Nicks v. State of Mo., 94-3752

• Decision Date: 12 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-3752,94-3752
• Citation: 67 F.3d 699
• Parties: 43 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 34 Sandra NICKS, Appellee, v. STATE OF MISSOURI; Bellefontaine Habilitation Center; Keith Schafer, Individually and in his official capacities; Gregory Kramer, Individually and in his official capacities; Defendants, Margaret Kesselring, Individually and in her official capacities; Sherris McMahan, Individually and in her official capacities; Kay Karras, Individually and in her official capacities, Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 699

67 F.3d 699

43 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 34

Sandra NICKS, Appellee, v. STATE OF MISSOURI; Bellefontaine Habilitation Center Keith Schafer, Individually and in his official capacities; Gregory Kramer Individually and in his official capacities Defendants Margaret Kesselring, Individually and in her official capacities; Sherris McMahan, Individually and in her official capacities; Kay Karras, Individually and in her official capacities, Appellants.

No. 94-3752.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 16, 1995.

Decided Oct. 12, 1995.

Karen King Mitchell, Chief Counsel Governmental Affairs Division, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, Missouri, argued, for appellant.

Mary Anne Sedey, St. Louis, Missouri, argued, for appellee.

Before BOWMAN and HEANEY, Circuit Judges, and KYLE, ^* District Judge.

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Kay Karras, Margaret Kesselring, and Sherris McMahan appeal the judgment of the District Court ¹ awarding damages to Sandra Nicks on her sexual harassment claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988). We affirm.

I.

The evidence submitted to the jury in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, showed that Nicks was sexually harassed by Robert Little, a co-worker, from 1987 to 1989 while she was employed as a psychologist at the Bellefontaine Habilitation Center (BHC), a state-run mental health facility. BHC consists of office buildings and group homes occupied by patients in a setting that resembles a college campus. Little was a qualified mental retardation professional assigned to a group home in BHC's Unit I; Nicks was never assigned to work in that group home. Little's unwanted attention included, but was not limited to, purposeless visits, some of several hours' duration, to the office Nicks shared with Karras; Little's attempts to discuss his personal and marital problems with Nicks; statements of Little's desire to have a relationship with her; quests through the parking lot for her car; and attempts to follow her around at work. The evidence of Little's harassing behavior is substantial.

Nicks testified that she reported Little's conduct to her immediate supervisor, defendant Kay Karras, in the fall of 1988, and Karras corroborated Nicks's testimony. Rather than taking action to correct Little's job-related conduct, Karras suggested that Nicks work at one of BHC's group homes when Nicks's schedule required her to work alone after regular business hours. Little, however, followed Nicks to the group homes and continued to demonstrate his unwelcome interest in her. Nicks again reported Little's conduct to Karras, who did nothing. Nicks twice reported Little's conduct to Little's immediate supervisor, Ron Gerhardt, who also did nothing. Nicks and other BHC employees requested a meeting with defendant Sherris McMahan, manager of BHC's Unit I, to discuss Little's conduct. Nicks and other employees reported that Little was following Nicks around the campus and pursuing her during both day and night shifts. They also stated that Little's behavior was getting progressively worse. McMahan refused to act, stating that BHC could not do anything until Little "did something" to Nicks. Tr. vol. IV at 13. Karras testified that she reported on the concerns raised at the meeting to defendant Margaret Kesselring, BHC's personnel director. Nicks also called Kesselring to schedule a meeting regarding Little's behavior. Kesselring, however, told Nicks that "it's irrelevant," Tr. vol. III at 91, 92, and took no action against Little even though BHC's disciplinary procedures provided for sanctions ranging from counseling to discharge. In fact, when Little resigned in October 1989, Kesselring recorded that he was an employee in good standing, which made him eligible for reemployment at BHC.

On March 2, 1989, Nicks requested a 30-day sick leave, which was denied by BHC despite the fact that Nicks's treating psychologist and psychiatrist both recommended a medical leave. Nicks did not report for work, and BHC dismissed her effective April 18, 1989. Nicks appealed her dismissal to the Personnel Advisory Board (PAB), which reinstated Nicks with back pay and attorney fees. On February 7, 1991, the decision and order of the Board was affirmed by the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. During Nicks's absence from BHC, however, Little was not idle. He visited her apartment complex, posing as a concerned co-worker, and convinced the apartment manager to let him into Nicks's apartment. He telephoned Nicks at her apartment several times daily, calling back when Nicks would hang up on him. He sent a long personal note professing his "love" for Nicks in a package disguised to look as if it had been sent by a St. Louis University professor. He left notes for her at St. Louis University, where she was taking graduate courses, and, on one occasion, he left a single red rose and a note for Nicks at the psychology department office. This behavior continued through August 1989. During all of this time, Little was still employed by BHC, and the evidence shows that the individual defendants were aware of Little's continuing harassment of Nicks.

During the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement, Nicks instituted workers' compensation proceedings and received compensation for a permanent partial disability resulting from the emotional stress caused by Little's harassment. On August 17, 1990, she also filed this action in federal district court for damages and injunctive relief. The District Court disposed of several counts of her complaint in pre-trial rulings. At trial, Nicks's Sec. 1983 claims against Karras, Kesselring, and McMahan were submitted to the jury while her Title VII claims for injunctive relief against the State of Missouri and BHC were submitted to the court. The jury found in favor of Nicks on her Sec. 1983 claims and awarded $70,000 in compensatory damages for mental anguish and suffering and $4,500 in punitive damages against Karras, Kesselring, and McMahan. The court found Missouri and BHC liable for violating Nicks's Title VII rights and granted injunctive relief, requiring BHC to circulate its sexual harassment policy and to conduct training on this topic.

Missouri and BHC have not appealed from the court's judgment. The individual defendants, however, appeal from the judgment entered on the jury's verdict and from the court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. They argue that (1) evidence of Little's continuing harassment of Nicks after she was no longer employed by BHC should have been excluded because it is irrelevant and prejudicial and because the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; (2) they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidence was insufficient in a number of different ways; (3) jury instruction 10 is an incorrect statement of the law; and (4) they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Nicks's claim for punitive damages because Nicks did not prove that they acted with reckless or callous indifference to Nicks's constitutional rights.

II.

The appellants first argue that evidence of Little's conduct during the period between Nicks's dismissal and her reinstatement to her position at BHC should have been excluded because it is irrelevant and prejudicial or because the appellants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Nicks's claims for damages attributable to this period. We disagree. A district court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and such a decision will not be disturbed "absent a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." Laubach v. Otis Elevator Co., 37 F.3d 427, 428-29 (8th Cir.1994). We find no such abuse of discretion in this case.

The appellants argue that they cannot be liable for Little's actions toward Nicks during the period following her dismissal when she was not an employee of BHC. The evidence of Little's conduct during this period, they argue, is not admissible because Little was not acting under color of state law once Nicks was no longer a fellow state employee. In other circumstances, this argument might be persuasive. The appellants in this case, however, misunderstand Nicks's theory of the case. Nicks does not argue that Karras, Kesselring, and McMahan are responsible for Little's conduct because Nicks was once employed by BHC. Rather, Nicks argues that the appellants are responsible for Little's conduct during the period following Nicks's dismissal because that conduct was a natural and foreseeable consequence of their failure to prevent Little from harassing Nicks while both were employed at BHC. In other words, Nicks argues that the appellants' inaction while she was employed at BHC was the cause in fact of all of Nicks's injuries, both before and after her dismissal. See Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 669-70 (8th Cir.1992) (noting that defendant can be liable under Sec. 1983 for unconstitutional deliberate indifference if that is "cause in fact" of plaintiff's injuries), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2395, 124 L.Ed.2d 297 (1993).

We believe a jury reasonably could conclude that Little's conduct during the period following Nicks's dismissal flowed from the previous inaction of the appellants that Nicks argues violated her rights. Thus, evidence that tended to prove that Little continued to harass Nicks after her dismissal by their common employer, her superiors never having lifted a finger to discourage Little's offensive conduct prior to Nicks's dismissal, is clearly relevant to the jury's assessment of Nicks's damages. See Fed.R.Evid. 401. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that evidence. ²

We turn next to the appellants' related argument that they were entitled to qualified immunity from damage claims based on the evidence in question because Nicks had no clearly established right to be free from sexual harassment by a fellow BHC employee...