Niernberg, by Niernberg v. Gavin
Decision Date | 30 October 1950 |
Docket Number | No. 16559,16559 |
Citation | 123 Colo. 1,224 P.2d 215 |
Parties | NIERNBERG, by NIERNBERG et al. v. GAVIN. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Walter F. Scherer, Denver, for plaintiffs in error.
Pershing, Bosworth, Dick & Dawson, Winston S. Howard, and Arthur K. Underwood, Jr., all of Denver, for defendant in error.
This is an action for damages resulting from injuries suffered by six-year-old plaintiffMichael Niernberg on premises of defendant Gavin.The record discloses that at the time of the accident defendant was engaged in cleaning a fifty-gallon steel tar barrel.For that purpose he stood the barrel on its open end close to the rear line of a vacant lot owned by him, raised one side of the barrel by use of pieces of wood so that it stood at an angle and built a fire under it for the purpose of melting the tar.Plaintiff Michael and two young companions, who had been playing in the adjacent alley, were attracted by the tar which was flowing from the barrel and busied themselves dipping sticks in it for the purpose of making torches.While so engaged Michael either stumbled or lost his balance and stuck his hand in the hot tar, causing the injuries here involved.The evidence is undisputed that defendant stood near the barrel, saw the children playing, and repeatedly ordered them to go away, and that he'kicked the fire out' before plaintiff's injury.
By stipulation, the case was tried to the court and, after plaintiffs had completed the presentation of their evidence, defendant moved for judgment on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to prove a claim.The motion was sustained and judgment of dismissal entered, to which error is here specified.
It first is contended that the evidence established an attractive nuisance.In this we think counsel is mistaken.Among other reasons, as said in King v. Simons Brick Co., 52 Cal.App.2d 586, 126 P.2d 627, 629, 'It is only in those cases where a dangerous trap on premises otherwise safe is concealed from view or when an artificial device, attractice to children, is left exposed and upon premises accessible, open and unguarded that the owner is liable for damages resulting by reason of injuries to children who are attracted to the premises by such contrivances.'See, also, Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co., 112 Ind.App. 170, 44 N.E.2d 184;Schock v. Ringling Bros., etc., 5 Wash.2d 599, 105 P.2d 838.In the present case no trap or unguarded device is involved.However, this question appears to be academic, since the attractive-nuisance doctrine is only an exception to the general rule limiting the liability of landowners as to trespassers, and, as we have held in Krause v. Watson Brothers Transp. Co., 119 Colo. 73, 200 P.2d[123 Colo. 4] 387, without recourse to that doctrine the owner of premises is liable for injuries resulting from active negligence to trespassers whose presence is known, or in the...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 7-day Trial
-
S.W. v. Towers Boat Club, Inc.
...other requirement of the doctrine was not met. ¶ 35 In Niernberg, this court explained that the attractive nuisance doctrine is “an exception to the general rule limiting the liability of landowners as to trespassers.”
123 Colo. at 3–4, 224 P.2d at 216(emphasis added). Although this court ultimately did not apply the doctrine in that case, our reasoning began with the premise that the doctrine applies only to child trespassers who are attracted onto the premises by a “dangerousin that case, our reasoning began with the premise that the doctrine applies only to child trespassers who are attracted onto the premises by a “dangerous trap” or “artificial device” that is left “open and unguarded.” Seeid. at 3, 224 P.2d at 216. In that case, undisputed evidence established that the landowner had seen the child plaintiff playing near the tar barrel that the landowner was cleaning, and that he repeatedly warned and attempted to protect the child from the hot tarestablished that the landowner had seen the child plaintiff playing near the tar barrel that the landowner was cleaning, and that he repeatedly warned and attempted to protect the child from the hot tar that ultimately injured him. Id. at 2–3, 224 P.2d at 215–16. Under those facts, this court did not apply the attractive nuisance doctrine. Instead, it relied on the principle that a landowner is liable for injuries resulting from “active negligence to trespassers whose presence is known ”... -
SW v. Towers Boat Club, Inc.
...plaintiffs' argument, the supreme court has explicitly stated that “the attractive-nuisance doctrine is only an exception to the general rule limiting the liability of landowners as to [child] trespassers.”
Niernberg v. Gavin, 123 Colo. 1, 3, 224 P.2d 215, 216 (1950)(emphasis added). ¶ 26 Recognizing the continued vitality of that rule is consistent with the legislature's intent. As the supreme court stated in Gallegos, by amending the premises liability statute to “re-link a... -
Rubens v. Pember
...drawn from the evidence as it stood at the close of the plaintiffs' case, then we cannot interfere with the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Blair v. Blair, 144 Colo. 442, 357 P.2d 84;
Niernberg v. Gavin, 123 Colo. 1, 224 P.2d 215.' (Emphasis It is also a well-established rule that unless a reviewing court can state that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to compel a contrary determination,... -
People v. STOORMAN
...conclusions to be drawn from the evidence as it stood at the close of the plaintiffs' case, then we cannot interfere with the findings and conclusions of the trial court," citing Blair v. Blair, 144 Colo. 442, 357 P.2d 84 (1960);
Niernberg v. Gavin, 123 Colo. 1, 224 P.2d 215 (1950). Complainant's burden in disciplinary cases against an attorney is proof by clear and convincing evidence. C.R.C.P. 251.18(d). Clear and convincing evidence is proof persuading the trier of fact...
-
Disciplinary Opinions
...evidence as it stood at the close of the plaintiffs' case, then we cannot interfere with the findings and conclusions of the trial court," citing Blair v. Blair, 144 Colo. 442, 357 P.2d 84 (1960); Niernberg v. Gavin, 123 Colo. 1,
224 P.2d 215(1950). Complainant's burden in disciplinary cases against an attorney is proof by clear and convincing evidence. C.R.C.P. 251.18(d). Clear and convincing evidence is proof persuading the trier of fact that contentions a party... -
The Landowners' Liability Statute
...P.2d 952 (1964); Hayko v. Colorado & Utah Coal Co., 77 Colo. 143, 235 P. 373 (1925). 8. Staley, supra, note 6; Kopplekom v. Colorado Cement Pipe Co., 16 Colo.App. 274, 64 P. 1047 (1901); Niernberg v. Gavin,
123 Colo. 1, 224 P.2d 215 (1950); Hayko, supra, note 7; Phipps v. Mitze, 116 Colo. 288, 180 P.2d 233 (1947). 9. Supra, note 4 at 412-13. 10. Supra, note 4 at 412-15. 11. Id.; Lunt v. Post Printing...