Niles v. Niles
| Decision Date | 30 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 6022,6022 |
| Citation | 546 A.2d 329,15 Conn.App. 718 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Beatrice F. NILES v. Richard B. NILES. |
George J. Bradford, with whom were William Citti and, on the brief, Maria T. Tomasky, Westport, for appellant (plaintiff).
Richard B. Niles, pro se.
Before DALY, EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL and FOTI, JJ.
The plaintiff wife appeals from a post-judgment order in a dissolution action, which awarded the defendant husband interest on his share of the proceeds of the sale of the marital home. The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred (1) in not applying the doctrine of res judicata to deny interest, and (2) in applying General Statutes §§ 52-350f and 37-1 to a "family judgment." We find no error.
The parties previously appeared before this court in Niles v. Niles, 9 Conn.App. 240, 518 A.2d 932 (1986), the details of which will not be repeated here. It is sufficient for purposes of the present appeal to state that the parties' marital home was sold on February 25, 1985, and that, by judgment rendered on August 9, 1985, the defendant became entitled to $67,816.65 as his share of the proceeds. The trial court's judgment was affirmed in Niles v. Niles, supra, on December 9, 1986. The plaintiff failed to pay the defendant his share until February 2, 1987, and then only after a motion had been filed to compel her to do so.
The defendant again returned to court seeking post-judgment interest on the $67,861.65, to which he claimed entitlement from August 9, 1985, the date of the original judgment. The trial court agreed with the defendant and awarded postjudgment interest in the amount of $8952.83, for the period commencing August 9, 1985, plus further interest at a per diem rate of $14.87 from April 3, 1987, the date the motion was heard, until the date of payment of such interest.
The plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of res judicata to prevent the award of postjudgment interest. Under this doctrine, a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction precludes the relitigation of all relevant claims which were litigated or which might have been litigated in the initial action. Ven Nguyen v. DaSilva, 10 Conn.App. 527, 531, 523 A.2d 1369 (1987). When this matter was before the trial court on August 9, 1985, only the question of prejudgment interest was litigated. The matter of postjudgment interest was not before the court, as it could not have been presumed that the plaintiff would fail promptly to remit to the defendant his share of the sales proceeds, in light of the trial court's judgment stating the defendant was so entitled. We therefore conclude that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the trial court's award of postjudgment interest, as that matter had not and could not previously have been litigated.
The plaintiff next claims that the trial court erred in holding that interest may be awarded on the marital home sale proceeds which the plaintiff contends derived from a "family judgment." We assume that the plaintiff, by the use of that term, intends to refer to "family support judgments." For purposes of postjudgment procedures, that term is defined in General Statutes § 52-350a(7) as "a judgment, order or decree of the superior court for payment of a legal obligation for support or alimony to a spouse, former spouse or child and includes any such order for periodic payments whether issued pendente lite or otherwise." There is no statutory definition of the term "family judgment" used by the plaintiff.
The defendant, on the other hand, argues that the judgment in question was not a family support judgment, but rather constituted a "money judgment," as defined in the pertinent part of § 52-350a(13) as "a judgment, order or...
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Dougan v. Dougan, No. 28711.
...the due date of the payment. Indeed, this recognition is routine in courts' determination of interest. See, e.g., Niles v. Niles, 15 Conn.App. 718, 721, 546 A.2d 329 (1988) (imposing interest for time period in which plaintiff had "use of the money" to which defendant was 3. Indeed, one cou......
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Blake v. Blake
...when the decision is read as a whole it is clear that the court considered it as a division of property; (2) under Niles v. Niles, 15 Conn.App. 718, 546 A.2d 329 (1988), interest is authorized; (3) the phrase "final payment" is ambiguous and, since the defendant did not testify "the court i......
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DeMatteo v. DeMatteo
...in a separation agreement also does not undermine the authority of the court to make an award of interest. See Niles v. Niles, 15 Conn.App. 718, 727, 546 A.2d 329 (1988); LaBow v. LaBow, The trial court here found that the "unjustified refusal of the defendant to endorse the checks" would h......
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Bruno v. Comm'r
...judgment." Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 52-350a(13) (2016); Profetto v. Lombardi, 137 A.3d 922, 924 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016); Niles v. Niles, 546 A.2d 329, 330 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988). Accordingly, Connecticut courts order interest on the unpaid amount of a judgment in a domestic action, as the divorce......
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Survey of 1989 Developments in Connecticut Family Law
...legislative commissioner's office. 91. Blake I, 207 Conn. 217, 541 A.2d 1201 (1988). 92. The trial court relied upon Niles v. Niles, 15 Conn. App. 718, 546 A.2d 329 (1988), which the Supreme Court expressly approved. 93. 17 Conn. App. 544,544 A.2d 763 (1989). 94. Id. at 54 (citations omitte......
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Survey of 1990 Developments in Connecticut Family Law
...superior court pursuant to the general statutes. 112. 211 Conn. 485, 580 A.2d 398 (1989). 113. Id. at 499. See also, Niles v. Niles, 15 Conn. App. 718 721 548 A.2d 329 114. LaBow and Kronholm preceded Blake which preceded DeMatteo which failed to cite Blake or Conn. GEN. STAT. § 52-350a and......