Nicoletti v. Brown
| Decision Date | 29 October 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. C87-1456.,C87-1456. |
| Parties | Phillip NICOLETTI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert BROWN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
Walter J. Gerhardstein, David G. Latanick and Grant D. Shoub, Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiffs.
David J. Kovach, Office of the Atty. Gen., Cleveland, Ohio, for Robert Brown.
Shane Egan, Ohio Legal Rights, Columbus, Ohio, for Francis Johnson.
This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The plaintiffs1 are involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons residing at the Cleveland Developmental Center ("CDC"), a state operated institution for the mentally retarded and developmentally disabled. Named as defendants are Robert Brown, Director of the Ohio Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities ("ODMRDD"),2 Patrick Rafter, Chief of the Division of Developmental Centers, and Gregory Darling, Superintendent of CDC.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that they have each been determined to be eligible for Medicaid intermediate care services for the mentally retarded ("ICF/MR" services). They also allege that they, in fact, received such services until November of 1986, at which time CDC lost its certification as an ICF/MR facility because defendant failed to maintain CDC in accordance with the standards established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act ("Title XIX"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, et seq. (Supp. 1987). Plaintiffs contend that, since that time, they have merely been "warehoused" at CDC, an environment which they and various mental health experts have characterized as "hazardous" and "dangerous." Recently, plaintiffs allege, they have been informed that operations at CDC will be phased down over the next year; that approximately twenty (20) members of the CDC staff will be laid off, thereby further diminishing the level of care and services available to CDC residents; and that CDC residents will be relocated to other non-Medicaid certified facilities outside Cuyahoga County. Plaintiffs contend that such relocation will make it difficult for them to maintain contact with and receive visits from their families and loved ones, and that despite the transfers, they still will not be placed in Medicaid certified facilities. Upon receipt of notice of the impending phase down of CDC and the threatened transfer of CDC residents, plaintiffs initiated this suit.
Although the complaint in this case is far from a model of draftsmanship, it appears to the Court that plaintiffs attempt to set forth four separate, yet somewhat interrelated, claims for relief. First, plaintiffs contend that defendants have violated their rights under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000, et seq. (Supp.1987). Second, they contend that their rights under the Medicaid provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, et seq., have been violated. Third, plaintiffs allege that the conditions at CDC violate their fourteenth amendment due process rights to minimally adequate training, safety, and freedom from undue restraint as articulated in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). Finally, plaintiffs allege that they have a protected property interest in being housed in an institution that meets the standards of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and that they have been unconstitutionally deprived of this property interest.
In addition to requesting a declaratory judgment declaring that their rights under the foregoing statutory and constitutional provisions have been violated, plaintiffs also seek an injunction ordering that the defendants: (a) immediately improve the conditions at CDC so that CDC residents can be assured of their constitutionally protected liberty interests; (b) immediately seek Medicaid re-certification of the CDC; (c) allow residents to choose placement in another appropriate Medicaid-certified facility; (d) cease relocating Medicaid/ICF-eligible residents to non-Medicaid/ICF-certified facilities; and (e) cease laying off staff members at the CDC until the resident's rights can be guaranteed. Additionally, plaintiffs seek attorney fees and costs.
Following an initial hearing, the Court granted plaintiffs a temporary restraining order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b). Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding such motions, the Court must "take as true the material facts alleged" in the complaint, Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 1850, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976), and may dismiss an action only when it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). For the following reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby granted in part and denied in part. Each of the plaintiffs' four theories will be considered separately.
Plaintiffs' first claim for relief is predicated upon the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 ("Disabled Assistance Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000, et seq. (Supp.1987).3 Plaintiffs contend that the Disabled Assistance Act gives them an entitlement to a "system to advance the rights of persons with developmental disabilities" and a right to "receive program services under an individual habilitation plan."4 They contend that these rights have been violated by the defendants, and request this Court to issue appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief, ordering the defendants to implement a plan that will assure that all residents of CDC "receive appropriate program services under an individual habilitation plan and have their rights as residents of CDC and as citizens advanced by defendants."
The defendants, in their motion to dismiss, argue that the Disabled Assistance Act does not provide the plaintiffs with any substantive rights upon which to base this action. The basis of defendants' argument is that the "rights" conferred by the Disabled Assistance Act are conditioned upon the state's acceptance of funds distributed under the Act. Additionally, the defendants argue that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) ("Pennhurst I"), holding that 42 U.S.C. § 60095 did not confer substantive rights upon the mentally retarded, is controlling in this case. The defendants also contend that the only relief available under the Disabled Assistance Act is the termination of federal funds, which was not requested by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs, in their memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, respond that the holding in Pennhurst I covered only a narrow issue regarding the Disabled Assistance Act and does not preclude their claims. The plaintiffs additionally assert that the Disabled Assistance Act creates substantive rights which are enforceable through a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6
For the reasons provided below, the Court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss the claim brought under the Disabled Assistance Act.
The Disabled Assistance Act establishes "a federal-state program whereby the Federal Government provides financial assistance to ... participating States to aid them in creating programs to care for and treat the developmentally disabled." Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 11, 101 S.Ct. at 1536. Congress, in 42 U.S.C. § 6000(b)(1), states the purpose of the Disabled Assistance Act as being:
... to assist States to (A) assure that persons with developmental disabilities receive the care, treatment, and other services necessary to enable them to achieve their maximum potential through increased independence, productivity, and integration into the community, and (B) establish and operate a system which coordinates, monitors, plans, and evaluates services which ensures the protection of the legal and human rights of persons with developmental disabilities.
Additionally, in 42 U.S.C. § 6000(b)(2), Congress states that the "... specific purposes of this chapter are — (A) to assist in the provision of comprehensive services to persons with developmental disabilities, ... and (B) to assist States in appropriate planning activities; ...."
The provisions of the Disabled Assistance Act consist of several requirements which the states must meet in order to qualify for the funds available under this Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 6008 (). Other provisions describe the administrative aspects of the Disabled Assistance Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 6002 (). Additionally, at least one provision of the Disabled Assistance Act has been held to be nothing more than words of encouragement from Congress, designed merely to "nudge" the states in the preferred direction. See Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 20, 101 S.Ct. at 1541 ().
The specific rights claimed by the plaintiffs under the Disabled Assistance Act are found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 6023 and 6042 which provide as follows:
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