Nijensohn v. Ring
| Decision Date | 08 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-159 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Zev D. Nijensohn v. Michael J. Ring, Esq. & Highland Realty Trust, LLC |
On Appeal from Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division Mary Miles Teachout, J.
Russell D. Barr and Chandler W. Matson of Barr Law Group Stowe, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
William F. Grigas of Stackpole & French Law Offices Stowe, for Defendant-Appellee Ring.
Christopher D. Roy of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellee Highland Realty Trust LLC.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll and Cohen, JJ., and Howard, Supr. J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned
¶ 1. This appeal involves a dispute over the sale of real property in Vermont arising out of an ongoing divorce proceeding in Massachusetts. In dividing the divorcing parties' assets, the Massachusetts court ordered a special master to sell the Vermont property. After the sale, plaintiff filed an action in the civil division of Vermont superior court to rescind the sale and quiet title to the property. Applying the doctrine of comity, the civil division dismissed his action, deferring to the ongoing proceeding in Massachusetts. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the civil division should not have dismissed his suit on comity grounds because the Massachusetts court lacked jurisdiction to order the special master to sell the property. We conclude that the civil division acted within its discretion and affirm.
¶ 2. We begin by recounting the procedural history of the Massachusetts divorce proceeding and related actions filed in Vermont. In 2017, plaintiff's wife filed for divorce in Massachusetts. The couple owned a second home in Stowe, Vermont. In 2018, the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court appointed a special master, Attorney Michael Ring, and authorized him to "perform all acts necessary to facilitate the listing and sale" of the property. The Massachusetts court ordered each party to fully cooperate with the sale process suggested by Attorney Ring.
¶ 3. After the divorce trial, in February 2019, the Massachusetts family court ordered Attorney Ring to "immediately engage the services of a real estate agent of his choosing in Vermont" to list the property for sale. This order gave Attorney Ring the power to sign agreements, set the listing price, negotiate, accept offers, and sign the purchase and sale agreement. The order also required the parties to "fully and promptly cooperate" with Attorney Ring.
¶ 4. In August 2019, the Massachusetts family court issued a divorce decree nisi that required the "previously ordered sale process" for the property to "continue until the real estate is sold" and ordered the parties to continue cooperating with Attorney Ring to facilitate the sale. Subsequently, plaintiff appealed several of the court's rulings, including the divorce decree.
¶ 5. In the interim, Attorney Ring filed a petition in the family division of Vermont superior court, asking the court to domesticate the orders of the Massachusetts family court and recognize his authority to sell the property. Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss, explaining that his Massachusetts appeal meant that the orders were not final and therefore not entitled to recognition in Vermont under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1 (). The family division agreed and dismissed the petition in January 2020.
¶ 6. Back in Massachusetts, plaintiff filed a motion in the Massachusetts Appeals Court to stay the sale of the property pending appeal. The court denied the motion in May 2020, concluding that plaintiff had failed to show irreparable harm and that his likelihood of success on the merits, as well as the potential harm to his wife, weighed against granting the motion.
¶ 7. Shortly thereafter, the Massachusetts family court issued a contempt order against plaintiff. The order stated that the appeals court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a stay "provides an opportunity for Attorney Ring to again seek certification of this authority to convey the parties' real estate in Vermont, all as had been previously ordered by this Court." The order further stated that if the parties failed to sign the sale documents, "Attorney Ring has full authority to effect conveyance to a bona fide third-party purchaser of the parties' Vermont real estate."
¶ 8. In September 2020, Attorney Ring entered into an agreement with a buyer, Highland Realty Trust LLC, to purchase the Stowe property. As part of the sale, the parties agreed to hold back $100, 000 in escrow, half of which was to be released upon a final, non-appealable divorce decree, or all released upon the delivery of a deed signed by both plaintiff and his wife. Without this deed, the remaining $50, 000 was to be used "to reimburse the buyer for any actual costs incurred and attorney's fees to defend any action by the seller(s)." The agreement also provided that the transaction was "subject to and conditioned upon the issuance by the Lamoille Superior Court of the entry of a decree for incorporating a foreign judgment." Attorney Ring asked the divorcing parties to agree to the sale and sign the deed. Plaintiff's wife agreed to sell the property, but plaintiff did not respond. Despite plaintiff's unwillingness to cooperate, Highland Realty accepted a deed from Attorney Ring along with an affidavit attesting to his authority from the Massachusetts family court.
¶ 9. In January 2021, plaintiff filed the instant action in the civil division of Vermont superior court against Attorney Ring and Highland Realty. He alleged that Attorney Ring lacked authority to sell the property to Highland Realty and asked the court to rescind the contract, quiet title, and hold Attorney Ring in contempt for failure to follow the Vermont family division's order dismissing Attorney Ring's petition for domestication. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. .
¶ 10. The civil division held a hearing in March 2021. Counsel for Attorney Ring argued that the court should dismiss the case because the property was marital property within Massachusetts's jurisdiction and thus Vermont courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, counsel for Highland Realty argued that the Vermont court should defer to the Massachusetts proceeding as a matter of comity. Plaintiff's counsel maintained that Vermont courts have jurisdiction over real property located within the state and that Attorney Ring should not have sold the property until his appeal in Massachusetts was resolved and a final order could be domesticated in Vermont recognizing his authority. When the civil division asked plaintiff's counsel why he did not bring this action in Massachusetts, he explained that the sale was a Vermont transaction involving Vermont property and that he didn't believe that "going to Massachusetts to try to change that order would have any impact on what happens here in Vermont."
¶ 11. The civil division granted defendants' motions to dismiss. While the civil division determined that it had jurisdiction to quiet title to Vermont property, it concluded that consistent with the principles of comity, under which a court may recognize or defer to the acts of another jurisdiction, it would dismiss the complaint to avoid interfering with the pending action in Massachusetts. Plaintiff moved to reconsider, arguing that comity was inappropriately applied, and the civil division declined to disturb its judgment.
¶ 12. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the civil division erred by dismissing his case on comity grounds. He contends that because the property is located in Vermont, the Massachusetts court lacked jurisdiction to order Attorney Ring to directly convey the property, relying principally on Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1909) (). As a result, plaintiff argues, the civil division erroneously deferred to the Massachusetts proceeding under principles of comity.
¶ 13. Comity principles may apply when multiple courts have jurisdiction over the same dispute. The doctrine "teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter." Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005) (quotation omitted); see also Cavallari v Martin, 169 Vt. 210, 215, 732 A.2d 739, 743 (1999) ("[I]n appropriate circumstances, principles of comity can provide a[] . . . basis for nonintervention by a Vermont court in a dispute that has already come before some other forum."). Under this doctrine, courts have discretion to stay or dismiss a proceeding if "an action concerning the same parties and the same subject matter has been commenced in another jurisdiction capable of granting prompt and complete justice." Angelopoulus v. Angelopoulus, 2 N.E.3d 688, 695 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 86 cmt. b (1969) ( that "where it is clear that plaintiff can secure all the relief to which [they are] entitled in the first action . . . courts will frequently, in their discretion, grant a stay of the second action pending the outcome of the first"). We have explained that comity "is designed to foster cooperation among the states, preclude forum shopping, avoid multiple or inconsistent judgments, and promote...
To continue reading
Request your trial