Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac Gmc, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. A. 00-1634-A.,CIV. A. 00-1634-A. |
| Citation | 143 F.Supp.2d 535 |
| Parties | Bradley NIGH, Plaintiff, v. KOONS BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. and Household Automotive Finance Corporation, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Alexander Hugo Blankingship, Blankingship & Associates, Alexandria, VA, for Plaintiff.
Arthur Marck Schwartzstein, McLean, VA, John Ogelsby Long, III, Feidler Long Kathan, Alexandria, VA, for Defendants.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. The specific issues before the Court are numerous, but basically present the question of whether the Court can conclude as a matter of law that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims sounding in the Federal Odometer Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Virginia Consumer Protection Act of 1977, breach of contract, fraud, and conversion.
This case involves an individual consumer's transactions with a major automobile dealership in connection with the purchase of a sports utility vehicle, or "truck." The parties contracted to offset the price of the truck with the consumer's trade-in vehicle and to finance the purchase of the truck through the dealership. The consumer visited the dealership on three separate occasions. On the first visit, a dealership representative discussed the consumer's credit terms with the consumer, filled in a retail sales contract, and then had the consumer sign the contract. The dealership then asked the consumer to return for a second visit because the dealership had not been able to obtain financing on the first contract. On the second visit, the contract presented to the consumer required an additional $2,000 down payment. The consumer objected to the increased down payment, but he signed the contract. The dealership then asked the consumer to return for a third visit, explaining that the dealership had to remove an erroneous charge from the contract. The consumer signed the contract with the removed charge. The consumer never paid the additional $2,000 down payment. Instead, the consumer brought suit against the dealership, alleging that the dealership violated several federal statutes, the laws of contract, and the laws against fraud in connection with the signing of the three sales contracts. Among the consumers claims are that the dealership did not provide the consumer with a copy of his credit terms before he signed the sales contracts so that he could shop for better lending rates; the dealership failed to disclose that the truck had a defective odometer; the dealership made a misrepresentation as to whether the truck had been in an accident; the dealership miscalculated his annual percentage rate, finance charges, amount financed, and sales taxes; the dealer incorrectly transferred title to the truck; and the dealer charged him for items that he did not receive.
For the reasons stated below, the Court finds most of the consumer's claims to be without merit; however, a small number of claims remain for the trier of fact.
Plaintiff Bradley Nigh went to Defendant Koons, Buick, Pontiac, GMC, Inc.'s automobile dealership located in Alexandria, Virginia on February 4, 2000 to buy a vehicle. Nigh met with Koons' salesperson John Sherman about purchasing a 1997 Chevrolet Blazer ("Truck"). When Nigh expressed interest in purchasing the Truck, Mr. Sherman directed Nigh to Koons' finance manager. No Koons representative had disclosed the price of the Truck before Nigh met with the finance manager. The finance manager disclosed the terms of the deal to Nigh and inserted the terms onto a retail installment sales contract ("RISC"). As part of the deal, Nigh was going to trade-in his Dodge Dakota in order to get a decreased price on the Truck. He provided Koons an estimate of $7,500 on the remaining balance on the loan on the Dakota. Also, Nigh was going to permit Koons to arrange financing for the truck. The RISC provided that the sale of the truck was conditioned upon approval by a lender of the terms listed on the RISC. (Compl., Ex. A.) If the RISC was not approved under the terms agreed upon by Nigh and Koons, Nigh could return the Truck, cancel the sale, and get back his down payment. The RISC listed a down payment of $4,000.
With all of the terms in place on the RISC, the finance manager directed Nigh to sign the contract to complete the sale. Nigh signed the contract. Koons did not complete a Buyer's Order as part of the paperwork to settle the purchase transaction. During the settlement of the sales contract, Koons completed Odometer Disclosure Statements ("ODS"). Koons omitted information from the ODS, such as the identity of the person completing the documents and the signature of a Koons representative. Nigh signed all of the documents presented to him and drove the Truck off the lot.
Approximately two weeks later, Koons contacted Nigh and informed him that they had "a better deal." Koons asked Nigh to return to the dealership to sign a new contract. Defendant had been unable to find a lender to finance the transaction on the terms of the February 4, 2000 sales contract ("RISC 1"). Koons drafted new terms and was able to find a lender. Koons presented this new RISC ("RISC 2") to Nigh when he returned to the dealership on February 25, 2000. Koons informed Nigh before he signed RISC 2 that he would have a better interest rate, that his payments would decrease by $70 a month, and that he would have to pay an additional $2,000 down payment. Nigh informed Koons that he did not have $2,000, and that he wanted to just cancel the deal. He asked that his Dodge Dakota be returned. Koons responded that Nigh could not have the Dakota back because Koons sold it. Nigh opted to sign a promissory note obligating him to pay Koons an additional $2,000 rather than be without a vehicle.
Nigh's next contact with Koons was precipitated by a phone call to Nigh's brother. Nigh asserts that his brother informed him that Koons called and said that Nigh needed to return to the dealership to sign a new contract, or else Koons would report the Truck as stolen. Nigh returned to Koons on March 5, 2000, but he did not mention to anyone the issue of reporting the vehicle as stolen. Koons presented new paperwork to Nigh, which indicated a decrease of his monthly payments by $18 a month. Koons had removed a charge for a "silencer" that had been listed on RISC 2, but that had not been contracted for and had not been installed. Nigh signed the new RISC ("RISC 3"), and again drove the Truck home.
Later, Koons contacted Nigh and informed him that Nigh owed Koons an additional $1,959.73 to pay off the lien on his trade-in vehicle. The amount owed on the Dodge Dakota was in excess of the $7,500 estimate that Nigh provided, and Koons had to pay a repossession and storage charge to regain possession of the Dakota. Nigh has not paid the $1,959.73 or made any payments on the $2,000 promissory note. Nigh sues Koons for the manner in which it conducted the sales transactions for his purchase of the Truck. Koons counterclaims for the amounts owed Koons on the promissory note and owed for the payment on the trade-in lien.
As an initial matter, Nigh clarifies that he can prove damages without the assistance of an expert. Under the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") and the Federal Odometer Act ("FOA"), Nigh seeks statutory damages. No expert is necessary to prove the statutory amount. The bases for damages for the Virginia Consumer Protection Act ("VCPA"), breach of contract, fraud, and conversion claims are established by the documents submitted by the parties.
In Count 1 of his Complaint, Nigh alleges several violations of the Federal Odometer Act. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 32701 et seq. (West 1999 & Supp.2000). Nigh alleges that the Odometer Disclosure Statement was not signed, bears the wrong date, and indicates the wrong mileage. In addition, Nigh asserts that Koons violated the FOA by failing to document the Truck's mileage on the actual date of sale, February 25, 2000. Nigh also alleges that the Truck's odometer was altered, and that Koons should have disclosed this fact.
In Count 2, Nigh alleges several violations of the Truth in Lending Act with respect to the first sales contract (RISC 1). See Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., (commonly known as the Truth in Lending Act), as implemented by Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226. First, Koons violated TILA by failing to make meaningful and accurate disclosures prior to the consummation of the sales transaction for Truck. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. Second, Koons failed to disclose an increase of the cost of the Truck because of a discount withheld by the lender. Third, Koons failed to disclose that it was collecting a yield spread premium. Fourth, Koons failed to disclose its $289 processing fee as a finance charge. Fifth, Koons failed to indicate that certain figures on the RISC were estimates.
In Count 3, Nigh alleges that Koons violated TILA in several respects as to the second sales contract (RISC 2). Again, Nigh asserts that Koons failed to make timely disclosures prior to consummation of the sales contract, failed to disclose the discount and yield spread premium, and disclosed an inaccurate finance charge with regard to the processing fee. Nigh also claims that Koons improperly calculated the sales tax on RISC 2. In addition, Nigh asserts that Koons charged Nigh $965 on RISC 2 for a "Silencer" that Koons never installed. Nigh argues that these miscalculations changed the amount financed, the finance charge, total number of payments, total sales price, and the annual percentage rate.
In Count 4, Nigh alleges TILA violations with regard to...
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