Niekamp v. Mo.

• Decision Date: 28 September 2022
• Docket Number: 20-CV-04075-WJE
• Parties: CARLA NIEKAMP, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

CARLA NIEKAMP, Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., Defendants.

No. 20-CV-04075-WJE

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Central Division

September 28, 2022

ORDER

Willie J. Epps, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 57) and suggestions in support thereof (Doc. 58) filed by Defendants State of Missouri, the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, and the Division of Employment Security (“Defendants”). Plaintiff Carla Niekamp has filed suggestions in opposition (Doc. 73), to which Defendants have timely replied (Doc. 88). Also pending before the Court is Ms. Niekamp's Motion to Exclude the Declaration of Dana Miranda (Doc. 71), to which Defendants have filed suggestions in opposition (Doc. 84). Ms. Niekamp has not filed a reply, and the time to do so has passed. These issues are now ripe for consideration. For the reasons that follow, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and the Motion to Exclude is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

This discrimination case arises from Ms. Niekamp's employment with Defendants as an Investigator III in the Prosecution Unit from 2015 to 2018. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2, 7; Doc. 73, p. 6; Doc. 74, p. 2). She alleges that she had more work experience than her predecessor, Michael Kauflin, but was paid less when hired for the same work. (Doc. 73, p. 6). After completing an initial probationary period, she received a pay increase pursuant to the Office of Administration's (“OA”)

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Uniform Classification and Pay System, but her annual salary remained substantially less than male colleagues with the same title. (Doc. 74, p. 2; Doc. 58-2, ¶¶ 7-8; Doc. 73, p. 9).

On April 25, 2018, Ms. Niekamp filed a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging sex discrimination based on unequal pay. (Doc. 1-1, p. 1; Doc. 74, p. 29). She contends that after complaining of sex discrimination, her supervisors retaliated against her by curtailing her ability to effectively supervise and manage her subordinates, creating a hostile work environment. (Doc. 73, pp. 15-25). She further claims that these working conditions were intolerable leading to her constructive discharge on October 31, 2018, and the filing of a second Charge with the MCHR and EEOC alleging retaliation on June 23, 2019. (Doc. 1-3, p. 1; Doc. 73, pp. 14-15; Doc. 74, p. 29).

Ms. Niekamp filed a complaint in this action on May 5, 2020, alleging unequal pay based on gender discrimination in Count I, retaliation in Count II, and associational discrimination in Count III. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 69-113). The Court previously dismissed Count III in its order granting in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 20, p. 8).

II. Motion to Exclude

The Court addresses Ms. Niekamp's Motion to Exclude first because it challenges, in part, the record supporting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Niekamp argues that Defendants' reliance on Ms. Miranda's declaration in support of their summary judgment motion should be stricken by the Court because: (1) Defendants did not timely identify Ms. Miranda as an expert witness; (2) Defendants did not timely identify Ms. Miranda as a fact witness in their Rule 26 disclosures; and (3) Ms. Miranda lacks the requisite personal knowledge to testify about the matters in her declaration. (Doc. 71, pp. 5-8). Defendants counter that: (1) Ms. Miranda does not

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provide an expert opinion; (2) Ms. Niekamp is not prejudiced by the lack of disclosure because Ms. Niekamp's disclosures identify similarly situated individuals employed by Defendants with knowledge of the State of Missouri's pay system; and (3) Ms. Miranda has personal knowledge of the facts in her declaration based on years of experience in Human Resources for the State of Missouri and after reviewing relevant documents. (Doc. 84, pp. 2-4). In her Motion to Exclude, Ms. Niekamp also requests the Court exclude Defendants from calling Ms. Miranda as a witness for any purpose in the case, including at trial. (Doc. 71, p. 8). Because summary judgment is granted, the Court need not reach that issue.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A)(i) requires a party to disclose to an opposing party the information “of each individual likely to have discoverable information . . . that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” Additionally, Rule 26(a)(2)(A) requires a party to disclose “the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present” expert testimony. Parties have an ongoing duty to timely supplement their Rule 26(a) disclosures “if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure . . . is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1)(A). A party who fails to identify witnesses or supplement its disclosures under Rule 26 “is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1); see also Vanderberg v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc., 906 F.3d 698, 703 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f a party does not satisfy the expert disclosure requirements in Rule 26(a)(2), the undisclosed information or expert is excluded unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless.”).

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1. Defendants were not required to disclose Ms. Miranda as an expert witness under Rule 26(a)(2)(A) because her declaration provides only lay witness testimony.

“Determining whether a witness is offering an expert or lay opinion requires a case-by-case analysis of both the witness and the witness's opinion.” United States v. STABL, Inc., 800 F.3d 476, 486 (8th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Smith, 591F.3d 974, 982-83 (8th Cir. 2010)). A witness's opinion qualifies as expert testimony if:

(a) [their] scientific, technical, or other

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