Nicolaou v. Cooperman
Citation | 438 F.2d 993 |
Decision Date | 25 February 1971 |
Docket Number | Patent Appeal No. 8439. |
Parties | Jean N. NICOLAOU, Appellant, v. Michael COOPERMAN, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Darryl Mexic, Richard C. Sughrue, Sughrue, Rochwell, Mion, Zinn & Macpeak, Washington, D. C., attys. of record, for appellant.
Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Judges, and FORD, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation.
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Patent Interferences involving appellant's application1 and appellee's patent2 and awarding priority to the junior party, the patentee Cooperman.
The subject matter in the interference relates to solid state display devices having an electroluminescent layer coupled to a layer of ferroelectric material. The ability of the ferroelectric material to distribute an A.C. signal to the electroluminescent layer is based on the impedance characteristic of the material. When a particular voltage, known as the coercive voltage, is applied to the ferroelectric material, it exhibits a low impedance to small A.C. signals. At other voltages, it exhibits a high impedance to such A.C. signals.
An A.C. signal is applied across the combination of the ferroelectric and electroluminescent layers and gets through the ferroelectric layer in sufficient amounts to energize the electroluminescent layer (and render it luminous) only in a region where low impedance exists. A bias voltage is applied to the ferroelectric layer in such manner that the voltage imposed varies from one end of the material to the other end at any instant. By varying the bias voltage, the coercive or critical voltage position moves across the ferroelectric layer. This causes the region of low impedance to move across the ferroelectric layer which in turn results in a region of light being swept across the electroluminescent layer.
The eleven counts of the interference are claims copied from the Cooperman patent. The broadest count reads:
1. An electroluminescent display device comprising an electroluminescent phosphor, a ferro-electric member electrically coupled to said phosphor, and means for providing a distributed bias across said ferro-electric member.
There are two issues on appeal. The first involves the operativeness of the Nicolaou device, which we find to be determinative of appellant's right to make the counts. The second concerns appellee's proof of reduction to practice prior to the August 7, 1959 filing date of the Nicolaou parent application. Since we affirm the decision of the board in regard to the first issue, we find it unnecessary to reach the second.
During the motion period, appellee moved to dissolve the interference on the ground that appellant has no right to make the counts for the reason that appellant has not disclosed an operative apparatus. The examiner denied this motion, and adhered to his decision on reconsideration. Both parties took testimony on the question of operability and, on final hearing, the board decided the issue of operability in favor of appellee. To aid in understanding the board's decision, we reproduce those findings of fact and law relevant to the operability issue:
Appellant alleges that the board, through confusion of the legal tests for right to make the counts and the tests for operability, improperly placed the burden of proving operability on him. In support of this contention, appellant points to the board's citation of Brand v. Thomas, 96 F.2d 301, 25 CCPA 1053 (1938), which involved a right to make issue. We, too, are somewhat confused by the citation of Brand v. Thomas. If it was cited to indicate that appellant had the burden of proving that the device disclosed in Nicolaou was operable or could be made operable by one of ordinary skill in the art, this would clearly be in error. Chase v. Gartner, 374 F.2d 914, 54 CCPA 1385 (1967); Field v. Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 37 CCPA 1211 (1950); Trumbull v. Kirschbraun, 67 F.2d 974, 21 CCPA 758 (1933). The tests and burdens to be applied when operability is in issue were set forth by this court in Field v. Knowles, supra:
The disclosure of an application placed in interference by the Patent Office is presumed to be an operative disclosure, Mark v. Greenawalt, 32 App.D.C. 253, and will not be held to be inoperative unless it is established (by the junior party by a preponderance of the evidence, Trumbull et...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY v. General Instrument Corp.
...and (2) that the device so described could not be made operative by changes obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Nicolaou v. Cooperman, 438 F.2d 993, 58 C CPA 938 (1971); Field v. Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 37 CCPA 1211 (1950); Carlson Hoist & Machine Co. v. Builders Equipment Corp., 96......
-
Ex parte Morita
...The use of "includes" seems to conflict with what the Specification discloses and this leads to indefiniteness. See Cohn, 438 F.2d at 993; Moore, 439 F.2d at 1235-36. Appellant has not identified a reversible error in the Examiner's determination that the scope of "the estimation parameter"......
- Enzo Life Sciences, Inc. v. Digene Corp.
- Ex parte Fry