Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified School Dist., C-93-4531 MHP.

• Decision Date: 15 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. C-93-4531 MHP.,C-93-4531 MHP.
• Citation: 964 F.Supp. 1369
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: NICOLE M., a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem, JACQUELINE M., Plaintiff, v. MARTINEZ UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Patricia S. Crocker, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Martinez Unified School District, and Darlene Guzman, individually and in her official capacity as Principal of Martinez Junior High School, Defendants.

Page 1369

964 F.Supp. 1369

NICOLE M., a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem, JACQUELINE M., Plaintiff, v. MARTINEZ UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Patricia S. Crocker, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Martinez Unified School District, and Darlene Guzman, individually and in her official capacity as Principal of Martinez Junior High School, Defendants.

No. C-93-4531 MHP.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

April 15, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Pamela Y. Price, Pamela Y. Price Law Offices, Oakland, CA, Karen T. Wolff, Lucas Law Firm, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Thomas G. Beatty, McNamara Houston Dodge McClure & Ney, Walnut Creek, CA, for Defendants.

OPINION

PATEL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Nicole M., by and through her guardian ad litem, Jacqueline M., filed this action on December 22, 1993. On September 13, 1995, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint, alleging that (1) defendant Martinez Unified School District ("MUSD") intentionally discriminated against plaintiff in education on the basis of plaintiff's sex in violation of 20 U.S.C. section 1681 ("Title IX"); (2) defendant Darlene Guzman intentionally deprived plaintiff of her civil rights on the basis of plaintiff's sex in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983; (3) defendants MUSD, Guzman, and Patricia Crocker denied plaintiff her civil rights, particularly her right to be free from discrimination based on sex in a business establishment, in violation of California Civil Code sections 51, 51.5, and 52(a); (4) MUSD and Crocker negligently retained, trained, supervised, and disciplined Guzman and other personnel; (5) MUSD, Guzman, and Crocker negligently inflicted emotional distress on plaintiff; and (6) MUSD and Crocker violated California Education Code sections 200, 212.5, 212.6, 220, and 230, which prohibit sexual harassment in educational institutions.

Now before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Having considered the parties' arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court grants the defendants' motion in part and denies the defendants' motion in part.

BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff attended Martinez Junior High School ("MJHS"), part of the MUSD, from approximately September 1991 to February 1993. MUSD receives federal financial assistance for its public education programs. Crocker is, and at all times relevant herein, was employed as the Superintendent of MUSD. Guzman was at all times relevant herein employed as the Principal of MJHS.

Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 1991 and continuing through the beginning of 1993, when she transferred out of MJHS, male students at the school repeatedly sexually harassed her. The harassment consisted of unwanted verbal comments regarding plaintiff's breasts and figure in general, and on one occasion involved a male student touching plaintiff's breast during class.

On January 4, 1993, plaintiff's mother, Jacqueline M., told Guzman that Nicole M. was being sexually harassed at school. On January 11, 1993, Jacqueline M. gave Guzman the names of the boys who had harassed Nicole M., as well as the names of other female students who witnessed the harassment. Sometime later, Guzman also learned that Nicole M. had been sexually assaulted in one of her classes. Guzman suspended for one day the boy who had sexually assaulted Nicole M.

Guzman took some additional action in response to the reported sexual harassment, but plaintiff alleges that these measures were inadequate and, at times, counter-productive. For example, sometime in January 1993, Guzman spoke with a group of girls, including Nicole M., so that the girls could tell her about any harassment and identify the harassers. However, although Guzman said that she would keep this meeting confidential, she later broke that promise and others at MJHS, including the harassers, discovered that Nicole M. had reported the harassment.

In late January 1993, Guzman moved Nicole M. into new classes so that she could avoid the worst harassers. Subsequently, the worst harasser was placed into one of Nicole M.'s new classes. Nicole M.'s complaints about this arrangement were unavailing. On February 3, 1993, Jacqueline M. informed Guzman that at least one boy continued to sexually harass Nicole M. On February 4, 1993, Jacqueline M. told Crocker about the sexual harassment that was occurring.

Because she no longer felt safe at MJHS, Nicole M. transferred from MJHS to a school in another district on February 17, 1993. On December 22, 1993, plaintiff filed this action.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss will be denied unless it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 792 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064, 107 S.Ct. 949, 93 L.Ed.2d 998 (1987). All material allegations in the complaint will be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.1986).

DISCUSSION

I. Title IX Claim Against MUSD

Title IX provides, in relevant part, "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Plaintiff seeks to maintain, under Title IX, an action for damages against MUSD for failing to adequately respond to student-to-student hostile environment sexual harassment.

At the time of filing their papers both plaintiff and defendants acknowledged that there was recent case law from this District holding that under Title IX a plaintiff may state a student-to-student hostile environment sexual harassment claim for damages against a school district if, and only if, the plaintiff alleges that the school district intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's sex. See Doe By and Through Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F.Supp. 1560 (N.D.Cal.1993) ("Petaluma I"). Both parties urged this court, for different reasons, not to adopt the Petaluma I holding. However, since that time the decision in Petaluma I has been reconsidered and its holding revised. Doe By and Through Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F.Supp. 1415 (N.D.Cal.1996) ("Petaluma III").² The court will take up the arguments of the parties in light of Petaluma I and Petaluma III.

Nicole M. encourages the court to hold that plaintiffs need not plead or prove that a school district intentionally discriminated on the basis of sex in order to recover damages against the school district for a Title IX student-to-student hostile environment sexual harassment claim. Nicole M. contends that instead, a plaintiff should be able to recover money damages against a school district if the school district knew or should have known of the student-to-student sexual harassment and failed to take reasonable steps to stop it.

In contrast, defendants suggest that school districts should never be liable for failing to intervene when one student sexually harasses another. Defendants reason that it is difficult for school personnel to detect when adolescent behavior rises to the level of sexual harassment. Additionally, defendants maintain that it is not appropriate public policy to mandate that school districts be insurers of adolescent behavior and that a finding of school district liability will unleash a flood of lawsuits.

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has directly discussed the existence or nature of a cause of action against school districts under Title IX for student-to-student sexual harassment. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could recover damages under Title IX against a school district for teacher-to-student sexual harassment. Id. at 74-75, 112 S.Ct. at 1037-38. In Franklin, the plaintiff alleged that a teacher had sexually harassed her and that the district knew of the harassment but took no steps to stop it. Id. at 63-64, 112 S.Ct. at 1031-32. The plaintiff sought to recover money damages from the school district. Id. Defendant argued that Congress enacted Title IX under its Spending Clause powers, and as a result, plaintiff could recover no money damages even if she could establish that the defendant school district intentionally discriminated against her. The Court addressed the nature of remedies available under Spending Clause legislation,³ citing to a portion of Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981), in which the Pennhurst Court explained that

[u]nlike legislation enacted under § 5 [of the 14th Amendment] ... legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the `contract.' There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 101 S.Ct. at 1540 (citations omitted).

The Franklin Court applied this reasoning to defendant's position that plaintiff could not recover damages against a school district even when the school district "intentionally" discriminates and concluded that defendant's contention was erroneous. The Franklin Court interpreted Pennhurst as prohibiting damage awards under Spending Clause legislation only when the alleged violation was "unintentional." Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75, 112...