Nine State Street v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Bridgeport, 270 Conn. 42 (CT 7/6/2004), (SC 17110).

• Decision Date: 06 July 2004
• Docket Number: (SC 17110).
• Citation: 270 Conn. 42
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NINE STATE STREET, LLC, <I>v.</I> PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF BRIDGEPORT ET AL.

Page 42

270 Conn. 42

NINE STATE STREET, LLC,v.

PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF BRIDGEPORT ET AL.

(SC 17110).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 14, 2004.

Officially released July 6, 2004.

Syllabus

Pursuant to statute (§ 8-8 [b]), an appeal by any person aggrieved by a decision of a planning and zoning commission "shall be commenced by service of process ... within fifteen days from the date that notice of the decision was published ...."

The plaintiff, who had filed an application for a special permit to construct and operate an asphalt production facility, sought to appeal to the trial court from the defendant planning and zoning commission's denial of that application. The commission had published notice of its decision on May 10, 1998, and the plaintiff served notice on the chairman and clerk of the commission and on the city clerk on May 26, 1998, the day after Memorial Day. The trial court, concluding that process was not served within fifteen days of publication of the commission's decision in accordance with § 8-8(b), sua sponte, dismissed the plaintiff's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. From the judgment of dismissal, the plaintiff appealed, claiming that because the fifteenth day fell on Memorial Day, a legal holiday, service of process on the sixteenth day constituted sufficient compliance with § 8-8 (b). Held that the trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiff's zoning appeal was untimely; in light of the clear statutory (§ 8-8 [p]) directives that an appeal from a planning and zoning commission "shall be considered to be a civil action," and that the right of a person to appeal and the procedure prescribed "shall be liberally interpreted in any case where a strict adherence to these provisions would work surprise or injustice," this court declined to interpret § 8-8 (b) as shortening the legislatively prescribed time period within which the plaintiff must serve process on the commission and the municipality, when the fifteenth day falls on a day when municipal offices are closed, when to do so would deny the plaintiff any remedy and leave it without recourse for what might be an otherwise meritorious appeal.

Procedural History

Appeal from a decision by the named defendant denying the plaintiff's applications for a special permit and coastal site plan, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Stodolink, J., granted the plaintiff's motion to cite in Seaside Village Homes, Inc., et al., as additional defendants; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court, Owens, J.; judgment dismissing the plaintiff's appeal, from which the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed. Reversed; further proceedings.

Robert G. Golger, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Barbara Brazzel-Massaro, associate city attorney, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Elliott B. Pollack, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher J. Smith, for the appellees (intervening defendant Seaside Village Homes, Inc., et al.).

Borden, Katz, Vertefeuille, Zarella and Leavitt, Js.

Opinion

KATZ, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the fifteen day statutory period for commencing a zoning appeal may be extended when the fifteenth day falls on a legal holiday. The plaintiff, Nine State Street, LLC appeals¹ from the judgment of the trial court dismissing its zoning appeal from the named defendant, the planning and zoning commission of the city of Bridgeport (commission),² for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that its zoning appeal was untimely because service of process had not been made within the fifteen day period prescribed by General Statutes § 8-8 (b).³ Specifically, the plaintiff contends that, in the present case, because the fifteenth day fell on Memorial Day, a legal holiday, service of process on the sixteenth day constituted sufficient compliance with the statute. We agree and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed factual and procedural background. In 1998, the plaintiff applied to the commission for a special permit to construct and operate an asphalt production facility. After conducting several public hearings, the commission denied the plaintiff's request. On May 10, 1998, the commission published a public notice of its decision in a newspaper having a general circulation in the municipality. Sixteen days later, on Tuesday, May 26, the day after Memorial Day, the plaintiff served an appeal upon the chairman and clerk of the commission and upon the city clerk. Because process was not served within fifteen days of publication of the commission's decision, as required by § 8-8 (b), the trial court, sua sponte, dismissed the plaintiff's zoning appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the timeliness of a zoning appeal is governed by principles applicable to civil actions generally. Applying these principles, the plaintiff therefore claims that service of process on May 26, the sixteenth day, was timely because the fifteenth day fell on a legal holiday, when municipal offices are not required to be open. The defendants contend, in response, that common-law principles are inapplicable in the present case because zoning appeals, like other administrative appeals, are subject to strict statutory filing requirements. The defendants therefore contend that the statutory fifteen day period, set forth in § 8-8 (b), cannot be extended when the fifteenth day falls on a legal holiday. We agree with the plaintiff.

"As a threshold matter, we address our standard of review. We have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alliance Energy Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Board, 262 Conn. 393, 398, 815 A.2d 105 (2003). "A brief overview of the statutory scheme that governs administrative appeals, including land use appeals, is necessary to our resolution of this issue. There is no absolute right of appeal to the courts from a decision of an administrative agency. . . . Appeals to the courts from administrative [agencies] exist only under statutory authority . . . . Appellate jurisdiction is derived from the . . . statutory provisions by which it is created, and can be acquired and exercised only in the manner prescribed. . . . In the absence of statutory authority, therefore, there is no right of appeal from a planning commission's decision . . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 611-12, 793 A.2d 215 (2002).

We note, at the outset, that the plaintiff's claim raises an issue of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, we begin with our well established principles of statutory construction. Our legislature recently has enacted No. 03-154, § 1, of the 2003 Public Acts, which provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." In the present case, the relevant statutory text and the relationship of that text to other statutes do not reveal a meaning that is plain and unambiguous. Accordingly, our analysis is not limited and we look to other factors relevant to the inquiry into the meaning of § 8-8, including its legislative history and the circumstances surrounding its enactment and its purpose.

Section 8-8 (b) provides in relevant part: "[A]ny person aggrieved by any decision of a board . . . may take an appeal to the superior court for the judicial district in which the municipality is located. The appeal shall be commenced by service of process . . . within fifteen days from the date that notice of the decision was published as required by the general statutes. . . ."

Traditionally, the failure to comply strictly with the provisions of § 8-8 (b) rendered a zoning appeal subject to dismissal. See Spicer v. Zoning Commission, 212 Conn. 375, 378, 562 A.2d 21 (1989). In 1989, however, the legislature amended § 8-8 to include the "savings provisions" of § 8-8 (p) and (q).⁴ See Public Acts 1989, No. 89-356, § 1 (p) and (q). Of particular pertinence in the present case is § 8-8 (p), which provides: "The right of a person to appeal a decision of a board to the Superior Court and the procedure prescribed in this section shall be liberally interpreted in any case where a strict adherence to these provisions would work surprise or injustice. The appeal shall be considered to be a civil action and, except as otherwise required by this section or the rules of the Superior Court, pleadings may be filed, amended or corrected, and parties may be summoned, substituted or otherwise joined, as provided by the general statutes."

The legislative history underlying the 1989 amendments reveals that they were intended to provide "a greater measure of fairness" to persons seeking to appeal from the decisions of local zoning commissions and boards of appeal. See 32 S. Proc., Pt. 12, 1989 Sess., p. 4217, remarks of Senator Richard Blumenthal; see also 32 H.R. Proc., Pt. 25, 1989 Sess., p. 8802, remarks of Representative William L. Wollenberg (endorsing "an easing of burdens as far as going forward in [zoning appeals], a more liberal view of these things"). In light of this legislative intent, and in light of the statute's clear directive that "[t]he appeal shall be considered to be a civil action"; General Statutes § 8-8 (p); we conclude that the timeliness of a zoning appeal may be informed...