defendants. The bill alleged that each of the complainants had obtained a judgment against the defendant Henrietta F. Handly; that a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum was issued on each judgment, on which she was arrested, and afterwards discharged as an insolvent debtor, surrendering no property or debts in her schedule. The bill further alleges, that by the will of the late Mary Ann Handly, land, slaves and other personal property were conveyed to Isaac Campbell in trust for the benefit of said Henrietta F. Handly, then the wife of Alexander Handly, and her family; that the property was still held by the trustee Campbell; that Alexander Handly the husband was dead; that all or some of the articles which constitute the debts of complainants were necessaries furnished to Henrietta F. Handly and her family, at the instance of Campbell the trustee. The parties Handly and Campbell were the only defendants to the bill. The bill prayed for a sale of Henrietta F. Handly's interest in the trust estate to pay the debts due complainants, and for general relief.
The defendant Campbell alone answered. He admitted the conveyance in trust, and alleged that he had performed his duties as trustee as fully as he was capable of performing them; that he always deemed it his business to furnish H. F. Handly and her family everything necessary for their support, out of the proceeds of the farm and negroes. He denied the right of complainants to interfere with his execution of the trust; he denied emphatically that any of the articles were furnished at his request; he did not admit that what complainants called the equitable interest of Henrietta F. Handly could be taken or sold to satisfy complainants' debts, alleging that thereby the whole purpose of the conveyance would be defeated without the action or assent of the grantor or grantee.
Copies of the will of Mary Ann Handly and the codicil thereto, are filed with the bill. The provisions of these papers, so far as they are involved in this suit, in substance invest Isaac Campbell as trustee with the title to the plantation on which testatrix resided, containing one hundred and ninety acres, during the life time of H. F. Handly, the daughter of testatrix; after her death remainder over to such of her children as may be then living. The trustee was directed so to use and conduct the farm or plantation as to be most advantageous to the interests and support of said Henrietta F. Handly and her children during the life time of the said Henrietta. He is also invested as trustee during the life time of said Henrietta, with the title to several slaves and other personal property particularly described, upon the same trusts; and after her death remainder over to her children then living.
The exhibits filed by complainants fully prove their judgments and the discharge of their debtor under the insolvent laws; but there is no proof that the debts or any part of them, were contracted by the authority of Campbell the trustee.
The record nowhere shows the precise number of Henrietta F. Handly's children; it may, however, be gathered from certain clauses in the will, that they were as many as five in number if no more.
The testatrix obviously intended that the property, real and personal, set apart by testatrix for her daughter and her family, should be kept together for their joint support during the life time of her daughter. The sale of the specific property prayed for could not be made, because no title, legal or equitable therein vested in the debtor; her only interest was in the products of the property. It would be at variance with well settled rules in regard to the preservation of personal property held in trust, or property in which there are expectant interests, to expose it to a public sale; thereby scattering it broadcast over the country, and rendering it impossible to reclaim it when the purposes of the trust, or the rights of the expectants shall require its production. I am therefore of opinion the Circuit court decided rightly in refusing to decree a sale of the specific personal property as prayed for in the bill of complainants.
It remains to be considered whether under the prayer for general relief the court should have sequestered Mrs. Handly's interest in the products of the property, real and personal, or her alleged equitable estate in the subject itself for the benefit of her creditors. If Mrs. Handly had any interest therein subject to her own disposal, or which could be separated from the interests of others without impairing their rights, such interest might, on familiar principles, be subjected to the payment of her debts. Coutts v. Walker, 2 Leigh 268; Haleys v. Williams, 1 Leigh 140. The creditors of an insolvent debtor can derive from the debtor only such interest as he held, and in the language of the statute, may " lawfully depart withal."
There is nothing in the nature or law of property which would prevent the testatrix, when about to die, from appropriating her property to the support of her poor and helpless relations, according to the different conditions and wants of such relations; nothing to prevent her from charging her property with the expense of food, raiment and shelter for such relations. There is nothing in law or reason, I conceive, which should prevent her from appointing an agent or trustee to administer her bounty. The difference in the conditions of the beneficiaries necessarily requires a difference in the amounts to be expended on each individual and the casualties of life may render this inequality still greater. It is impossible to foresee the vicissitudes in affairs, and to provide by will in advance for every event; and no practicable mode exists to meet these difficulties but to authorize the appointment of some agent, trustee or other person to exercise the power which the testatrix is prevented by death from exercising herself. The leading intent here is to support Henrietta F. Handly and her children, and to promote their interests; and the trustee is directed to carry this intent into execution. The duty of supporting a family, especially on a limited amount of property, necessarily requires unequal expenditures upon different members of the family; an infant of tender years is sustained at less expense than an adult; a child in good health will grow and in time be able to sustain itself; whereas another, in a sickly condition, or of unsound mind, may require long continued assistance and the expenditure of large sums of money; all of which clearly fall within the scope of the duty to support the family. The will obviously intends that the property shall be kept together for the life time of the daughter; its products are charged with the unequal and varying amounts necessary to support the beneficiaries: The products of every part of the property are charged with the whole burden, the amount of which can only be known from time to time whilst the trust is in the process of execution. It may be and very probably is the case that the property, if kept together and economically managed, would do no more than support the family. If, however, Mrs. Handly, either by direct conveyance, or indirectly by operation of law, can withdraw from the trust property one-sixth part thereof, or any other given proportion, then it must be held that another beneficiary may do the same thing; and thus the charge upon the whole property may be thrown upon a fragment of it. By keeping a small amount of property upon a little farm a family living thereon may be supported; but if divided, the shares of each would be inadequate to his or her support. If testatrix had intended to give equal benefits to her daughter and each child, nothing was easier than to have said so; yet she has not said so; but on the...
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