Nielsen v. Meeker

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: O'DONNELL; MATIA, P.J., and KARPINSKI
• Citation: Nielsen v. Meeker, 112 Ohio App.3d 448, 679 N.E.2d 28 (Ohio App. 1996)
• Decision Date: 08 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 69001,69001
• Parties: NIELSEN, Appellee, v. MEEKER, Appellant.

Page 448

112 Ohio App.3d 448

679 N.E.2d 28

NIELSEN, Appellee, v. MEEKER, Appellant.

No. 69001.

Court of Appeals of Ohio Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Decided July 8, 1996.

Joseph G. Stafford and James E. Powell, Cleveland, for appellee.

John D. Sutula, Cleveland, for appellant.

O'DONNELL, Judge.

Marsha Meeker, natural mother of Taylor Nielsen, appeals from the April 6, 1995 order of the juvenile court which, inter alia, failed to find David B. Nielsen, Taylor's natural father, in contempt of court for failure to comply with an earlier agreed upon court order to pay child support.

On August 14, 1991, Nielsen filed a complaint in juvenile court to establish parentage and on March 3, 1992, successfully established his paternity of Taylor, born February 18, 1989. Almost one year later, on February 23, 1993, the court adopted a negotiated support agreement that delineated the rights and obligations of the parties and specifically provided for Nielsen to pay past support of $15,000 to Meeker on or before April 1, 1993.

Thereafter, on August 3, 1993, Meeker filed a motion to show cause, alleging an $11,500 deficiency on the past support obligation and seeking interest and a current support arrearage of $1,700. Almost two years later, on March 15, 1995, the court finally held a hearing on that motion and journalized its order, from which Meeker now appeals and assigns five errors for our review.

The first assignment of error states:

I

"The juvenile court abused its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence proffered exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, & 7 of appellant as these exhibits were relevant to the issues relating to the payment of child support, imposition of penalties, from an award of attorney fees and interest."

Meeker argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it did not allow her to introduce certain exhibits on the issue of Nielsen's financial condition and his ability to pay the $15,000 past support obligation, attorney fees, and interest.

Nielsen contends that since he did not raise the ability to pay in defense against the motion to show cause, the trial court properly precluded admission of these exhibits.

Thus, the issue for our review is whether the trial court properly excluded these exhibits.

We begin our analysis with an examination of Evid.R. 401, which defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Evid.R. 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible * * *. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."

The trial court is vested with the sound discretion to rule on the admission or exclusion of evidence based upon relevance, and these rulings will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Renfro v. Black (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 27, 556 N.E.2d 150. The term "abuse of discretion" connotes more than an error of law or judgment. It implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 482, 450 N.E.2d 1140, 1142.

In this instance, the record indicates that the evidence which Meeker sought to introduce included a picture of Nielsen's house in South Dakota, a deed to Nielsen's house in Colorado, various checks drawn on Nielsen's checking account, and individual and corporate federal income tax returns for Nielsen and his veterinary practice. While these exhibits may be probative of Nielsen's ability to pay, the matter considered by the court concerned satisfaction of a substantial portion of the $15,000 support obligation, which was resolved without these exhibits. The admission of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the record does not indicate that the court's attitude here in ruling on these exhibits was arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. Hence we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding these exhibits. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.

Appellant's second and third assignment of error have a common basis in law and fact and therefore we consider them together. They state:

II

"The juvenile court abused its discretion and ruled against the manifest weight of the evidence in not finding appellee in contempt of court for failing to pay current support timely through child support enforcement agency."

III

"The trial court abused its discretion and ruled against the manifest weight of the evidence in not finding the appellee in contempt of court for his failure to pay in full the fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00) before April 1, 1993."

Meeker contends that the court abused its discretion by failing to find Nielsen in contempt of court in two instances: first, for failing to make support payments for January, February and March 1995, and, second, for failing to pay $15,000 by April 1, 1993 in accordance with the prior agreed judgment entry.

Nielsen maintains that he should not have been held in contempt of court because his support payments were current as of the date of the hearing and, further, that he had loaned Meeker $8,500, which should have been set off against the balance due on the $15,000 payment.

The issue then for our consideration is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not finding Nielsen in contempt of court in both instances.

We begin our analysis with a consideration of R.C. 2705.02, which concerns contempt of court and specifically provides:

"A person guilty of the following acts may be punished as for a contempt:

"(A) Disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a court or an officer."

A prima facie case of civil contempt is made by establishing a prior court order and evidence of nonpayment according to its terms. See Rossen...