Nieves v. Standard Dredging Corporation

• Decision Date: 19 December 1945
• Docket Number: No. 4069.,4069.
• Citation: 152 F.2d 719
• Parties: NIEVES et al. v. STANDARD DREDGING CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

152 F.2d 719 (1945)

NIEVES et al. v. STANDARD DREDGING CORPORATION.

No. 4069.

Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

December 19, 1945.

Benjamin Ortiz and Alvaro Ortiz, both of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for appellants.

J. Henri Brown and Enrique Cordova Diaz, both of San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Roger Siddall, of New York City, for appellee.

Before ALBERT LEE STEPHENS, MAHONEY, and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.

MAHONEY, Circuit Judge.

The question before us on this appeal is whether the plaintiffs were "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" so as to entitle them to unpaid wages, liquidated damages and a reasonable attorney's fee and costs under §§ 6, 7 and 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206, 207, 216. There is no dispute as to the findings of fact made by the lower court.

From 1941 to 1943 the defendant, a sub-contractor, carried on dredging operations for a site for a graving dock, entrance channel for same and adjacent waterfront, in Puerca Bay, Puerto Rico, as part of the construction of the United States Naval Base known as Roosevelt Roads. Prior to this dredging work the shores of Puerca Bay were a swampy, almost entirely uninhabited wilderness. The material dredged was deposited ashore by the defendant to make a fill in the naval base. The bay itself had not been used by ships of any kind for the purpose of delivering or receiving merchandise to or from Puerto Rico. The graving dock was an original or new construction which was constructed by the general contractor for the Navy and the dredging operations were the first such operations in this area. The plaintiffs were employed on the dredges, drill boats, general utility launches, and as shore gangs for pipe lines and dikes. They normally slept ashore and had their meals ashore except for lunch on the night shift. Those who were employed in the galley of the dredges consisted of night and day cooks, stewards, mess boys, cook helpers and dishwashers and they had their quarters on the dredges where they slept and took all their meals. Those on each dredge consisted of a mate, second mates, deck hands, deck oilers, engineers and helpers, oilers, handy men, wipers, firemen and galley employees. The mate assisted the leverman and directed and supervised the deckhands who were employed in handling the dredges, making lines fast and letting them go, and doing general work; the second mates had work similar to deckhands; the deck oilers worked on the deck machinery and outside gear; the assistant engineer was engaged below deck operating the engine and supervising the helpers; the oilers assisted the engineers; the handymen at times worked in the engine room as did the wipers; the firemen maintained the fires and kept up the proper head of steam; the stewards took care of stores and supervised the galley generally; the cooks, dishwashers, cooks' helpers and mess boys were concerned with the preparation and serving of the meals; welders and carpenters were also employed on the dredges. Some of the plaintiffs were employed on the drill boats as firemen, oilers, loaders, primers and deckhands. On the launches were a captain and deckhands. Others were shore laborers on the pipe lines.

In answer to the complaint filed by the plaintiffs the defendant asserted that none of them was engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the Act and that, even if they were, they were seamen within the meaning of § 13(a) (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a) (3), and therefore exempt from its benefits. The lower court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs were not engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce but in a new and original construction of a channel and dry dock, neither of which had been in existence prior to this undertaking. It considered it unnecessary to pass on the question as to whether or not any of the plaintiffs were seamen within the meaning of the exemption. On a motion for rehearing the court ruled that since the plaintiffs were engaged in a new construction the navigability or non-navigability of Puerca Bay and its subsequent use in commerce was immaterial.

On appeal the parties submitted the case on briefs. The plaintiffs urge that the lower court was in error in dismissing the complaint and in denying the motion for rehearing.

It is clear that none of the plaintiffs was engaged in the production of goods for commerce. No goods were produced to move in commerce. The dredging operations and work incident to them were not the production of goods as defined in the Act, § 3(i), 29 U.S.C.A. § 203 (i). Nor were any of the plaintiffs engaged in any process or occupation necessary to the production of such goods, § 3 (j). We are concerned here only with the question of whether they were engaged in commerce, § 3(b); whether their activities "are actually in or so closely related to the movement of the commerce as to be a part of it." McLeod v. Threlkeld, 1943, 319 U.S. 491, 497, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 87 L.Ed. 1538. In that case the Supreme Court stated at page 495 of 319 U.S. at page 1250 of 63 S.Ct., 87 L.Ed. 1538: "The test of the Federal Employers' Liability Act 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. that activities so closely related to interstate transportation as to be in practice and legal relation a part thereof are to be considered in that commerce, is applicable to employments `in commerce' under the Fair Labor Standards Act." We do not believe that the activities of any of the plaintiffs were "actually in or so...