Nipper v. Snipes
Decision Date | 21 October 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 92-1371,92-1371 |
Citation | 7 F.3d 415 |
Parties | 38 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 23 Paul W. NIPPER, Jr.; R. Bruce Ford, individually, and as a Beneficiary of the Profit Sharing Plan and Pension Plan of Psychiatric Associates, P.A.; Jeffrey R. Mellom; M. P. Norungolo, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John T. "Ted" SNIPES, Defendant-Appellant, and Diane K. Snipes; Financial Services Advisory, Incorporated, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Larry Dean Estridge, Wyche, Burgess, Freeman & Parham, P.A., Greenville, SC, argued for defendants-appellants.
John Patrick Freeman, Columbia, SC, argued (James R. Gilreath, Greenville, SC, on brief), for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.
This case presents the question of whether judicial findings of fact entered in state court in a different case involving some of the same parties were properly admitted into evidence by the district court. Because we are of opinion that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for a new trial.
This controversy arises out of the civil jury trial of John T. "Ted" Snipes and Diane Snipes on causes of action related to the sale of limited partnership interests in real estate partnerships. The causes of action presented to the jury for its decision included breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, civil RICO violations, constructive fraud, and civil conspiracy. The jury found Mrs. Snipes innocent of any wrongdoing, but held her husband liable on the breach of fiduciary duty and common law fraud causes of action.
During the course of the trial, counsel for the plaintiffs 1 introduced into evidence, over defendants' objection, Plaintiff's Exhibit 20, an order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Greenville County, South Carolina in a case concerning a different real estate partnership and in which Nipper was a plaintiff and Ted Snipes was a defendant. The order included South Carolina Circuit Judge Frank P. McGowan, Jr.'s findings of fact in the case. Portions of the findings of fact were read to the jury by plaintiffs' counsel during the direct examination of plaintiff Nipper. The portions of Judge McGowan's order that plaintiffs' counsel read to the jury repeatedly referred to factual findings of misrepresentations made by Ted Snipes, Snipes's failure to disclose material information, and Snipes's participation in a civil conspiracy, as well as findings that Mrs. Snipes had knowingly filed false affidavits in the case.
Plaintiffs' counsel justifies the introduction of the order by stating that he needed it to establish an ongoing conspiracy for the civil conspiracy causes of action. At the end of the direct examination of Nipper, the district court instructed the jury that the order was admitted only for the purpose of showing a conspiracy involving Ted Snipes, and the court reminded the jurors of the limiting instruction during the jury charge. The jury found for the defendants on the conspiracy causes of action.
On appeal, Snipes argues that, although the civil conspiracy causes of action were found in his favor, the order was inadmissible hearsay, and the admission of the order into evidence and its publication to the jury caused unfair prejudice to him and resulted in his liability on the breach of fiduciary duty and common law fraud causes of action. 2 Plaintiffs argue that the order fits within the public records exception of Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
We note at the outset that Judge McGowan's order, as used in the context of this case, is hearsay evidence, under Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), which is not admissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions mentioned in the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Fed.R.Evid. 802. Rule 803 provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
....
(8) Public Records and Reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth ... (C) in civil actions and proceedings ... factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C). Plaintiffs argue that the order properly was admitted as a public record or report under Rule 803(8)(C). Plaintiffs devote much of their argument to an attempt to show that defendant did not make a showing that the record was not sufficiently trustworthy or authentic. Plaintiffs' arguments assume, however, the very issue in this case, which is whether the order is admissible in any event under Rule 803(8)(C).
Rule 803(8)(C), on its face, does not apply to judicial findings of fact; it applies to "factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law." Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C). A judge in a civil trial is not an investigator, rather a judge. In fact, a review of the advisory committee note to Rule 803 makes plain that the drafters intended this portion of the rule to relate to findings of agencies and offices of the executive branch. See Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 311-313; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F.Supp. 1125, 1185 (E.D.Pa.1980) (). There is not the slightest hint, from either the text of the rule or the advisory committee note, that the rule applies to judicial findings of fact.
We note that at common law a judgment from another case would not be admitted. 5 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 1671a (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1974); 1 McCormick on...
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