Nielsen v. Kezer

• Decision Date: 31 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 15032,15032
• Citation: 232 Conn. 65,652 A.2d 1013
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Mark NIELSEN et al. v. Pauline R. KEZER, Secretary of the State, et al.

Page 1013

652 A.2d 1013

232 Conn. 65

Mark NIELSEN et al. v. Pauline R. KEZER, Secretary of the State, et al.

No. 15032.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 29, 1994.

Decided Jan. 31, 1995.

John C. Yavis, Jr., with whom was Gale K. Busemeyer, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Gregory T. D'Auria, with whom were Henry S. Cohn, Asst. Attys. Gen., and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., for appellee (named defendant).

Lawrence J. Halloran, for appellee (defendant A Connecticut Party).

Before BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

PALMER, Associate Justice.

The issue raised by this appeal is whether the defendants, Pauline R. Kezer, the secretary of the state, and the A Connecticut Party (ACP), unlawfully failed to recognize the named plaintiff, Mark Nielsen, a candidate for the state senate in the November 8, 1994 general election, as the ACP's endorsed candidate from the twenty-fourth senatorial district. Nielsen and the plaintiff, Charles Hamad, the sole delegate at the ACP's twenty-fourth senatorial district convention, brought this action after Kezer refused to certify Nielsen as the ACP's endorsed candidate based upon the ACP's determination that Hamad's purported endorsement of Nielsen was invalid. The plaintiffs, claiming that the defendants' actions violated their rights under the federal constitution and state election laws, sought an order of mandamus against Kezer and, in the alternative, an injunction against the ACP, directing them to recognize Nielsen as the endorsed candidate of the ACP.

The trial court denied the relief requested by the plaintiffs and rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court and, on the motion of the plaintiffs, we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 4024. ¹ We affirm the judgment of the trial court. ²

The record reveals the following facts. On July 23, 1994, the ACP held a convention for the purpose of endorsing a state senate candidate from the twenty-fourth senatorial district. Under ACP rules adopted pursuant to General Statutes § 9-382, ³ each of the three towns located in that district, namely, Bethel, New Fairfield and Danbury, was entitled to select one delegate to the convention, plus one additional delegate for every ten enrolled party members in the town. ⁴ Because Hamad was the only ACP member in the twenty-fourth senatorial district to file the petition necessary to become a convention delegate, however; ⁵ see General Statutes § 9-407; ⁶ he was the convention's sole delegate, as well as its chairperson. ⁷

Two candidates for the state senate from the twenty-fourth district sought the recommendation of the ACP's executive committee: Nielsen, the nominee of the Republican Party and the Independent Party, and Christopher Setaro, the nominee of the Democratic Party. ⁸ The executive committee recommended Setaro, whose nomination, under ACP rules, was thereby considered duly made and seconded upon the convening of the convention. ⁹ At the convention, however, Hamad nominated Nielsen, and purported to endorse him. Thereafter, Hamad and Nielsen filed a certificate of party endorsement with the secretary of state in accordance with General Statutes § 9-388. ¹⁰

On July 29, 1994, Setaro submitted his formal protest of Hamad's purported endorsement of Nielsen to the ACP executive committee. Specifically, Setaro claimed that the endorsement was invalid because Nielsen's nomination had not received a second as required by ACP rules.

In accordance with General Statutes § 9-387 ¹¹ and ACP rules, ¹² the executive committee met on August 2, 1994, to resolve the dispute concerning Hamad's purported endorsement of Nielsen. By unanimous vote, the committee sustained Setaro's challenge and declared the purported endorsement of Nielsen invalid on the ground that it had not been seconded in accordance with the rules of the party. Accordingly, by letter dated August 2, 1994, Diane S. Blick, the ACP state chairperson, notified Kezer that the ACP "made no endorsement for the office of State Senator in the twenty-fourth Senatorial District." Kezer thereupon informed Nielsen that, in view of the ACP's resolution of the dispute, his name would not appear on the ballot as the ACP's endorsed candidate. ¹³

The plaintiffs then commenced this action, alleging that Nielsen had been unlawfully deprived of his right to appear on the ballot as the ACP's endorsed candidate, and that Hamad had been improperly denied his right as a convention delegate to endorse the candidate of his choice. The plaintiffs sought an order of mandamus compelling Kezer to place Nielsen's name on the ballot as the ACP candidate and, in the alternative, an injunction directing the ACP to withdraw its August 2, 1994 letter to Kezer informing her that the party had not endorsed a candidate from the twenty-fourth senatorial district. The ACP filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint because the issues raised therein were nonjusticiable political questions. After a hearing, the trial court denied the ACP's motion to dismiss, but rendered judgment for the defendants, concluding that their refusal to recognize Nielsen as the ACP endorsed candidate did not violate the plaintiffs' rights. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that: (1) Kezer improperly deferred to the ACP's incorrect resolution of the dispute; (2) the defendants' refusal to recognize Nielsen as the ACP endorsed candidate violated General Statutes §§ 9-390 and 9-407, ¹⁴ which provide for the selection of candidates by local delegates; and (3) the defendants' actions deprived Hamad of his federal constitutional right to vote for the candidate of his choice. ACP contends that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims and, accordingly, that the court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' action. ¹⁵ We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that although it had subject matter jurisdiction to decide the plaintiffs' claims, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the defendants' actions violated their rights either under the United States constitution or the state election laws. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

We first consider the defendants' contention that the trial court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' action because it did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the plaintiffs' claims. Specifically, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs' claims are nonjusticiable because they raise political questions the resolution of which is beyond the court's authority. We disagree.

It is well settled that certain political questions cannot be resolved by judicial authority without violating the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 706, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 222 Conn. 166, 184-85, 610 A.2d 153 (1992); Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 193 Conn. 670, 679-80, 480 A.2d 476, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 875, 105 S.Ct. 236, 83 L.Ed.2d 176 (1984). As we have stated, the "characterization of such issues as political is a convenient shorthand for declaring that some other branch of government has constitutional authority over the subject matter superior to that of the courts." Pellegrino v. O'Neill, supra, at 680, 480 A.2d 476. The fundamental characteristic of a political question, therefore, is that its adjudication would place the court in conflict with a coequal branch of government in violation of the primary authority of that coordinate branch. Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710. Whether a controversy so directly implicates the primary authority of the legislative or executive branch, such that a court is not the proper forum for its resolution, is a determination that must be made on a case-by-case inquiry. Id. at 210-11, 82 S.Ct. at 706.

In deciding whether an action is nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, we are to be guided by "several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the [question] arise[s].... Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question's presence." Id. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710.

We begin our analysis of the defendants' jurisdictional claim with the observation that the defendants do not contend that the executive or legislative branch had authority to resolve the plaintiffs' claims superior to that of the judicial branch. Rather, they argue that the trial court should have declined to adjudicate the plaintiffs' action in deference to the alleged decision-making autonomy of the ACP, a political party. Thus, the defendants have failed to demonstrate that the plaintiffs' claims implicate the core constitutional principle underlying the political question doctrine, namely, the separation of powers. We are doubtful, therefore, that the political question doctrine was intended to apply in such...