Nieskes & Craig, Inc. v. Schoonerman

• Decision Date: 02 November 1972
• Citation: Nieskes & Craig, Inc. v. Schoonerman, 337 N.Y.S.2d 750, 40 A.D.2d 931 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972)
• Parties: NIESKES AND CRAIG, INC., Respondent, v. John A. SCHOONERMAN and Sally A. Schoonerman, Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 750

337 N.Y.S.2d 750

40 A.D.2d 931

NIESKES AND CRAIG, INC., Respondent, v. John A. SCHOONERMAN and Sally A. Schoonerman, Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Nov. 2, 1972.

Henry B. Nesbitt, Palmyra, for appellants.

Stephen R. Sirkin, Newark, for respondent.

Before DEL VECCHIO, J.P., and MARSH, WITMER, CARDAMONE and HENRY, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

In April 1969 plaintiff, Nieskes and Craig, Inc., produced one McIntyre as a potential buyer of land owned by the defendants John and Sally Schoonerman. The property was ultimately sold to A.S.C. Realty Corporation for $60,000 in June, 1970. Although negotiations between McIntyre and the defendants had terminated in June, 1969, plaintiff claimed in its complaint that A.S.C. Realty Corp. was a successor in interest to McIntyre and that plaintiff was, therefore, entitled to its brokerage commission from the Schoonermans. Defendants appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion to set aside the jury's verdict for the plaintiff as being contrary to the law and against the weight of the evidence and for judgment for the defendants, or, in the alternative, for a new trial. We conclude that there was no evidence to sustain the jury's verdict and that defendants' motion to set it aside should have been granted, and also that no reason appears in this record to grant plaintiff a new trial. Plainly, a broker cannot be deprived of his commission merely because the actual purchaser takes in another's name (Baum & Sons Inc. v. Educational Alliance, 12 Misc.2d 270, 272--273, 172 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1017; Konner v. Anderson, 32 Misc. 511, 512, 66 N.Y.S. 338, 339). Where a third party does take title to the property in question the burden is on the broker claiming a commission to show that he is the procuring cause of the sale (Salzano v. Pellillo, 4 A.D.2d 789, 790, 165 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552). This record contains only circumstantial evidence, however, that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale. It is undisputed that in June, 1969 the defendants granted an option on the property to one John Rooney, who was represented by another broker. In September, 1969 three months after the termination of negotiations between the Schoonermans and plaintiff's prospective purchaser, McIntyre, McIntyre and Rooney petitioned the local zoning board for a zoning change for a portion of the subject property. Their petition stated that 'petitioners have an option to purchase' the property. In June, 1970 the property was sold by the defendants to A.S.C. Realty, a corporation which was represented at the closing by Rooney. Plaintiff contends that the fact of the joint zoning application in September, 1969 demonstrates that Rooney and McIntyre were in a joint venture in June, 1969 when Rooney acquired his option to purchase the property. Such is the sole evidence on which plaintiff bases its claim. Circumstantial evidence may, of course, support a verdict but such evidence is not sufficient by itself 'where the circumstances give equal...