Nissley v. JLG Industries, Inc.

• Citation: 452 A.2d 865,306 Pa.Super. 557
• Parties: Mary NISSLEY, Administratrix of the Estate of Russel K. Nissley, deceased, and Mary Nissley, Individually v. JLG INDUSTRIES, INC. and H.J. Williams Co., Inc., and Helgesteel Corporation. Appeal of HELGESTEEL CORPORATION.
• Decision Date: 19 November 1982
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

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452 A.2d 865 306 Pa.Super. 557 Mary NISSLEY, Administratrix of the Estate of Russel K.
Nissley, deceased, and Mary Nissley, Individually
v.
JLG INDUSTRIES, INC. and H.J. Williams Co., Inc., and
Helgesteel Corporation.
Appeal of HELGESTEEL CORPORATION. Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Argued May 10, 1982.
Filed Nov. 19, 1982.

Page 866

[306 Pa.Super. 559] Joel David Smith, Lancaster, for appellant.

David C. Keiter, York, for Nissley, appellees.

Christopher S. Underhill, Lancaster, for JLG, appellee.

Before CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO and HOFFMAN, JJ.

HOFFMAN, Judge:

Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding it subject to jurisdiction pursuant to Pennsylvania's Long-Arm [306 Pa.Super. 560] Statute, 42 PA.C.S.A. §§ 5322(A)(4) AND (B)^{1 2}. Because we find appellant's contacts with Pennsylvania insufficient to establish jurisdiction, we reverse the lower court.

On March 2, 1976, decedent was crushed to death between the basket of a man-lift (cherry picker) he was operating and a steel beam. On August 18, 1977, Mary Nissley, decedent's widow, filed suit against JLG Industries, Inc. (JLG), manufacturer of the man-lift. On March 4, 1980, the lower court granted JLG's petition to join both previous owners of the man-lift, H.J. Williams Co., and appellant, Helgesteel Corporation, as additional defendants. Appellant, a Wisconsin corporation, challenged the complaint alleging lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower court, on December 31, 1980, found appellant subject to Pennsylvania's jurisdiction and pursuant to Pa.R.App.P. 311(b), certified that the question of personal jurisdiction presented a substantial issue of jurisdiction, thus permitting this appeal.

The assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident must fall within the terms of the state long-arm statute and must meet the constitutional standards of due process. Monroeville Land Co., Inc. v. Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp. of Western Pennsylvania, 247 Pa.Superior Ct. 61, 371 A.2d 1326 (1977); Action Industries, Inc. v. Wiedeman, 236 Pa.Superior Ct. 447, 346 A.2d 798 (1975). Because the reach [306 Pa.Super. 561] of the Pennsylvania Long-Arm Statute is "co-extensive with requirements of due process under the Fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution," our controlling consideration here is "whether appellant had sufficient minimum contacts with this forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction permissible." Bev-Mark, Inc. v. Summerfield GMC Truck Co., 268 Pa.Superior Ct. 74, 78, 407 A.2d 443, 445 (1979). Due process

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requires that the defendant have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable in the context of our federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there... [I]t has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there.

Id. at 317, 66 S.Ct. at 158-59. "It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1957). Accordingly, "an essential criterion in all cases is whether the 'quality and nature' of the defendant's activity is such that it is 'reasonable' and 'fair' to require him to conduct his defense in that state." Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1957). This court arrived at a three-part test integrating these due process considerations:

First, the defendant must have purposely availed itself of the privilege of acting...